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In 1794, Pennsylvania adopted a homicide law that other States from Maine to California 
have imitated.1 The result is called the “Pennsylvania pattern.”  It features two degrees of 
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1 See infra authorities cited in note 15.  See also Cal. Penal Code §§ 187-93 (West 2005) (defining two degrees of 
murder and three lesser offenses); Maine Rev. Stat. Ann. § 201, Comment (West 2005) (Maine formerly followed 
the Pennsylvania pattern, with first- and second-degree murder, but eliminated degrees in 1977). 
2murder, first and second, both of which require proof of malice aforethought, and it typically is 
supplemented by lesser included offenses of manslaughter or negligent homicide that vary with 
the jurisdiction.2 The purpose of this Eighteenth-Century legislation was to limit the reach of 
capital punishment, although this function no longer is needed.3 The thesis of this article is that 
the Pennsylvania pattern produces poor crime definition, in spite of its surprising staying power, 
even today, across the country.  The most compelling examples of its deficiencies are probably 
to be found in the homicide jurisprudence of California, and this article therefore concentrates 
heavily on that State; but the concepts developed here apply to every jurisdiction that uses the 
Pennsylvania formulation. 
 One factor that makes California a striking illustration of the Pennsylvania pattern’s 
obsolescence is that the law of California usually innovates.  It stays contemporary, or at least 
this has always been my impression.  California gave us the impetus for Tarasoff  liability, and it 
gave us strict legal controls on city planning.4 Voters in that State have acted forcefully to adopt 
by-the-numbers tax limits, serious restrictions on affirmative action, and tighter treatment of 
probationers.5 The results in some cases have proved less than felicitous,6 but it has always 
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209); John L. v. People, 88 Cal. App. 4th 715 (2001) (upholding certain provisions of Proposition 21, including 
authorization of probation revocation and imposition of “more restrictive custody” with lowered proof standard). 
3seemed to me that California has been willing to change its laws. 
 It is surprising, therefore, that the California law of homicide has remained as stodgy as it 
has.  The reason is that it still conforms to the old-time Pennsylvania pattern of 1794.  It uses 
antiquated definitions and gradations of homicide.7 Decisions that contradict contemporary 
attitudes about the severity of murders remain in place, approved as authority, even though other 
decisions seem to have overruled them sub silentio.8 In fact, California’s murder jurisprudence 
has become so confused under the influence of the Pennsylvania pattern that one can only 
wonder pessimistically at the impression made on jurors who conscientiously try to follow the 
all-over-the-map instructions that result.9 The state legislature has changed a few doctrines 
around the edges,10 but the problem lies deeper:  in fundamental definitions of homicidal crimes 
that, under the Pennsylvania pattern, are based on oxymoron, misnomer, metaphor, and 
disproportion. 
 The reader should not get the impression that I favor California-bashing (or for that 
matter, Pennsylvania-bashing), because I find many aspects of California law to admire.11 But to 
put it bluntly, I think the Pennsylvania pattern is an anachronism, and by way of contrast, I find 
 
6 For example, the aftermath of Tarasoff, see supra note 4, included a proliferation of claims asserting that 
psychotherapists were negligent in failing to predict violence from diffuse and indirect indications.  The legislature 
acted to contain this liability by passing Cal. Civil Code § 43.92 (West 2005), which provides that psychotherapists 
have no duty to warn except when the patient has uttered a “serious threat of physical violence against an 
identifiable victim.”  Even after this legislation, there are dubious suits.  E.g., Calderon v. Glick, 131 Cal. App. 4th 
224, 31 Cal. Rptr. 707 (2005) (rejecting suit prohibited by § 43.92). 
7 See infra Pts. IA, IIA, IIB of this Article. 
8 See infra, e.g., Pt. IB of this Article. 
9 See infra, e.g., Pt. IB2a of this Article. 
10 See infra, e.g., Part IC of this Article. 
11 Compare, e.g., California authorities cited in supra note 2 (limiting city’s regulation of growth to achieve 
compliance with statutes requiring a general plan and adequate housing) with Mayhew v. Town of Sunnyvale, 964 
S.W.2d 234 (Tex. 1994) (holding that zoning change that frustrated investment in housing development was not 
unconstitutional or other illegal, in absence of legislative standards).  Texas permitted a city downzone so as to pull 
the rug out from beneath a landowner who had made enormous investments in a new housing development that was 
lawful under pre-existing provisions.  California law seems, admirably, to limit this result. 
4the homicide law of my State, Texas, preferable in virtually every respect in which it differs.  
Texas revised its Penal Code in 1973 in a way that was heavily influenced by the Model Penal 
Code,12 although it contains important departures from the MPC.  The revision was not pain-free.  
In fact, is was wrenching.13 But today, Texans are governed by murder laws that say what they 
mean, reflect the people’s values, produce crime gradations roughly corresponding to 
blameworthiness, and communicate the rules consistently to judges and jurors.14 
It is not so with the Pennsylvania pattern.15 Admittedly, the doctrines that this article will 
analyze are traditional.16 Some, in fact, come to us from time immemorial, with a patina of 
venerable fondness attached to them.17 Tradition and experience can furnish sound reasons for 
keeping the wisdom of the past.  But imagine a Pennsylvanian traveling to work on the local 
freeway in a horse and buggy, merely because that method of travel happens to be traditional.  
Except perhaps in Amish territory, onlookers rightly would suggest that the traveler should 
consider other alternatives.  So it is here: clumsy crime definition should not control us merely 
because it has been used for a long time. 
 
12 See infra, e.g., Pt. ID of this Article. 
13 The redefinition of virtually every offense led to a large number of wholesale reversals for reasons having nothing 
to do with guilt.  For example, in Day v. State, 532 S.W.2d 302 (Tex. Crim. 1976), a burglary case, the trial court 
did not instruct the jury on the offense of criminal trespass, which the Court of Criminal Appeals held was a lesser 
included offense.  The court’s holding was far from obvious, required an extensive opinion on rehearing, and 
produced two separate dissents and a separate concurrence.  Its effect, however, was widespread and can be inferred 
to have resulted in reversal of every pending burglary case presenting the issue.  Several cases held that indictments 
that apparently were standard forms applicable to many cases were “fundamentally defective” because they did not 
allege particulars of certain kinds, when the Penal Code did not call expressly for those particulars.  E.g., Smith v. 
State, 571 S.W.2d 917 (Tex. Crim. 1978) (ordering dismissal of indictment after conviction because indictment did 
not include certain language of statute that could be assumed to exist under other language, even though jury was 
properly instructed on all elements). 
14 See infra, e.g., Pt. ID of this Article. 
15 Pennsylvania enacted its statute in 1794.  A majority of the States ultimately followed Pennsylvania’s lead.  See 
generally Tom Stacy, Changing Paradigms in the Law of Homicide, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 1007, 1013-14 (2001).  See 
also DAVID CRUMP, ET AL., CRIMINAL LAW: CASES, STATUTES, AND LAWYERING STRATEGIES 32-
33 (2005) (explaining the Pennsylvania pattern). 
16 See infra, e.g., Pt. IA of this Article. 
5This article begins with the most serious homicidal crime in the Pennsylvania pattern.  
Specifically, it examines the statutory distinction between first-and second-degree murder, a 
distinction that produces significant differences in the treatment of convicted murderers but that 
is indeterminate, in many kinds of cases, almost to the point of meaninglessness.18 The article 
then contrasts the Pennsylvania pattern, with an emphasis on its California embodiment, to the 
Model Penal Code, as it is reflected in the Texas murder statute.19 Next, the article considers the 
basic definition of murder under the Pennsylvania pattern, which is expressed in a double 
misnomer and which makes the crime difficult to distinguish from lower degrees of homicide.  
Again, the article compares the Pennsylvania pattern to the different MPC-Texas approach.  
Later sections analyze the Pennsylvania-California and MPC-Texas treatments of voluntary 
manslaughter, involuntary manslaughter, and felony murder.20 A final section contains the 
author’s conclusions, which include the concern that the Pennsylvania pattern of homicide law 
encourages both inappropriate acquittals and inappropriate convictions to a degree that could be 
avoided by revised formulations. 
 Frankly, the scope of this article is ambitious, and maybe there is a danger that it is too 
ambitious. Most articles on homicide tend to confine themselves—sensibly—to single 
jurisdictions or to single concepts.21 But homicide law usually is defined in terms of multiple 
levels of closely-related crimes, and an examination of one offense may not help to expose 
overlaps, confusion, or gaps in overall coverage.  And examination of a single jurisdiction may 
prove less valuable than a comparison of different approaches.  This article therefore undertakes 
 
17 For example, the term “malice aforethought” evolved over several centuries.  See WAYNE R. LAFAVE, 
CRIMINAL LAW § 14.1 (4th ed. 2003) (hereinafter cited as LAFAVE). 
18 See infra Pt. IA-C of this Article. 
19 See infra Pt. ID of this Article. 
20 See infra Pt. II-IV of this Article. 
6a broader analysis.  This is one reason for its emphasis on one Pennsylvania-pattern State 
(California), and it also is the reason the article will not analyze every detail for most homicidal 
crimes (particularly for the felony murder rule).  Still, I hope to say something about the entire 
Pennsylvania pattern, from top to bottom, that will be useful throughout the States that follow it, 
and to suggest concrete solutions to most of the problems that my article will raise. 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT: TWO STATUTORY PATTERNS,  
DIFFERING BOTH IN CONCEPT AND IN ORIGIN 
 Because this article concentrates on two distinct patterns of homicide law, it may be best 
to sketch them first. The California system follows the Pennsylvania pattern. It consists of (1) 
first degree murder, (2) second degree murder, (3) voluntary manslaughter, and (4) lesser 
manslaughters. Murder requires “malice aforethought”: a term of art that includes both 
intentional and unintentional killings. First degree murder also requires premeditation and 
deliberation, while second degree requires only malice. Voluntary manslaughter includes certain 
passion killings, and involuntary manslaughter requires criminal negligence. Felony murder 
suffices for either first-degree or second-degree, depending on the circumstances. This is a broad 
brush depiction, and there are many issues underlying the terminology. 
 The Model Penal Code defines crimes of (1) murder, manslaughter (which may be either 
(2) voluntary or (3) involuntary), and (4) criminally negligent homicide. There is only one degree 
of murder, but it includes some unintended killings. The MPC abolishes malice and defines mens 
rea precisely.  The Texas law of homicide follows the core MPC definitions. There are, however, 
some differences. For example, Texas defines a version of felony murder, whereas the MPC does 
not. Texas also abolishes voluntary manslaughter; the offense remains murder, but under 
specified circumstances, it is subject to a lesser maximum sentence. The effect is conceptually 
 
21 See infra authorities cited in notes 56, 101, 118, 192, 217, 258, 278, 287, 341, 352. 
7similar to retention of voluntary manslaughter, but with subtle differences. And there are further 
changes from the MPC, although its thrust is preserved in Texas.  
 There is a fundamental difference, too, in how the California and Texas systems 
developed.  Although now embodied in statutes, the Pennsylvania pattern and the California 
 approach reflect their common law origins.  Rather than embodying a single plan with grades 
calibrated together like those of the MPC, the Pennsylvania-California structure evolved 
gradually, beginning with one crime, unlawful homicide, then split into murder and 
manslaughter, and then only much later divided murder into degrees.  The difference in their 
origins informs the discussion of the respective homicide schemes. 
I. THE PREMEDITATION-DELIBERATION FORMULA 
 The most serious offense in the Pennsylvania pattern is first-degree murder.  This crime 
is separated from second-degree murder by the premeditation-deliberation formula.  Specifically, 
first-degree murder generally requires a “deliberate” and “premeditated” killing.22 This is a 
historical, traditional formulation, even though it is a creature of statute23 rather than common 
law.  The difference between first- and second-degree murder is significant because in 
California, for example, a first-degree conviction carries a minimum sentence of twenty-five
 
22 See Cal. Penal Code § 189 (West 2005).  See generally LAURIE L. LEVENSON & ALEX RICCIARDULLI, 
CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL LAW § 5:11-5:16 (2d ed. 2005) [hereinafter cited as LEVENSON et al.] (discussing 
this kind of murder). 
23 See LAFAVE § 14.7.  It should be added that the more basic common law concept of malice may have 
incorporated a kind of “premeditation” at its inception, but if so, it was different in both meaning and purpose.  See 
infra note 196. 
8years and can subject the defendant to the death penalty24 or life imprisonment without the 
possibility of parole.25 Second-degree murder, by way of contrast, carries a fifteen-year 
minimum.26 
There are other ways of committing first-degree murder.  The California statute, again 
influenced by Pennsylvania, also includes murder committed by “lying in wait,” “poisons,” and 
certain other kinds of specific means.27 This article will consider these provisions later.  They 
are gap-fillers that indirectly prove the point that the premeditation-deliberation formula is 
inadequate to cover the subject.28 Most first-degree cases, however, still depend upon 
premeditation and deliberation. 
 Evidently, the policy underlying the Pennsylvania pattern is that a single factor 
distinguishes the most serious murders: a mens rea that combines “premeditation” and 
“deliberation.”  One might argue that, in Pennsylvania, the intelligent planner—the kind of 
genteel murderer one meets in an Agatha Christie novel—is the prototype for the worst of the 
worst, although this argument is overly simplistic.  The problem is, the line that Pennsylvania 
draws between first- and second-degree murder is vague, indeterminate, and shifting.  It 
produces arbitrary results.29 Furthermore, by adopting a mens rea of premeditation and 
deliberation as the sole determinant of blameworthiness, the Pennsylvania pattern sometimes 
gets it backward, punishing lesser crimes more severely and depreciating the seriousness of more 
 
24 Capital punishment need not, however, be related to degrees of murder.  It depends, instead, on specific factors 
separate from the murder conviction itself.  See infra note 141 and accompanying text.  Thus, the persistence of the 
Pennsylvania pattern is surprising in light of its initial purpose of restricting capital punishment, a purpose for which 
it no longer is needed.  See supra note 3 and accompanying text. 
25 Cal. Penal Code § 190 (West 2005). 
26 Id. 
27 Cal. Penal Code § 189 (West 2005).  See also infra Pt. IC of this article (analyzing these provisions). 
28 See infra Pt. IC of this Article. 
29 See infra Pt. IB of this Article. 
9blameworthy offenses.30 
It should be added that, by using this top-to-bottom approach and beginning with the 
most serious homicidal crime, this article risks losing sight of the history of the Pennsylvania 
pattern.  In fact, murder existed long before first-degree murder was invented.  Furthermore, 
first-degree murder itself is an old idea.  It dates from the Eighteenth Century, and the California 
statute defining this crime was adopted more than a hundred years before the first of the cases 
that this article will discuss.  But examining the offenses from top to bottom has an 
organizational simplicity to it, and that is why this article uses this approach. 
A. The Search for Meaning:  Premeditation and Deliberation in People v. Anderson 
 The poster case for what is wrong with the premeditation-deliberation formula is the 
California Supreme Court’s decision in People v. Anderson.31 Although Anderson was decided 
during the 1960’s, and has undergone some amount of modification, it still is part of the law 
today.32 The murder in Anderson was particularly brutal.  Ironically, however, the very fact that 
the killing was random, violent, and indiscriminate—factors that, one might think, would have 
aggravated the crime—resulted in exonerating the defendant of first-degree murder.  Thus begins 
our strange journey: with a murder that was random, violent, and indiscriminate, which under the 
Pennsylvania pattern, can become a factor in mitigation.33 
1. The Murder in Anderson 
Anderson lived with a Mrs. Hammond, whose youngest daughter, Victoria, was ten years 
 
30 Cf. notes 65-69 and accompanying text (comparing cases). 
31 447 P.2d 942 (Cal. 1968) (en banc). 
32 See infra Pt. IB2 of this Article. 
33 See infra note 56 and accompanying text. 
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old.34 On the morning of the murder, Mrs. Hammond left for work, leaving Victoria at home 
with the defendant.  Anderson was on his third day in a drinking binge.35 Mrs. Hammond’s son 
Kenneth came home from school in the afternoon and heard sounds like boxes being moved and 
someone cleaning up.  He saw blood on the kitchen floor, and the defendant, dressed only in 
slacks, falsely explained that he had cut himself.36 Mrs. Hammond returned, and the defendant 
explained the blood by telling her that  Kenneth had cut himself.37 When Kenneth denied it, the 
defendant invented a third story: he told Mrs. Hammond that Victoria had cut herself but that the 
cut was not serious.  He further falsely explained that Victoria was at a friend’s for dinner.38 
Kenneth had a “weird” feeling, and so he looked into Victoria’s room.  He found her nude, 
bloody body under some boxes and blankets on the floor and ran out of the room screaming that 
Anderson had killed Victoria.39 
The arresting officer found Anderson’s blood-spotted shorts on a chair in the living room 
and defendant’s socks, with blood encrusted on the soles, in the master bedroom.  The evidence 
established that Victoria’s torn and bloodstained dress had been ripped from her and her clothes, 
including her panties out of which the crotch had been torn, were found in various rooms of the 
house.  There were bloody footprints matching the size of the victim’s leading from the master 
bedroom to Victoria’s room, and there was blood in almost every room, including the kitchen, 
which appeared to have been mopped.40 Over sixty wounds were found on Victoria’s body.  The 
cuts extended all over her, including one from the rectum through the vagina, and including the 
 
34 447 P.2d at 943-44. 
35 Id. at 944-45. 
36 Id. 
37 Id. at 945. 
38 Id. 
39 Id. at 944. 
40 Id. at 945. 
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partial cutting off of her tongue.  Some of the wounds, including the vaginal ones, were post-
mortem.41 
The California Supreme Court defined the issue by saying, “We must, in the absence of 
substantial evidence to support the verdict of first-degree murder, reduce the conviction to 
second-degree murder.”42 The jury had convicted Anderson of first-degree murder and fixed the 
penalty at death.43 Evidently, the jury concluded that infliction of sixty stab wounds on a ten-
year-old child, during the course of activity that involved tearing off her clothes, tearing her 
panties, and chasing her throughout the house while she bled profusely enough to leave 
footprints from one room to the next and blood in nearly every part of the house, was sufficient 
to show a deliberate and premeditated killing.  But the California Supreme Court rejected the 
jury’s seemingly straightforward reasoning and summarized the People’s case as follows:44 
Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the judgment, the first 
degree conviction must rest upon the following supporting proof: when Kenneth 
arrived home from school he found the doors locked, and when the police officers 
arrived to arrest defendant they found the shades in the front room down; 
defendant apparently had attempted to clean up the bloodstained kitchen, and had 
fabricated conflicting explanations of the blood that Kenneth noticed in the 
kitchen, the blood that Victoria's mother observed in the living room, and 
Victoria's absence on the evening of the killing; defendant had stabbed Victoria 
repeatedly and had inflicted a post mortem rectal-vaginal wound; bloodstains 
were found in several rooms of the house; Victoria's bloodstained and shredded 
dress was found under her bed next to which her nude body was discovered under 
a pile of boxes and blankets; Victoria's slip, with the straps torn off, was found 
under the bed in the master bedroom; the crotch was ripped out of Victoria's 
bloodsoaked panties; and the only bloodstained clothes of defendant's which were 
discovered were his socks and his shorts, from which facts the People argue that 
defendant was almost nude during the attack. . . . 
The court acknowledged, “the legislative definition of the degrees of murder leaves much to the 
 
41 Id. 
42 Id. at 946-47. 
43 Id. at 943. 
44 Id. at 947. 
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discretion of the jury in many cases.”  That discretion, however, “must have a sound factual basis 
for its exercise.”45 Here, according to the Court, there was no “sound factual basis” for the jury’s 
exercise of discretion to find Pennsylvania-style first-degree murder.46 
2. The “Anderson Factors”:  Redefining Premeditation in Terms of 
“‘Planning’ Activity,” “Motive,” and “Particular and Exacting” Means 
 The Anderson court began by identifying factors that it considered insufficient for first-
degree murder.  It then identified three evidentiary characteristics that it found controlling.  
Finally, it concluded that all of the required characteristics were absent.  Each of these steps in 
the court’s reasoning is subject to criticism. 
(a)  Factors That Are Not Enough, According to Anderson. The court considered it “well 
established” that “the brutality of a killing cannot in itself support a finding [of] premeditation 
and deliberation.”  Furthermore, the court cited authority to the effect that “multiple acts of 
violence on the victim” are insufficient to show “careful thought and weighing of 
considerations.”47 Furthermore, an inexcusable and frenzied killing was less likely to qualify as 
premeditated or deliberate, because it supported the inference that the killing resulted from a 
“random,” “violent,” and “indiscriminate” attack, “rather than from deliberately placed wounds 
inflicted according to a preconceived design.”48 
The court recognized “the need to clarify the difference between the two degrees of 
murder” and the bases upon which a reviewing court might find that “the evidence is sufficient” 
for first-degree murder.  Therefore, the court proposed to set forth “standards . . . for the kind of 
 
45 Id. 
46 Id. at 947-48. 
47 Id. at 947. 
48 Id. at 952. 
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evidence which is sufficient to sustain a finding of premeditation and deliberation.”49 Part of the 
court’s concern reflected a legitimate effort to conform faithfully to the legislative intent 
expressed in the language of the statute.  “[L]egislative classification of murder into two degrees 
would be meaningless if ‘deliberation’ and ‘premeditation’ were construed as requiring no more 
reflection than may be involved in the mere formation of a specific intent to kill.”50 Therefore, 
the Anderson court saw a need to define premeditation and deliberation with narrow evidentiary 
requirements. 
(b) The Anderson Factors.  The court then set out three types of evidence that it 
considered relevant to the premeditation-deliberation issue:51 
The type of evidence which this court has found sufficient to sustain a finding 
of premeditation and deliberation falls into three basic categories: (1) facts about 
how and what defendant did prior to the actual killing which show that the 
defendant was engaged in activity directed toward, and explicable as intended to 
result in, the killing–what may be characterized as "planning" activity; (2) facts 
about the defendant's prior relationship and/or conduct with the victim from 
which the jury could reasonably infer a "motive" to kill the victim, which 
inference of motive, together with facts of type (1) or (3), would in turn support 
an inference that the killing was the result of "a pre-existing reflection" and 
"careful thought and weighing of considerations" rather than "mere unconsidered 
or rash impulse hastily executed"; (3) facts about the nature of the killing from 
which the jury could infer that the manner of killing was so particular and 
exacting that the defendant must have intentionally killed according to a 
"preconceived design" to take his victim's life in a particular way for a "reason" 
which the jury can reasonably infer from facts of type (1) or (2). 
In summary, premeditation and deliberation could be made out by evidence of (1) “‘planning’ 
activity,” (2) “motive,” and (3) a “particular and exacting” “manner of killing” that evidenced a 
“preconceived design.” 
 The court also provided standards about the weight to be given the three factors in 
 
49 Id. at 948. 
50 Id. 
51 Id. at 949 (emphasis added).  See generally LEVENSON § 5.12 (discussing Anderson). 
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determining whether the evidence was sufficient to show premeditation and deliberation:52 
Analysis of the cases will show that this court sustains verdicts of first degree 
murder typically when there is evidence of all three types and otherwise requires 
at least extremely strong evidence of (1) or evidence of (2) in conjunction with 
either (1) or (3). . . . 
In other words, the first factor, planning activity, seems to have emerged as paramount:  the only 
factor that could carry the day alone, if supported by “extremely strong evidence.”  Motive could 
suffice if combined with either “planning activity” or a “particular and exacting” manner of 
killing, but the manner of killing alone, by implication, would be insufficient.  
 From there, it was downhill all the way as the court consigned the prosecution’s case to 
meaninglessness.  The court found no evidence of “any conduct by defendant prior to the killing 
which would indicate that he was planning anything, felonious or otherwise.”53 The infliction of 
sixty stab wounds, even when coupled with evidence that the defendant pursued ten-year-old 
Victoria in such a manner as to leave blood in most every room, did not, according to this court, 
show a design to kill.  Also, in the court’s view, there was no evidence of “any behavior towards 
Victoria from which the jury could reasonably infer that defendant had a ‘motive’ or desire to 
sexually attack and/or kill her,”54 although the court did not tell us what other significance the 
tearing of Victoria’s clothes and panties might have had when combined with Anderson’s own 
state of undress.  Finally, according to the court, the “manner of killing and the condition of the 
body” could not support an inference of “deliberately placed wounds inflicted according a 
preconceived design.”55 The court did not explain why sixty stab wounds, inflicted during the 
bloody pursuit of a ten-year-old child whose panties and dress had been shredded, did not show a 
 
52 Id. 
53 Id. at 952. 
54 Id. 
55 Id. 
15
design to kill, although it did characterize these facts as “random,” “violent,” and 
“indiscriminate.” 
 Therefore, Victoria’s killing was not first-degree murder.  It was only second-degree, 
punishable by a minimum of fifteen years.  The jury’s evaluation of the crime as among the most 
serious and blameworthy to be found among California offenses, and its decision to impose the 
most severe available sentence, were not consistent with California jurisprudence. 
B. Evaluating Anderson: Bad Judicial Reasoning?  A Bad Statute?  Both?  Or Neither?  
 The holding in Anderson, understandably, has been the subject of criticism.56 Here, this 
article will consider four possibilities for evaluating the decision.  The first is that the court failed 
to consider the evidence properly.  The justices invented their own three-factor standard and 
construed the evidence to fit their idiosyncratic preferences.  In this view, the legislation is not 
the problem; the problem is that the court usurped the function of the factfinder.  The second 
possibility, however, is that the statute is poorly conceived, and that the Anderson result is 
defective because the Pennsylvania pattern furnishes a poor definition of its most severe crime.  
According to this view, the California Supreme Court did what it had to do in its judicial role, by 
faithfully carrying out the legislative command.  And after all, the statute existed long before 
Anderson. It presented the same kinds of interpretive difficulties before the court wrestled with 
them in that case, and although the difficulties were the subject of pointed criticisms, the 
legislature never acted.  It left the court to clean up the mess.  Third, it is possible that both of the 
 
56 E.g., Matthew A. Pauley, Murder by Premeditation, 36 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 145, 159-66 (1999); Bruce 
Ledewitz, Mr. Carroll’s Mental State, or What Is Meant by Intent, 38 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 71, 108-09 & n.163 
(2001); Charles L. Hobson, Reforming California’s Homicide Law, 23 PEPP. L. REV. 495, 517-21 (1996). 
 It should be emphasized, however, that not all commentators fault the court for the holding, even when they 
criticize the California jurisprudence.  Cf. Suzanne E. Mounts, Premeditation and Deliberation in California: 
Returning to a Distinction without a Difference, 36 U.S.F. L. REV. 261 (2002) (arguing that the difficulty traces to 
the term premeditation itself and that the court had to reach its holding because of this term).  Whether there is 
enough blame, to divide it between the legislature and the court, is the subject of this section of this article. 
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above suggestions are accurate: the legislation is badly formulated, and the court mishandled the 
evidence.  This approach would conclude that the statute is clumsy, but still, it would have 
authorized a first-degree murder conviction in Anderson if only the court had not mistreated the 
evidence.  Fourth and finally, one can opt for none of the above.  One can decide, in other words, 
that the result in Anderson is appropriate. 
1. Did the Anderson Court Fail to Evaluate the Evidence Properly? (Did 
Bad Judicial Reasoning Create the Result?)   
 Three justices dissented in Anderson. Justice Burke’s dissenting opinion disagreed with 
the court’s evaluation of the evidence.  Specifically, Justice Burke would have upheld the 
inference of a motive of sexual assault against Victoria:57 
The jury could reasonably infer from the evidence adduced that the 
underlying motive of the crime was sexual gratification: defendant chose a time 
when he was alone in the house with the little girl; the window blinds were down 
and the doors locked; he pursued the child throughout the house inflicting one 
wound after another; he ripped out the crotch of her panties; he tore her remaining 
clothes from her; he had removed his own clothes excepting his socks–there was 
no other logical explanation for the absence of other bloody male clothing and he 
took a shower immediately after the crime; furthermore, at one time during the 
assault he had the child on the bed as evidenced by the large bloodstain found in 
the center of the mattress; and, finally, a number of the wounds inflicted upon the 
child could be considered sexual in nature, particularly the thrust of the knife into 
her vagina, the cutting through to the anal canal and the numerous cuts and 
contusions of her private parts and thighs. . . . 
Furthermore, Justice Burke would have found sufficient evidence of premeditation, as he 
explained in one brief but pointed sentence:58 
. . . [T]here is credible evidence from which the jury could find a 
premeditated homicide, e.g. the locking of the doors (whether before or after the 
actual killing is a matter of conjecture), the duration of the assault, the pursuit 
through many rooms with a quantity of blood being left in each room, the 
extensive stabbings many of which would have sufficed as fatal, the removal of 
 
57 Id. at 955.  This reasoning also would have supported affirmance of the first-degree conviction on another ground, 
namely, murder in the course of a felonious lewd act upon a child.  See infra Pt. I(C) of this Article. 
58 Id. 
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the murder weapon from one room and the apparent repeated use of it in other 
rooms. . . .  
This reasoning would have resulted in affirmance of Anderson’s conviction.   
 Perhaps the difficulty in Anderson, then, is that the court substituted its own evaluation of 
the evidence for that of the jury.  The jury must decide the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable 
doubt, but a different standard applies in appellate courts.  An appellate judge must view the 
evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, and then must affirm if any rational trier 
of fact could have found proof beyond a reasonable doubt.59 The appellate standard of review is 
a lenient one, favoring affirmance—so lenient that it may at first blush seem inconsistent with 
the policy of the criminal law to protect the accused.  This apparent paradox disappears, 
however, when one realizes that otherwise, jurors would become a nullity.  The jury would be 
reduced to the status of a group assembled to make a sort of “advisory verdict,” with the real 
verdict to be supplied by the appellate court after its re-evaluation of the evidence.  In fact, the 
Anderson court recited that it was “[v]iewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the 
judgment.”60 A possible criticism of Anderson is that after articulating this standard, the 
California Supreme Court simply lost its way and did not follow it. 
 Perhaps this arguable lack of deference to the jury was aggravated by the court’s creation 
of the Anderson factors—the three factors of “planning activity,” “motive,” and “a particular and 
exacting” manner of killing—factors that depart significantly from the statutory language, which 
instead requires premeditation and deliberation.  As Justice Hugo Black famously observed, “one 
of the most effective ways of diluting or expanding a [legal principle] is to substitute for the 
crucial word or words . . . another word or words, more or less flexible and more or less 
 
59 See infra note 60 and accompanying text. 
60 447 P.2d at 947. 
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restricted in meaning.”  In this manner, he explained, a “broad, abstract and ambiguous concept” 
can “easily be shrunken in meaning,” or it can also, on the other hand, be interpreted to govern 
issues that it never was intended to.61 Thus, when the court transformed the statutory language 
into three factors of its own independent creation and made “‘planning’ activity” assume 
talismanic importance, it arguably did not “clarify” the legislative intent so much as it distorted 
it.  A defender of the opinion can argue, contrariwise, that the three factors are related to 
premeditation, particularly “planning”; to this, the reader who sees an inappropriate redefinition 
of the standard in the Anderson opinion can only say, yes, but these three narrow factors are not 
all that can prove the state of mind encompassed in the idea of “premeditation”—and the dissent 
did a better job, because it recognized this point. 
 For one thing, one can argue that the idea of “‘planning’ activity” is an oxymoron.  
“Planning” is a mental function, whereas planning “activity” suggests the requirement of a 
physical manifestation, something as concrete as a written diagram designed to facilitate an 
assassination.  The court could, instead, have defined premeditation in the sense of a clearly 
evidenced design to kill (which could readily have been inferred in Anderson).62 Or, the 
reference to planning “activity” might be read as calling for some type of circumstantial evidence 
of planning, in the crime or in events before or after it, without focusing solely on the need for 
specific “actions” that were themselves part of conduct that constituted “planning.”  For 
example, this conception might include evidence that the crime required a long duration of 
sustained activity.  What the court did, instead, however, was to reshape the issue into a 
requirement of “planning activity”:  a rule depending on physically manifested evidence that the 
 
61 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 509 (1965) (dissenting opinion). 
62 The court elsewhere noted that premeditation and deliberation carry their “ordinary dictionary meanings.”  447 
P.2d at 948. 
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defendant undertook “activity,” distinctly preceding the crime itself.  Thus, the majority was able 
to deny the existence of premeditation by finding no evidence of planning in “defendant’s 
actions prior to the killing.”63 By avoiding the trap into which the majority fell, relying as it did 
so heavily upon convoluted phrases such as “planning activity,” Justice Burke was able to find 
premeditation in such factors as “the duration of the assault, the pursuit through many rooms 
with a quantity of blood being left in each room, the extensive stabbings many of which would 
have sufficed as fatal, the removal of the murder weapon from one room, and the apparent 
repeated use of it in other rooms.”64 This criticism of Anderson, then, would conclude that 
Justice Burke’s reasoning was more faithful to the legislative concept of deliberation and 
premeditation than the elaborate structure of factors that the majority created from inferences 
outside the statute. 
 This theory—that the flaw in Anderson is the court’s evaluation of the evidence—is 
reinforced by comparison of the Anderson opinion to those of other courts.  For example, 
Commonwealth v. Carroll65 is a decision of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court from about the 
same time as Anderson, and it resulted in the affirmance of a first-degree murder conviction with 
considerably less evidence of premeditation and deliberation than Anderson arguably presents.  
Carroll shot his wife in the back of the head approximately five minutes after a heated argument.  
There was significant evidence that “rage,” “desperation,” and “panic” had produced an 
impulsive homicide, brought about by the defendant’s psychological dependence on his wife and 
her nastily expressed refusal to support his career.66 Carroll’s own evidence showed that the 
killing was an “automatic reflex,” as opposed to “an intentional premeditated type of 
 
63 Id. at 952. 
64 Id. at 955. 
65 194 A.2d 911 (Pa. 1963). 
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homicide.”67 The court observed, however, that premeditation could arise instantaneously. 
“Whether the intention to kill and the killing, that is, the premeditation and the fatal act, were 
within a brief space of time or a long space of time is immaterial if the killing was in fact 
intentional, willful, deliberate, and premeditated.”68 The court’s conclusion:  “There is no doubt 
that this was a willful, deliberate and premeditated murder.”  One can easily argue that Carroll 
and Anderson are backward, with Anderson falling into a more blameworthy category of 
homicide while Carroll presents a lesser, although still serious, kind of offense—especially since 
the court described Carroll as “terribly provoked” by his “belligerent and sadistic wife” at the 
time of the killing.69 This consideration alone does not prove that the Anderson court was 
wrong, of course; one can argue that the statute forced the court to do what it did, and that 
Carroll is the decision that is wrong.  Carroll does, however, point out a different pathway. 
 One also can argue that the Anderson court made several errors in logic and that they 
cumulated so as to lead the court away from the legislative standard.  In this view, the court 
created evidentiary standards (the three factors) that did not correspond very closely to the 
statute.  It also improperly ignored other relevant concerns, such as the brutality and violence of 
the killing, its duration, the multiple repetitions of the killing force, the nature of the wounds, the 
many physical locations of the crime (in different rooms), the lethal nature of the implement, and 
Anderson’s multiple cover-ups.70 Arguably, too, the court gave insufficient deference to the 
 
66 Id. at 534-35. 
67 Id. at 534-35. 
68 Id. at 533. 
69 Id. at 536. 
70 The court refused to consider Anderson’s repeated lies and destruction of evidence as factors supporting any 
inference of premeditation, holding that only his “actions prior to the killing” were relevant.  Similarly, Professor 
Lafave refers to cover-up evidence as “obviously not relevant,” citing Anderson. LAFAVE 770 & n.32. 
 This reasoning is erroneous.  Evidence of post-crime events may not be alone sufficient to support conviction, but 
there can be little question that it is “relevant,” at the very least, to the actor’s earlier mental state.  Thus, there is a 
mass of cases holding that post-crime flight or evidence destruction, while not sufficient to prove an earlier crime, is 
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jury’s verdict, when its duty was to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict.  
Finally, the court adopted reasoning that was unduly cramped when it denied the existence of 
“any evidence” from which the jury could reasonably have inferred a sexual attack. 
 This is the blame-it-on-the-court argument.  The trouble is, as we shall see next, the 
legislature’s act in adopting the Pennsylvania pattern was the factor that precipitated the court’s 
strange decision. 
2. The Alternative Theory, That the Statutory Definition of First-Degree 
Murder Is Flawed: Is Anderson the Legislature’s Fault? 
 There is another way to look at Anderson, one that is more favorable toward the court.  
The legislature had defined first-degree murder, and the court faced the difficult job of applying 
the muddled Pennsylvania standard.  One might think that an intentional killing would qualify as 
deliberate and premeditated, but the statutory scheme seemed to indicate that intent, by itself, 
was sufficient only for murder, not for first-degree murder.71 Premeditation and deliberation 
must mean something more, or so the argument would go.  Furthermore, the three Anderson 
factors had appeared in earlier cases, even if they had not reflected the rigid formula Anderson 
seemed to infer from them.72 Thus, the court in Anderson might be viewed as having attempted 
to make sense out of vague statutory language by using earlier interpretations, which is a proper 
function of the judiciary.  In fact, the court forthrightly acknowledged that there were 
“imperfections” and a “lack of conceptual consistency” in the Pennsylvania pattern but correctly 
 
admissible to supply some evidence of it.  See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, 
EVIDENCE 162-63 (3d ed. 2003) (“courts generally admit evidence of behavior indicating consciousness of guilt” 
to prove a “guilty mind.”)  For a more persuasive treatment of post-crime evidence, see Hernandez v. State, 50 P.3d 
1100, 1113 (Nev. 2002) (“. . . even if the knife was thrust into Donna’s vagina after her death, it is relevant evidence 
of [defendant’s] state of mind before her death as he beat her, stabbed her repeatedly, and strangled her”).  The 
Anderson court should have considered the post-crime evidence in the same way. 
71 See supra note 50 and accompanying text. 
72 The Anderson court discussed the prior decisions at 447 P.2d at 949-952.  For two excellent critiques of the 
statute, see Charles L. Hobson, supra note 56, at 517-21, and Suzanne E. Mounts, supra note 56. 
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recognized a duty to “make practical application” of the law.  Furthermore, these cases and other 
authorities had repeatedly called upon the legislature to fix problems that were obvious from the 
early days.  So, what else was the court to do, in Anderson?73 A critic of the opinion could 
readily conclude that this theory is not entirely persuasive, because the logic of the Anderson 
opinion arguably remains flawed in several respects; these considerations do, however, raise the 
question whether the problem with Anderson lies in the statutory language, rather than in the 
court’s interpretation of it. 
 And there does indeed seem to be reason to fault the Pennsylvania pattern itself.  
Specifically, defining first degree murder in a way that depends exclusively on premeditation and 
deliberation raises two kinds of criticisms.  First, the premeditation-deliberation formula 
dissolves into meaninglessness in some kinds of cases.  This is why the California court in 
Anderson referred to the legislation as creating jury “discretion” to find either first- or second-
degree murder.  Second, by choosing mens rea as the sole determinant of the most serious grade 
of murder, and a peculiarly defined mens rea at that, the legislation creates an artificial standard 
that prevents crime grading from correlating with offense severity. 
 (a) Vagueness in the Premeditation-Deliberation Formula.  At first blush, the concept of 
“premeditation” does not seem excessively vague.  But when it is combined with the concept that 
premeditation can arise in an extremely brief time period, or in other words virtually at the 
instant of the crime,74 the standard that it seems to impose disappears.  “Premeditation” that 
appears “instantaneously” is an oxymoron.75 The California court in Anderson seemed tacitly to 
 
73 Id. at 948.  For early vigorous criticism, see Pike, What Is Second-Degree Murder in California?, 9 S. Cal. L. 
Rev. 112 (1936). 
74 E.g., People v. Donnelly, 190 Cal. 57, 2109 P. 523 (1922) (holding that premeditation does not require any 
appreciable time lapses between the intention to kill and the act of killing, but instead, that they may be as 
“instantaneous” as successive thought of the mind). 
75 See LAFAVE § 14.7(a) for a discussion of the time issue. 
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recognize this problem by its insistence on the importance of “planning activity,” or actual 
activity that occurs demonstrably beforehand.  But Anderson leaves open the possibility that 
premeditation can arise without prior planning activity. 
 The law must be conveyed to the jury, and the kind of confusion inherent in the coupling 
of “premeditation” with an impulse arising instantaneously then will manifest itself in jury 
instructions that  do not guide the jury.  Empirical studies tend to demonstrate that jurors 
conscientiously attempt to follow the judge’s instructions.76 Lengthy deliberations in hard cases 
may well come down to interpretation of words used in the court’s charge.77 And so, if there is 
to be an instruction that is internally contradictory in a jury trial, let it not be in the basic 
definition of the most serious criminal offense that the State has created. 
 The Anderson court avoided recognizing the problem of vagueness by characterizing it, 
instead, as jury “discretion.”78 This euphemism papers over the defect, but it hardly solves the 
problem.  Unguided discretion is the opposite of law; it is lawlessness.  As Kenneth Culp Davis 
wrote in his landmark work, Discretionary Justice, “The vast quantities of unnecessary 
discretionary power that have grown up in our system should be cut back, and the discretionary 
power that is found to be necessary should be properly confined, structured, and checked.”79 
Otherwise, discretion manifests itself in arbitrary results, dissatisfied litigants, and lessened 
respect for law.  But it is particularly in the guidance of decisionmakers that discretion or 
vagueness is a disadvantage.  In a series of decisions, the United States Supreme Court has 
 
76 E.g., HARRY A. KALVEN & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 219, 220-41 & n.31 (1966). 
77 For example, after the Watergate scandal that led to the resignation of President Richard Nixon, a jury found 
presidential aid Dwight Chapin guilty of perjury, and the foreman explained the jury’s long deliberations by saying, 
“We spent [most] of our time on semantics.  Interpretation of words.”  Houston Chronicle, April 7, 1974, § A, at 12, 
col. 2. 
78 See supra note 45 and accompanying text. 
79 KENNETH CULP DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE 216 (1969). 
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explained why.80 Citizens who attempt to comply with the law need reasonable specifics so they 
can avoid unintentional commission of crimes.  But as the Court has been clear in observing, the 
more important reason for eliminating vagueness is to guide decisionmakers who must apply the 
law.81 Obviously, these decisionmakers include juries.  The kind of vagueness inherent in the 
premeditation concept was not sufficient to create a constitutional violation, and the Anderson 
court cannot be faulted for enforcing it; but the vagueness issue should have prompted the 
legislature to reconsider the term. 
 In fact, the Anderson court’s invocation of “discretion” as an alternate term to vagueness 
is an indication that the premeditation-deliberation formula is a non-standard.  In this regard, the 
definition of first-degree murder resembles the fallout from the ill-fated treatment of insanity in 
Durham v. United States,82 which defined insanity as the “product” of a “mental disease or 
defect.”  Critics described this definition, too, as a “non-rule,”83 and undoubtedly it led to jury 
“discretion” of a sort.  The Durham test also resulted in blizzard of appellate opinions84 going in 
different directions and sometimes featuring abrupt reversals.85 Finally, even the court that had 
created the rule abandoned it.86 During its unhappy existence, the Durham rule “traveled a 
remarkably circuitous path toward the conclusion that the jury needed some guidance, that words 
 
80 E.g., Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (    ) (citing other cases). 
81 The “more important aspect” of vagueness doctrine is to avoid statutes with “standardless sweep [that] allows 
policemen, prosecutors, and juries to pursue their personal predilections.”  Id., citing Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566 
575 (1974). 
82 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954). 
83 See LAFAVE at 394, citing ABRAHAM S. GOLDSTEIN, THE INSANITY DEFENSE 84 (1967). 
84 “In the decade following Durham, over one hundred appellate opinions involving the sanity issue were decided by 
the” D.C. court.  LAFAVE 395. 
85 See, e.g., Blocker v. United States, 274 F.2d 572 D.C. Cir. 1959); Blocker v. United States, 288 F.2d 853 (D.C. 
Cir. 1961) (refusing initially, on the basis of expert testimony, to recognize “antisocial personality disorder” as a 
mental disease or defect giving rise to the insanity defense but then ordering new trial based on different testimony 
in another case by another expert). 
86 United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969 (D.C. Cir. 1972). 
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like ‘mental disease’ and ‘product’ were inadequate, and that the standard would have to 
incorporate somehow a description of the sorts of effects . . . that were relevant to compliance 
with the criminal law.”87 Even today, as Professor LaFave puts it, “[t]he eighteen years of 
experience with Durham remain instructive on the fundamental question of how the insanity 
defense should be defined”88—and, one might add, how all substantive criminal law doctrines 
ought to be defined, including laws against murder. 
 When the Durham court overruled its own rule in United States v. Brawner,89 it 
emphasized the importance of “uniformity.”90 In addition, it considered the effect of jury 
“discretion” and determined that, instead of discretion concealed in indeterminate language, 
jurors needed and deserved more specific guidance in the form of legal rules:91 
. . . If the law provides no standard, members of the jury are placed in the 
difficult position of having to find a [person] responsible for no other reason than 
their personal feeling about [that individual]. . . . It is far easier for them to 
perform the role assigned to them by legislature and courts if they know . . . that 
their verdicts are "required" by law. . . . 
There may be a tug of appeal in the suggestion that law is a means to justice 
and the jury is an appropriate tribunal to ascertain justice. [But] [t]his is a 
simplistic syllogism. . . .  The thrust of a rule that in essence invites the jury to 
ponder the evidence . . . , and then do what to them seems just, is to focus on what 
seems "just" as to the particular individual. . . .  
The court explained further, as follows:92 
Still another aspect of justice is the requirement for rules of conduct that 
establish reasonable generality, neutrality and constancy. . . . It is the sense of 
justice propounded by those charged with making and declaring the law–
legislatures and courts–that lays down the rule . . . .  It is one thing . . . to tolerate 
 
87 LAFAVE 395, quoting ABRAHAM S. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 83, at 86. 
88 LAFAVE 395. 
89 471 F.2d 969 (D.C. Cir. 1972). 
90 Id. at 984. 
91 Id. at 988, quoting ABRAHAM S. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 83, at 81-82. 
92 471 F.2d at 988-89. 
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and even welcome the jury's sense of equity as a force that affects its application . 
. . the legal rules that crystallize the requirements of justice as determined by the 
lawmakers of the community. It is quite another to set the jury at large, without 
such crystallization, to evolve its own legal rules and standards of justice. . . . 
This “instructive experience,” as Professor LaFave describes it, should lead to extreme 
skepticism about the viability of jury “discretion” of the kind that the Anderson court uncritically 
accepted, or that the Pennsylvania pattern makes inevitable. 
 The non-standard contained in the premeditation-deliberation formula raises other 
disadvantageous possibilities.  Jurors may feel the need to obtain guidance from sources other 
than the judge’s instructions.  For example, the focus of the premeditation-deliberation formula 
on poorly defined subjective mental states means that mental health experts, particularly 
psychologists and psychiatrists, may become important witnesses.93 If these experts address the 
issue directly, by opining on the question whether the defendant “did” or “did not” premeditate, 
they may undermine the law-defining function of the court.94 Even if they testify in terms that 
do not replicate the ultimate issue, these experts can accomplish the same result by substituting 
synonyms for premeditation and deliberation.  This state of affairs invites the prospect of a 
cottage industry of partisan witnesses, paid to become advocates and to shove the legal standard, 
rather than the facts, in one direction or the other.  Alternatively, the jury may obtain guidance on 
the meaning of premeditation from the adversary lawyers who present the case to them.  Bad 
crime definitions and indeterminate jury instructions mean that trial lawyers have more rhetorical 
influence over jurors.95 Sometimes the prosecutor and defense lawyer, through balanced use of 
 
93 Cf. Commonwealth v. Carroll, 194 A.2d 911 (Pa. 1963) (observing that role of psychiatrist who testified about 
premeditation was to persuade the jury). 
94 This concern is illustrated by the insanity cases following Durham, which are discussed supra in notes 84-91 and 
accompanying test.  In fact, experts at first frequently testified that defendants actions were or were not “products” 
of “mental diseases or defects,” and they thereby tacitly resolved underlying legal issues.  This practice was 
disapproved in Washington v. United States, 390 F.2d 444 (D.C. Cir. 1967). 
95 See DAVID CRUMP et al., supra note 15, at 51. 
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jury argument, can explain the confusing instructions so that jurors understand them better.  But 
if one attorney is skillful and the other not, an imbalance may result, and thus a confusing jury 
charge makes outcomes depend significantly on the randomly distributed abilities of lawyers.96 
This undesirable effect is to some degree inevitable, but it should be contained by jury 
instructions that guide the jury, rather than by the exercise of lawmaking “discretion” by 
individual jurors. 
 Finally, there is the ugly prospect that invisible and unguided “discretion” may mean a 
result based on factors outside the law—or inconsistent with the law.  A jury unable to apply the 
court’s instructions may consider factors that no lawyer would recognize as relevant.  A jury that 
favors or disfavors a particular group or activity may consciously or unconsciously act upon its 
prejudices.97 Specific definition of crimes may not eliminate these possibilities, but it probably 
reduces them, whereas the Anderson court’s acceptance of discretion may have increased them. 
 (b) Crime Grading That Is Inconsistent With Blameworthiness.  But vagueness is not the 
only flaw in the Pennsylvania pattern.  By focusing so heavily upon the single factor of mens rea, 
and on one particular formulaic description of mens rea at that, the premeditation requirement for 
first-degree murder produces poor crime grading.  Highly blameworthy crimes may end up being 
categorized merely as second-degree, while murders that arguably are less blameworthy may 
come out as first-degree.98 The Anderson case is itself an example.  While tacitly admitting that 
the crime was particularly brutal, the court announced that “the brutality of a killing cannot in 
itself support a finding that the killer acted with premeditation and deliberation.”99 In fact, the 
 
96 Id. 
97 See supra note 81 (Supreme Court’s recognition that vagueness enables “police, prosecutors and juries” to follow 
their “personal predilections” instead of law). 
98 See infra notes 65-69 and accompanying text. 
99 See supra note 47 and accompanying text. 
28
Anderson opinion seems to depreciate the seriousness of violent murders precisely because they 
happen to be inexcusable, incomprehensible, and brutal.  The court made it clear that a 
“random,” “violent,” and “indiscriminate” murder would not qualify as deliberate or 
premeditated.100 In the topsy-turvy world of the Pennsylvania pattern, a defendant may be 
rewarded by reduction in the grade of the offense if the defendant committed it in a thoughtless, 
senseless, frenzied, and bizarre manner. 
 This issue is not new.  The great legal historian James Fitzjames Stephen described the 
arbitrariness produced by a premeditation standard in his landmark History of the Common Law 
of England:101 
As much cruelty, as much indifference to the life of others, a disposition at 
least as dangerous to society, probably even more dangerous, is shown by sudden 
as by premeditated murder . . . [Imagine that a man], passing along the road, sees 
a boy sitting on a bridge over a deep river and, out of mere wanton barbarity, 
pushes him into it and drowns him.  A man makes advances to a girl who repels 
him.  He deliberately but instantly cuts her throat . . . In none of these cases is 
there premeditation unless the word is used in a sense as unnatural as 
“aforethought” in “malice aforethought,” but each represents even more diabolical 
cruelty and ferocity than that which is involved in murders premeditated in the 
natural sense of the word. 
In other words, the premeditation-deliberation formula distorts crime grading by treating very 
serious murders as less serious.  The opposite also is true, because the premeditation-deliberation 
formula treats less blameworthy crimes more seriously than more blameworthy ones.  “One form 
of premeditated killing, mercy killing, society may not view as particularly ‘blameworthy’.”102 
Nevertheless, the Pennsylvania Pattern lumps these less blameworthy offenses together with the 
 
100 See supra note 48 and accompanying text.  The court has retreated somewhat from this position to observe that a 
“random” and “senseless” crime can still be premeditated.  See infra note 142 and accompanying text. 
101 JAMES F. STEPHEN, HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW OF ENGLAND 94 (1883). 
102 Sean J. Kealy, Hunting the Dragon: Reforming the Massachusetts Murder Statute, 10 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 203, 
249 (2001).  For an example, see State v. Forrest, 362 S.E.2d 252 (N.C. 1987) (mercy killing of ailing father by 
son). 
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most serious crime in the Penal Code. 
 States that still use the Pennsylvania pattern should listen to Judge Stephen’s time-
honored advice.  Not only is the premeditation-deliberation formula vague; to the extent that it 
embodies a standard at all, it creates results that are inconsistent with the policy of grading 
homicides to reflect their relative blameworthiness.  At its worst, it invites juries to act lawlessly 
in voting their prejudices.  There are better ways of defining murder, ways that this Article will 
consider below. 
3. The Third Theory: Both the Legislation and the Anderson Opinion Are 
Flawed 
 The third possibility is that the legislation and the Anderson opinion are both 
misconceived.  In this view, the statute defines first-degree murder poorly by using the 
premeditation-deliberation formula, but the California court could better have upheld Anderson’s 
conviction by using a different interpretive approach, such as that of the dissent.  As this article 
has already noted, the Pennsylvania pattern has persisted for a long time, and as the article will 
demonstrate later, the scholars who drafted the Model Penal Code squarely rejected it.  As for the 
Anderson opinion, the current interpretive regime, which this article will explore below, is far 
more deferential in upholding jury verdicts.  Today’s decisions probably would lend to an 
affirmance of Anderson’s conviction, and although the current court has refrained from 
overruling Anderson, it has pointedly expanded the kinds of evidence that can suffice for 
premeditation and avoided the rigidity with which the earlier court seemed to apply its three 
factors. 
 This conclusion, it is submitted, is probably the most persuasive of the four possibilities.  
The court in Anderson lost its way.  But perhaps more importantly, the legislature can (and 
should) revise the statute, perhaps in ways more reflective of the Model Penal Code.  This article 
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will return to this question in its conclusion. 
4. Defending the Premeditation-Deliberation Formula and the Anderson 
Reasoning 
 In defense of the premeditation-deliberation formula, it can be said that this formulation 
is traditional.  It has been applied in the majority of American jurisdictions.103 For several 
reasons, however, the pedigree of the premeditation-deliberation formula is not a persuasive 
reason for retaining it.  In the first place, it does not trace to the common law; the English judges 
never divided murder into degrees.  That development is the result of legislation, which should 
be subject to change, just as all legislation is subject to change.104 Furthermore, the reasoning 
underlying the premeditation-deliberation formula was to limit more severe punishments, usually 
including the death penalty, to the most blameworthy crimes.105 Today, the death penalty is 
limited primarily by other factors.106 For determining the lengths of prison sentences, the 
premeditation-deliberation formula simply is too inaccurate to separate the most serious murders 
from less serious ones, both because of its vagueness and because of its dependence upon a 
single characteristic in a complex world that depends also on many other factors.107 
Changing a rule as ingrained as the premeditation-deliberation formula will not be 
without institutional costs.  There probably will be significant errors as legislation and 
adjudication struggle over many years to process a new definition through all of its 
 
103 See LAFAVE 766. 
104 Id. 
105 Id. 
106 Id. at 175-76. 
107 Cf. Kealy, supra note 101, at 249-51 (giving examples of ways in which premeditation and deliberation could be 
replaced by other characteristics).  This Article proposes a different solution: a single degree of murder with 
sentencing which may be structured by guidelines that treat those characteristics, among others.  See Pt. D of this 
Article, below. 
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consequences.108 But if this kind of shakeup of the system were sufficient to preclude reasoned 
change, physicians in California would cure infections today by bleeding patients rather than 
using antibiotics.  Tradition is not a sound reason for keeping the Pennsylvania pattern, and 
neither is the cost of change. 
 Another defense of the premeditation-deliberation formula might be founded on the 
argument that mens rea assertedly is the most reliable indicator (or to some, perhaps, the only 
indicator) of blameworthiness.109 This argument has been offered in other areas, particularly in 
opposition to the felony-murder rule110 and to victim impact evidence.111 Opponents of these 
doctrines often advance their concepts of blameworthiness as a reason for eliminating all other 
considerations than mens rea.112 The argument is unpersuasive for several reasons.  In the first 
place, the premeditation-deliberation formula does not focus on the range of blameworthy mental 
states; it focuses only on one vague but narrowly defined mental state.  To the extent that it has 
meaning, it produces the dubious result of preferring senseless, brutal, and bizarre murders for 
lenient treatment, precisely because they are senseless, brutal, and bizarre.113 This is a strange 
approach to blameworthiness. 
 Furthermore, an exclusive focus upon mens rea is a dubious way to distinguish or grade 
blameworthiness.  Components of the actus reus, including the act itself, the circumstances, and 
the result, also figure into the calculus of blameworthiness.  They always have, from the early 
 
108 Cf. supra note 13 and accompanying text (giving examples of one State’s experience). 
109 Cf. e.g., Commentary to Model Penal Code § 210.2 (Official Draft & Revised Comments 1980) (equating mens 
rea and state of mind with culpability and blameworthiness; using this argument as justification for rejecting the 
felony murder rule). 
110 Id. 
111 See Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 497 (1987) (holding victim impact evidence unconstitutional in capital cases on 
the theory that it allegedly is “irrelevant” to “blameworthiness”); South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805 (1989) 
(same); overruled by Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991) (discussed infra in note 117 and accompanying text). 
112 See supra notes 109-111. 
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days of the common law.  The debate over the felony-murder rule and over the admissibility of 
victim impact evidence proves this point.  Although attacks on the felony-murder rule usually 
include conclusionary statements that the rule separates guilt from blameworthiness by 
eliminating intent requirements,114 advocates of this argument do not explain why actus reus is 
not also an ingredient of blameworthiness.  Nearly all jurisdictions have retained the felony-
murder rule, and close examination shows that a sole focus upon mens rea does not produce 
results congruent with grades of blameworthiness:115 
Differences in result must be taken into account as part of actus reus if 
classification and grading are to be rational.  For example, murder and attempted 
murder may require similar mental states (indeed, attempted murder generally 
requires proof of a higher mental element), but no common law jurisdiction treats 
the two offenses as one, and certainly none treats attempted murder more 
severely.  The only difference justifying this classification is that death results in 
one offense but not in the other.  Similarly, it is a misdemeanor for a person to 
operate a motor vehicle while impaired by drugs or alcohol, but if this conduct 
causes the death of a human being, the offense in some jurisdictions is elevated to 
the status of homicide.  Most jurisdictions treat vehicular homicide more severely 
than the misdemeanor of alcohol-impaired driving, even though the actions and 
mental states of the defendant may be equivalent or identical. 
 These classifications are the result of a concern for grading offenses so as 
to reflect societal notions of proportionality. . . . 
 The felony murder doctrine serves this goal, just as do the distinctions 
inherent in the separate offenses of attempted murder and murder, or impaired 
driving and vehicular homicide.  Felony murder reflects a societal judgment that 
an intentionally committed robbery that causes the death of a human being is 
qualitatively more serious than an identical robbery that does not. . . .  
Another misguided attempt to reduce all crime grading to mens rea has concerned victim impact 
evidence.  The Supreme Court initially outlawed this kind of evidence in capital cases, reasoning 
 
113 See supra notes 98-101 and accompanying text. 
114 See supra notes 109-10 and accompanying text. 
115 David Crump and Susan Waite Crump, In Defense of the Felony Murder Doctrine, 8 HARV. J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 359, § I(A) (1985). 
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that the defendant’s intent was the only legitimate component of blameworthiness.116 
Ultimately, however, the court reversed itself and held that circumstances and results, as well as 
intent, were proper ingredients in the grading of a crime:117 
. . . [T]he assessment of harm caused by the defendant as a result of the crime 
charged has understandably been an important concern of the criminal law, both 
in determining the elements of the offense and in determining the appropriate 
punishment. Thus, two equally blameworthy criminal defendants may be guilty of 
different offenses solely because their acts cause differing amounts of harm. “If a 
bank robber aims his gun at a guard, pulls the trigger, and kills his target, he may 
be put to death. If the gun unexpectedly misfires, he may not. His moral guilt in 
both cases is identical, but his responsibility in the former is greater.” 
Similarly, the actus reus components of act, circumstances, and result, rather than a focus only 
on one type of mens rea, should be proper considerations in grading the severity of murders.  
More to the point, the fact that a murder is particularly brutal, inexcusable, and bizarre should be 
a factor in aggravation, not in mitigation.  Thus, the argument for basing the definition of first-
degree murder exclusively on mens rea divorced from context, in the manner of the 
premeditation-deliberation formula under the Pennsylvania pattern, is ultimately unpersuasive. 
C. Beyond People v. Anderson: The Perez and Combs Cases 
1. Modifications after Anderson: Are There Any?  If So, What? 
 Anderson is not the end of it, of course. There have been more recent decisions. Those 
decisions suggest that the California court has modified Anderson, but the problem is, they do 
not tell the reader how much of Anderson is left, nor do they articulate any new standard.118 A 
 
116 See supra note 111. 
117 Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991). 
118 See generally Suzanne Mount, Premeditation and Deliberation in California: Returning to a Distinction without 
a Difference, 36 U.S.F. L. REV. 261 (2002) (arguing that the recent cases blur the meaning of first-degree murder).  
Other useful articles, discussing Anderson and its later treatments, include Bruce Ledwitz, Mr. Carroll’s Mental 
State Or What Is Meant by Intent, 38 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 71 (2001); Matthew A. Pauley, Murder by 
Premeditation, 36 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 145 (1999); Sean J. Kealy, Hunting the Dragon: Reforming the 
Massachusetts Murder Statute, 10 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 203 (2001); Shiva Shirazi Davgudian, California Homicide 
Law: The Basics, 36 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1375 (2003); Julie Engels, Mens Rea: Purpose to Kill Offenses, 36 LOY. 
LA. L. REV. 1401 (2003); Tom Stacy, Changing Paradigms in the Law of Homicide, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 107 (2001). 
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possible reading of the decisions is that Anderson has been overruled sub silentio, but since the 
decisions continue to rely on Anderson with ostensible approval and some of them use its factors 
as though they were determinative,119 the law in California is unclear.  And if Anderson is indeed 
gone, it is arguable that there is nothing to take its place.  It also is possible, as some 
commentators have suggested, that the Anderson factors are now merely nonbinding guidelines 
and that premeditation and deliberation are to be read in their ordinary senses, or as symbols for 
little more than the requirement of a “purposeful” killing.  In other words, they mean no more 
than “intent,” in spite of the resulting effect on the distinction between first- and second-degree 
murder.120 If this is so, it arguably makes little difference to retain the Anderson factors. 
 People v. Perez is a typical post-Anderson decision.121 It bears a striking resemblance to 
Anderson factually, but the result is different, because the Perez court upheld the defendant’s 
first-degree murder conviction. The deceased was a pregnant woman who, ironically, had the 
same name as the victim in Anderson: Victoria.122 The defendant was an acquaintance who 
killed her with multiple stab wounds inflicted with two weapons, including a steak knife. The 
steak knife had broken, and there was evidence of blood in the kitchen, including blood in the 
knife drawer. The defendant had parked his car on the street and entered the house, possibly 
surreptitiously.123 The court of appeals, following Anderson, reversed the first-degree 
 
119 See infra notes 127-29 and accompanying text. 
120 See Julie Engels, supra note 118.  One commentator describes the result as “a distinction without a difference.”  
Suzanne Mount, supra note 118.  See generally LEVENSON § 5:12 (discussing meaning of Anderson in 2005 as 
“descriptive” but “not normative,” yet “useful to illustrate . . . that the elements of first-degree murder have or have 
not been satisfied”).  Professor Levenson’s summary is about the best that can be hoped for in light of the decisions. 
121 831 P.2d 1159 (1992). 
122 Id. at 1160. 
123 Id. at 1164. 
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conviction.124 The California Supreme Court reversed the reversal and reinstated the judgment.  
 One might think that, to reach this result, the court would have to overrule Anderson.  
Unfortunately, it did not. Instead, it read Anderson more narrowly than its reasoning would seem 
to justify. Specifically, the court’s interpretation of Anderson was that the three factors were 
neither required nor exclusive. This reading enabled the court to accuse the court of appeals of 
assuming the role of the jury, even though that is exactly what the Anderson court had effectively 
done,125 and what it arguably had mandated lower courts to do:126 
In identifying categories of evidence bearing on premeditation and 
deliberation, Anderson did not purport to establish an exhaustive list that would 
exclude all other types and combinations of evidence that could support a finding 
of premeditation and deliberation. . . . [I]t was attempting to do no more than 
catalog common factors that had occurred in prior cases.   The Anderson factors, 
while helpful for purposes of review, are not a sine qua non to finding first degree 
premeditated murder, nor are they exclusive. 
Given this reasoning, one might have expected the Perez court to articulate a new approach, one 
that would treat the Anderson factors neither as a “sine qua non” nor as “exclusive.” One might 
have expected, in other words, a review of the evidence that did not concentrate on the three 
Anderson factors and that considered other kinds of evidence; in fact, one might have anticipated 
a new standard.  But what the court did, after saying that the three factors were neither exclusive 
nor necessary, was to use those very three factors as if they were exclusive and necessary:127 
Evidence of planning activity is shown by the fact that defendant did not park 
his car in the victim's driveway, he surreptitiously entered the house, and he 
obtained a knife from the kitchen. As to motive, . . . it is reasonable to infer that 
defendant determined it was necessary to kill Victoria to prevent her from 
identifying him. . . . The manner of killing is also indicative of premeditation and 
 
124 Id. at 1163.  The California Supreme Court alleged that the court of appeals had “substituted its judgment for that 
of the jury,” but after Anderson, which mandated the analysis used by the court of appeals, this criticism was unfair. 
Id. 
125 See supra note 124. 
126 831 P.2d at 1163. 
127 Id. at 1164 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). 
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deliberation. The evidence of blood in the kitchen knife drawer supports an 
inference that defendant went to the kitchen in search of another knife after the 
steak knife broke. This action bears similarity to reloading a gun . . . . 
And so, is Anderson good law after Perez? Yes and no. Does Perez inaugurate a new approach? 
Yes and no. If it does create a new standard, what is it? No one can know from the opinion. 
 The California court has continued this muddled approach in later decisions. In People v. 
Combs,128 for example, the court again cited Anderson in reviewing a judgment of first-degree 
murder. Its first step was to recite the three Anderson factors. It then observed that the factors 
were neither necessary nor exclusive. But after doing so, the court again concentrated on the 
Anderson factors as though they were necessary and exclusive, using them as the organizing 
principle around which it reviewed all of the evidence.129 The facts in Combs were, as the court 
stated, overwhelmingly supportive of the jury’s premeditation-deliberation finding, and maybe 
the court cannot be faulted for failing to reach beyond the three factors to explain its affirmance. 
Combs demonstrates, however, that the Anderson factors still tend to control outcomes even if 
they have been watered down as requirements, and that there is no other identifiable standard for 
measuring premeditation and deliberation. 
 
2. Possible Interpretations of the Premeditation-Deliberation Formula 
Today 
 One possible way to read these decisions is to conclude that Anderson has been 
overruled. That interpretation depends upon broad inferences, however, and those inferences are 
weakened by the California court’s repeated citation of the decision with apparent approval.130 
The theory that Anderson is gone is also undermined by the court’s later reliance on the 
 
128 101 P.3d 1007 (Cal. 2004). 
129 Id. at 1026, 1027. 
130 See supra notes 127-29 and accompanying text. 
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Anderson factors as ostensibly necessary and exclusive, even though the court denies that they 
are. The Perez court went out of its way to harmonize its holding with Anderson by asserting, 
against the apparent tenor of the earlier decision, that Anderson did not make the three factors 
controlling, but merely mentioned them because they were shown by parts of the evidence in 
earlier decisions.131 
If Anderson has been overruled, furthermore, it is difficult to say what has taken its place. 
It may be that the court means to return to the general statutory language of premeditation and 
deliberation and to weigh the evidence against those terms directly. This interpretation would 
uphold jury findings in a way that would seem more in keeping with the legislative intent than 
the manner of review inaugurated by Anderson.132 Evidence that Anderson summarily and 
dubiously rejected could then become relevant, such as the violence of the crime, repetition of 
the method of killing, duration of the offense, physical breadth of locations in which it takes 
place, or efforts at concealment afterward.133 Specifically, unusual violence may provide 
evidence of effort, which may help to develop the planning factor.  Repetition may indicate 
conscious choice, as in the examples of reloading a gun or replacing a broken knife.  Duration of 
the offense is indicative of sustained effort over a period of time, making a deliberate plan to kill 
evident at some point, and arguably, so is pursuit of the effort to kill through multiple places 
such as the many bloody rooms in Anderson. Concealment efforts, although they cannot alone 
prove planning, may provide at least some evidence of planning, particularly if they are elaborate 
or if they must have taken prior thought.  The trouble is, many of the more recent decisions do 
 
131 See supra note 126 and accompanying text. 
132 Cf. supra notes 60-65 and accompanying text (discussing whether Anderson distorted the legislative language by 
translating it into the three factors). 
133 Cf. supra notes 63-64, 70 and accompanying text (critiquing Anderson’s rejection of these factors).  In support of 
the relevance of post-crime evidence, see supra note 70. 
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not seem to take this approach of broadening the scope of cognizable evidence, since they rely 
exclusively upon the three Anderson factors.134 
It is even possible, if push were to come to shove, that the court might announce that all 
that is meant by premeditation and deliberation is intent: just plain, old intent. Some 
jurisdictions, in fact, have adopted precisely this approach; they have compressed premeditation 
and deliberation into the lesser-included concept of intent.135 This interpretation has the 
advantages of simplicity, of creating greater congruence between the judicial concept of 
premeditation and deliberation and that of the jury (since intent is a term for which the common 
understanding is closer to its judicial interpretation), and, arguably, of better conformity of 
homicide verdicts to meaningful gradations of blameworthiness. At the same time, however, 
interpreting premeditation and deliberation as intent, and nothing more, can be opposed on the 
ground that it fails to give faithful meaning to the text written by the legislature.136 All three 
words appear in homicide statutes conforming to the Pennsylvania pattern. In California, “intent” 
is used as the express term for defining malice aforethought, which is the requirement for all 
murder, including second degree murder, and first-degree murder is an aggravated form of the 
 
134 Perez and Combs are examples.  See supra notes 121-29 and accompanying text. 
135 See, e.g., Greene v. State, 838 P.2d 54, 61 (Nev. 1997) (holding that “the terms premeditated, deliberate, and 
willful are a single phrase, meaning simply that the actor intended to commit the act and intended death as the 
result”). 
 The Nevada court later decided, however, to “abandon” its “inconsistent” jurisprudence by distinguishing and 
distinctly defining each term—but it also authorized jury instructions saying that premeditation could be as 
“instantaneous” as “successive thoughts of the mind.”  Byford v. State, 994 P.2d 700, 713-15 (Nev. 2000).  This 
“instantaneousness” instruction arguably negates the time-sequence ingredient inherent in “premeditation.”  See 
supra notes 74-75 and accompanying text.  Later, in fact, the Nevada  court reinterpreted Byford as “disapprov[ing]” 
this instruction, which Byford actually instead had approved(!), and it seemed to indicate that  “instantaneous” 
premeditation no longer qualified.  Thomas v. State, 83 P.3d 818, 824 (2004).  But then, to complete this odd chain 
of reversals, the Thomas court upheld the conviction in that case with the non sequitur that the time sequence did not 
matter, because the case involved a robbery-murder and “in robbery cases it is immaterial when the intent to steal 
the property is formed.”  Id. 
136 See, e.g., supra, note 135 and authorities therein cited (discussing decisions that abandoned treatment of intent as 
sufficient and attempted instead to follow distinct words of statute). 
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crime.137 The statutory texts seem to indicate, or at least they leave open the possibility, that an 
intentional murder could occur without premeditation and deliberation.138 On the other hand, this 
interpretation is not unavoidable; it is logically possible to interpret the text of the legislation (if 
not the judicial decisions) to allow malice to be found from intent or otherwise, but to hold that 
only first-degree murders exhibit intent.139 The statutory language dates from a century and a 
half ago,140 and it was written under conditions in which it had the very different function of 
confining capital punishment.141 Making sense out of first-degree murder under the Pennsylvania 
pattern may require the court to cut the Gordian knot, with the question being: in what manner 
are we to reconcile the conflicting possible interpretations?, because of the muddled state of 
affairs in which the premeditation-deliberation formula is to be found today. If so, following the 
lead of other jurisdictions and declaring that premeditation and deliberation mean, simply, intent, 
would have a variety of advantages. 
 Or, Anderson may still be good law. It may be weakened but unbroken. Perez may mean 
that the Anderson factors are still predominant, but that a reviewing court is to handle them in a 
way that defers to the jury more than the Anderson court did.  As one commentator, Julie Engels, 
persuasively puts it, the Anderson factors have become “guidelines, not rules.”  The courts use 
the factors merely “to aid in the premeditation analysis,” and they do so “more leniently” than 
Anderson’s “strict” restraints would require. This looser approach allows affirmance of a first 
 
137 Cal. Penal Code § 187-89 (West 2005). 
138 Id. In fact, this aspect of the statute was a major reason for the California court’s reasoning in Anderson.  See 
supra note 50 and accompanying text. 
139 Cf. supra note 135 and accompanying text (discussing cases that have equated intent and premeditation). 
140 Cf. Keeler v. Superior court, 470 P.2d 617 (Cal. 1970) (tracing the language of the present California murder 
statute to 1850). 
141 See LAFAVE 766, § 14.7.  But today, capital punishment is confined in a completely different way: by 
specification of particular, defined circumstances in which it is available.  E.g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 
(1976).  See also LEVENSON § 5:25 (discussing California’s “special circumstances” statute, which defines 
liability for capital punishment). 
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degree conviction without any particular pattern of the three factors; indeed, it may allow 
affirmance even if none is present.  Thus, even “[a] senseless, random, but premeditated killing 
supports first degree murder.”142 This interpretation is consistent with the holding in Perez, 
which is the most significant decision interpreting Anderson. It would mean a reversal of the 
result in Anderson, and it too would go a long way toward rationalizing the results in first-degree 
murder cases. 
 One possible criticism of this approach is that it undermines the requirements of 
premeditation and deliberation that are controlling under the Pennsylvania pattern.  In reality, 
“intent” may wind up supplying these ingredients.  Thus, as Engels also observes, “The result is 
that premeditation has taken on less and less meaning, becoming more synonymous with a 
purpose to kill.”143 This result may not be undesirable, and it arguably is as faithful to the 
legislative language as Anderson’s rigid interpretation.144 No matter what it does to interpret the 
premeditation-deliberation formula, a court will encounter a degree of irrationality and 
inconsistency requiring it to cut the Gordian knot.  Anderson did so by inventing criteria that do 
not fit the language.  Interpreting premeditation as “purpose” or “intent” is no worse a way to cut 
the knot, and arguably it is better. 
 But even if Anderson is (or has been) overruled or made more lenient, the problem 
remains: the premeditation-deliberation formula is still the statutory standard that distinguishes 
first-degree murder. These terms must be included in the trial court’s instructions to the jury, and 
usually, they will be defined for the jury. Their ambiguities, inconsistencies, omissions, and 
 
142 Julie Engels, Mens Rea: Purpose to Kill Offenses, 36 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1401, 1408-09 (2003).  The reference 
to “senseless, random” killings is quoted from Perez, 828 P.2d at 115.  See also, supra note 120 (describing 
Professor Levenson’s summary). 
143 Id. at 1409. 
144 Anderson also distorted the legislation, or at least this conclusion is readily arguable.  See supra note 61 and 
accompanying text. 
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irrational results will lurk in the background to influence the meaning of whatever definition of 
these terms is given to the jury. 
 Thus, Pattern Jury Instructions in California, today, include the following explanations:145 
CALJIC 8.20. Deliberate And Premeditated Murder 
. . . The word "deliberate" means formed or arrived at or determined upon as 
a result of careful thought and weighing of considerations for and against the 
proposed course of action.  
The word "premeditated" means considered beforehand. 
If you find that the killing was preceded and accompanied by a clear, 
deliberate intent on the part of the defendant to kill, which was the result of 
deliberation and premeditation, so that it must have been formed upon pre-
existing reflection and not under a sudden heat of passion or other condition 
precluding the idea of deliberation, it is murder of the first degree. 
The law does not undertake to measure in units of time the length of the 
period during which the thought must be pondered before it can ripen into an 
intent to kill which is truly deliberate and premeditated. The time will vary with 
different individuals and under varying circumstances. 
The true test is not the duration of time, but rather the extent of the reflection. 
A cold, calculated judgment and decision may be arrived at in a short period of 
time, but a mere unconsidered and rash impulse, even though it includes an intent 
to kill, is not deliberation and premeditation as will fix an unlawful killing as 
murder of the first degree. 
To constitute a deliberate and premeditated killing, the slayer must weigh and 
consider the question of killing and the reasons for and against such a choice and, 
having in mind the consequences, [he] [she] decides to and does kill. 
These instructions imply by their emphasis that no time is required, or in other words that 
“instantaneous premeditation” is possible, even though that notion seems internally inconsistent.  
They do not say so, however, and thus they remain ambiguous.  The instructions do not tell the 
jury that a “senseless, random” murder can be first degree, either, although the California 
 
145 Committee on Standard Jury Instructions, California Jury Instructions—Criminal (CALJIC) 8.20 (Oct. 2005). 
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decisional law says so;146 instead, they are capable of being understood as excluding first-degree 
murder for a senseless and random killing.  In fact, the Anderson court’s reasoning reached 
exactly this odd conclusion.  These pattern instructions do not even include the Anderson factors, 
although a reviewing court is quite likely to use those factors to evaluate the verdict, and thus, 
the jury is not told about the law that will uphold or reverse what the jury does.  Finally, 
premeditation and deliberation are not comprehensibly distinguished from intent, and the 
paragraph that ends by authorizing first-degree murder for someone who “decides” to kill makes 
them appear synonymous with intent.  This dizzying array of submerged issues guarantees that 
the jury will act with a wide range of unguided “discretion,” which is to say, lawlessly.147 Cases 
that ought to be first-degree will result in second-degree verdicts, and cases that ought to be 
second-degree will result in first-degree verdicts, with the distinctions based on nothing more 
than confusion.  Similar cases will result in disparate verdicts.  And the jury is free to vote on the 
basis of extra-legal considerations, including invidious ones, because of the concept of 
discretion. 
 Furthermore, imprecision about what has happened to Anderson will continue to confuse 
appellate counsel—and the courts. Appellate lawyers must feel forced to argue insufficiency of 
the evidence in many first-degree murder cases even if there is evidence galore, if only to avoid 
later claims that they were ineffective.  These sufficiency claims are less likely to have merit 
after Perez; still, because Anderson remains, they must be asserted.  They necessarily will elbow 
out full briefing of other appellate issues.  And they will consume scarce criminal justice 
 
146 See supra note 143 and accompanying text.  See also LEVENSON § 5:12 (the Anderson test itself “does not 
describe elements of premeditation” and is for appellate review only; it “should not be included in any instructions 
given to the jury.”)  Something is wrong when the definition given the jury is not consistent with the standard for 
review of the jury’s verdict. 
147 Cf. supra notes 45, 78-98 (quoting Anderson as approving jury “discretion” but arguing that discretion of this sort 
is really lawlessness, with numerous disadvantages). 
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resources wastefully.  In fact, a Westlaw search using the terms “premeditation,” “deliberation,” 
and “People v. Anderson” disclosed 505 appellate cases in California,148 of which hundreds are 
unreported, particularly among more recent cases. Unreported cases suggest unmeritorious 
issues.  But the most unfortunate aspect of this problem is that appellate counsel’s endeavor to 
attack sufficiency on premeditation-deliberation grounds often will not be related to values that 
matter.  If an affirmance or reversal results on this ground, there is no reason to believe that it 
will correlate with offense severity, since the premeditation-deliberation formula itself does 
not.149 
In California, the Pennsylvania pattern thus has created a climate in which millions of 
dollars’ worth of scarce criminal justice resources are spent on nothing of value, when they could 
be spent on victim compensation, better policing, improved prison conditions, or for that matter, 
litigation and appeals of issues that do matter.  And this criticism must be applicable, at least to 
some degree, in every jurisdiction that follows the premeditation-deliberation formula. The 
disadvantages of the premeditation-deliberation formula—its vagueness and tendency to produce 
results inconsistent with blameworthiness—are serious. 
 D. Situation-Specific First-Degree Murder: “Lying in Wait” and Other Gap-Fillers 
 The Pennsylvania pattern in most States does not rely exclusively on premeditation and 
deliberation to define first-degree murder, although these are the most frequent criteria.  First-
degree murder in California, for example, also includes murder perpetrated by means of 
“explosive, knowing use of ammunition designed primarily to penetrate metal or armor, poison, 
lying in wait, torture, . . . arson, rape, carjacking, robbery, burglary, mayhem, kidnapping, train 
 
148 The search focused upon the California state courts and used the following query: PREMEDITATION & 
DELIBERATION & “PEOPLE V. ANDERSON.” 
149 See supra Pt. I(B)(2)(b) of this Article (discussing inconsistency of premeditation-deliberation formula with 
blameworthiness). 
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wrecking, or any act punishable under [certain other statutes], or . . . discharging a firearm from a 
motor vehicle, intentionally at another person with the intent to inflict death.”150 Some of these 
criteria (such as lying in wait) are traditional,151 but most of the statute reads as though the 
legislature acted episodically in response to the newspaper headlines of the day—covering “train 
wrecking” murders and armor-piercing  bullets as rare examples of recent egregious homicides 
that otherwise were not covered as first-degree murders—instead of fixing the fundamental 
problems in the statute. 
 These specific-instance definitions of first-degree murder raise the same problems of 
proof, ambiguity, and inconsistency with blameworthiness that  are inherent in the 
premeditation-deliberation formula.  “Lying in wait,” for example, seems fairly specific at first 
blush, but in concrete cases, it can be extraordinarily difficult to apply, and the courts have found 
it necessary to produce a complex, multi-factor test for the meaning of “lying in wait.”152 What 
is more, the phrase means different things in different cases,153 although the courts easily confuse 
this point.154 In fact, Anderson and Perez, in their respective murders, probably “lay in wait,” 
since this kind of murder in California mainly seems to require a surprise attack, and it “does not 
require that the victim come to the murderer.”  Thus, in California (as opposed to some other 
jurisdictions), the murderer does not have to “wait” to “lie in wait.”155 The Anderson case shows 
 
150 Cal. Penal Code § 189 (West 2005).  See generally LEVENSON § 5:13-5:28 (discussing these kinds of murder in 
California).  Note that the specification of felonies that can support first-degree murders creates both a first-degree 
and a second-degree version of the felony-murder rule in California.  See LEVENSON § 5:17. 
151 See LAFAVE 771. 
152 E.g., People v. Huerta, 2005 WL 2374856 at III (Cal. App. 3d Dist.) (unreported decision).  See also infra notes 
153-54 and authorities therein cited (discussing other problems raised by “lying in wait”). 
153 Id. The jury’s task is made more complicated because in many cases, particularly death penalty cases, both 
formulations appear.  I.e., “lying in wait” is defined in two inconsistent ways.  The jury then must apply one lying-
in-wait definition to one issue and another definition of the same term to another issue. 
154 See id. The court there cited both definitions but did not indicate which it was applying. 
155 Id., citing People v. Gurule, 28 Cal.4th 557, 631 (2002).  In Gurule, the defendant surprised the victim after 
engaging him in conversation.  This circumstance sufficed to supply the lying-in-wait ingredient.  By this standard, 
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another kind of ambiguity by raising the issue whether Anderson killed while committing the 
felony of lewd acts upon a child in violation of California Penal Code § 288.156 This 
circumstance also suffices to elevate the murder to first degree.157 The Anderson majority held 
the evidence insufficient to raise “any” inference of a sexual motive,158 prompting the question 
whether there could ever be such a case, given the powerful evidence there of precisely that 
motive.  The dissent briefly but persuasively details the argument to the contrary.159 
These specific-means definitions of first-degree murder exhibit the flaw of disparity just 
as the premeditation-deliberation formula does: a disconnect from blameworthiness.  Given that 
the essential factor for “lying in wait” in California seems to be surprise,160 and given that many 
if not most murder victims presumably are surprised by their killers’ use of deadly force, it is 
easy to see how inconsistent outcomes can result.  A person subjected to surprise automatically 
becomes the victim of a first-degree murder, provided, that  is, that the jury exercises its 
“discretion” accordingly; but if the victim expects to be killed and is not surprised, this kind of 
special-means murder does not apply, and the killing may be reduced to a lesser degree, even 
though there is no basis in proportional crime grading for this difference.  In fact, the whole idea 
of separately defining lying-in-wait murders would seem unnecessary if only the words of the 
statute meant what they said, because it would appear that  a killer who lies in wait, intending to 
 
both Anderson and Perez would allow inferences of lying in wait, and a premeditation analysis would become 
unnecessary.  In fact, the reasoning in Gurule would appear to support first-degree murder in any case except one in 
which the victim approached the killer while knowing of the killer’s plan to kill that very victim.  See also 
LEVENSON § 5:15 (discussing complexities of “lying in wait”). 
 But some jurisdictions require a “watching and waiting in a concealed position.”  See LAFAVE 771, citing United 
States v. Shaw, 701 F.2d 367 (5th Cir. 1983). 
156 Cal. Penal Code § 288 (West 2005). 
157 Cal. Penal Code § 189 (West 2005) (defining as first-degree murder any killing perpetrated in the commission of 
a crime under § 288). 
158 447 P.2d at 954-55. 
159 See supra note 57 and accompanying text. 
160 See supra note 155 and accompanying text. 
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commit murder, acts with premeditation and deliberation anyway. 
 In the end, these specific-means definitions of first degree murder probably plug a few 
loopholes, but they do so at the expense of creating new ambiguities, inconsistencies, and 
disparities.  They serve mainly to demonstrate the inadequacy of the Pennsylvania pattern.  Isn’t 
there a better way? 
E. The Model Penal Code Approach: One Degree of Murder 
1. A Single Degree of Murder, Committed in One of Three Ways 
 My State, Texas, differs sharply from the Pennsylvania pattern (and from California) in 
its definition of murder. At one time, Texas did have two degrees of murder,161 but our 
legislature was persuaded by the drafters of the Model Penal Code162 to adopt a single degree. 
The offense can be committed in any one of three ways:163 
first, by “. . . intentionally or knowingly” causing the death of  an individual.
This type of murder in Texas is a verbatim adoption of the Model Penal Code 
formula, except that the word “intentionally” is substituted for the word 
“purposefully” in the MPC. “Intentionally” is defined precisely, following the 
MPC, and so is “knowingly.” 
second, by “. . . intending to cause serious bodily injury” while committing “an 
act clearly dangerous to human life” that causes the death of an individual. 
This Texas definition of murder resembles common law murder based on a 
serious assault, except that it goes beyond requiring the mental state of intent to 
commit the assault by adding an objective actus reus component: an “act clearly 
dangerous to human life.” This component confines the application of this 
provision. 
third, by committing a defined version of felony murder. This kind of murder also 
differs sharply in Texas from other definitions, which is discussed and critiqued in 
a later section of this article. 
 
161 The two degrees were “murder with malice” and (counterintuitively) “murder without malice” (emphasis added).  
See generally Mims v. State, 3 S.W.3d 923, 925-26 (Tex. Crim. 1999) (detailing the statutory history and citing the 
statute as Tex. Penal Code art. 1257 (1931)). 
162 American Law Institute, Model Penal Code § 210.1 (1962). 
163 Tex. Penal Code § 19.02 (b) (Vernon 2005) (emphasis added). 
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Jurors in Texas thus are not given confusing, internally inconsistent instructions. In the simplest 
kinds of cases, they are required to decide, beyond a reasonable doubt, whether the killing was 
“intentionally” or “knowingly” committed.164 
This inquiry, under the Model Penal Code, is clear and relatively unambiguous, and it 
probably can be applied by jurors with a facility close to that of judges. A definition of “intent” 
and of “knowledge” is provided.165 In close cases, these definitions probably are helpful, but the 
key advantage of the terminology is that the technical definitions do not vary sharply from the 
ordinary understanding.166 The use of a single degree of murder avoids reliance on any one 
particular factor in grading the seriousness of murders. The blameworthiness of the crime is 
taken into account at sentencing.167 At that stage, aggravating factors such as those present in the 
Anderson case can be taken into account, so that the violence, duration, and inexcusable nature 
of a murder like that one can be reflected in a more severe sentence. At the same time, the 
sentence for a intentional murder such as that in the Carroll case, above, where the defendant 
killed under circumstances of provocation, can reflect fully the mitigating factors that were 
present there, without the automatic enhancement of the minimum sentence, by a vague 
premeditation-deliberation formula, that would result in Pennsylvania or California. 
 At the same time, imagine a defendant whose intent was to inflict injury just short of 
death, but the defendant is in the unsympathetic position of saying, “I guess I went too far, and I 
killed the victim. Gee, I’m sorry.” California might well treat this act as less than murder or, at 
 
164 Tex. Penal Code § 19.02 (b)(1) (Vernon 2005). 
165 Tex. Penal Code § 6.03 (Vernon 2005). 
166 Intent exists when the result is the actor’s “conscious objective or desire.”  Knowledge exists when the actor is 
“reasonably certain” that the actor’s conduct will cause the result.  Id. These provisions are derived from § 2.02 of 
the Model Penal Code. 
167 The statute defines murder as a first-degree felony, and thus it carries a penalty imprisonment for 5 to 99 years or 
life.  Tex. Penal Code §§ 12.32, 19.02 (c) (Vernon 2005). 
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the least, might not regard it as first-degree.168 And it should be added, there will be cases in 
which the precise intent of the defendant—whether actually to kill, or whether to inflict injury as 
close as possible to death—cannot be known beyond a reasonable doubt, and although it would 
make sense to call the crime murder, and a serious grade of murder at that, a California jury 
might not be able to do so. By defining murder to include intent to cause serious injury, Texas 
enables the jury to find a verdict commensurate with the seriousness of this crime.  At the same 
time, Texas limits the offense by an objective requirement: a simultaneous act by the defendant 
that, viewed extrinsically, is “clearly dangerous to human life.”169 
2. A Real-Life Example: The “I Dare You to Kill Him” Murder 
 Perhaps it is best to illustrate this contrast by analyzing an example under both sets of 
laws.  I recall a case, from the days when I tried criminal cases frequently, that will help to 
compare these Texas laws to murder statutes conforming to the Pennsylvania pattern. We called 
it the “I Dare You to Kill Him” Murder, because it resulted when the killer responded, apparently 
reflexively, to a “dare.” A companion who happened to be present taunted the killer-to-be for 
reasons unknown, by saying, “I dare you to kill that guy,” whereupon the killer, apparently 
without thinking, raised his gun and did just that. The I Dare You to Kill Him Murder did not 
result in a published decision of any court, and I have been unable to reconstruct the precise 
evidence; nevertheless, I recall the crime with a vividness that probably results from its 
senselessness—and from thinking how poorly the Pennsylvania pattern would treat it. In the 
Criminal Law casebook of which I am a coauthor, the I Dare You to Kill Him Murder is stated 
 
168 The intent to kill would be lacking, and therefore express malice would be absent.  Cal. Penal Code § 188 (West 
2005).  The jury conceivably could find implied malice in the form of an “abandoned and malignant heart,” Id., but 
this phrase creates other difficult issues.  See infra Pt. II (B) of this Article (discussing second-degree murder). 
169 Intent to commit a serious injury assault is not enough, even if it causes death; the actor must also commit an “act 
clearly dangerous to human life.”  Tex. Penal Code § 19.02 (b)(2).  This requirement limits assaultive murder with 
an objective element. 
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hypothetically as follows:170 
Two gang members, known as “Big Jim” and “Shorty,” are . . . waiting to do 
a drive-by shooting. They do not plan to kill anyone, just to leave a “calling card” 
by shooting up a rival’s home. Suddenly, a stranger on a bicycle, unknown to 
either of them, approaches. Big Jim says to Shorty, “I dare you to kill this guy.” 
Without hesitation, Shorty lifts his gun and shoots. It appears that Shorty’s 
conduct is a mere reaction, with no thought or purpose, and in fact Shorty is afraid 
of Big Jim and usually does what he tells him to do without question. The bullet 
pierces the man’s aorta and immediately kills the victim, who happens to be a 
first-generation immigrant working as a message deliverer to support his five 
children. 
The reader can consider this example as hypothetical, if desired, although it correctly reflects a 
real case in its legally significant elements. 
 Murder, Pennsylvania style, would make a mess out of this case. The jury would be 
instructed to look for “premeditation” and “deliberation” in an act that is despicable precisely 
because is so bizarre, thoughtless, and inexcusable that an inquiry into these issues does not have 
much to do with the blameworthiness of the crime. The jury would be told that no particular time 
duration is required for premeditation and deliberation, an instruction that conflicts with the idea 
of distinct decisionmaking beforehand that is implied by premeditation and deliberation.171 The 
trial court (and appellate judges) might then be required to second-guess the jury’s verdict by 
using standards not provided to the jury, including (in California) the Anderson factors.172 This 
review, like the instructions to the jury, would not correspond at all to degrees of 
blameworthiness.  
 Specifically, using the Anderson factors, the appellate court probably would find that 
there was no “‘planning’ activity,” because the killer did nothing identifiable to prepare for 
 
170 DAVID CRUMP et al., CRIMINAL LAW: CASES, STATUTES, AND LAWYERING STRATEGIES 32 
(2005). 
171 See supra note 145 and accompanying text. 
172 See supra notes 121-29 and accompanying text. 
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killing this particular victim that was distinct from the killing itself. Since Anderson focuses on 
planning “activity,” rather than the (mental) planning that a premeditation requirement appears to 
call for, it seems to require a distinct “activity” beforehand, even though that factor may not 
correlate closely with blameworthiness. Here, there is none.173 Then, there is the second 
Anderson factor: motive. It seems doubtful that the jury can find a preexisting motive to kill here, 
one that would support an inference of premeditation.174 And finally, the third factor, that of a 
“particular and exacting” manner of causing death so as to support an inference of premeditation, 
is likewise absent, because the killer’s act was reflexive.175 The crime is senseless, thoughtless, 
and bizarre, but California might exonerate the I-Dare-You killer of first degree murder precisely 
because his act was senseless, thoughtless, and bizarre.176 Once again, the Pennsylvania pattern 
seems designed most of all to fit the genteel, intellectual killer of Agatha-Christie-type 
mythology, even though in fact it applies more broadly; and it produces nonsensical results when 
applied to the brutal, inexcusable kinds of murders of the real world—which are less romantic 
but far more common. 
 But really, the picture is more ambiguous than this analysis would imply. Does 
“‘planning’ activity” really mean an act distinct from the killing, after Perez? That opinion 
observed that the defendant had acted in a manner analogous to the “reloading” of a gun by 
obtaining a second knife after the first one broke.177 There is no comparable action here, in the I 
 
173 See supra notes 62-63 and accompanying text.  Cf. LEVENSON § 5:12 (listing six actions, such as “bringing a 
weapon to the scene” and “threatening the victim” beforehand, that suffice).  None of Professor Levenson’s six 
actions appear in the I-Dare-You Murder. 
174 See supra note 51 and accompanying text. 
175 Id. 
176 Actually, the California court has observed that first-degree murder can still exist even when the killing is 
“senseless” and “random,” if it is premeditated.  See supra note 146 and accompanying text.  But this rhetoric may 
not be useful.  First, the jury is not told about it.  See supra note 145 and accompanying text.  Second, the Anderson 
factors still are guidelines for the courts about what qualifies as “premeditated.” 
177 See supra note 127 and accompanying text. 
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Dare You to Kill Him Murder. On the other hand, the killing was all one course of conduct in 
Perez. If we consider the killing in that way, perhaps planning activity is an unimportant factor, 
not one that should keep this I-Dare-You crime from being first-degree. As for “motive,” can it 
be inferred from the I-Dare-You statement? Perhaps the motive to support premeditation is there: 
a motive to avoid seeming less than macho, by responding to a dare.  Although this is a dubious 
motive, it is an inferable one. On the other hand, one can infer that because the crime was 
reflexive and immediate, no motive sufficient for premeditation is present. Finally, there is the 
idea of “particular and exacting” means. But what does “particular and exacting means” mean? If 
it means the infliction of injury likely to cause death, a bullet through the aorta seems to qualify. 
If, on the other hand, one focuses on the shot itself—a spur-of-the-moment act here, without 
careful aiming—the inference of a “particular and exacting” means disappears. 
 Thus, the so-called guidelines for first-degree murder dissolve into the vaguest kind of 
ambiguity when applied to a real case. If that is to happen—if standards applied by reviewing 
courts are to turn into nothingness when used to resolve concrete cases—once again, let it be 
about something other than the definition of the most serious criminal offense in the Penal Code. 
 But we are not yet through. There also is the question of the viability of the Anderson 
 factors themselves: whether Anderson is still good law after Perez. If we look at what the 
California court has said, the three Anderson factors are not to be used as exclusive or necessary 
requirements.178 This conclusion might (or might not) lead to the upholding of a first-degree 
murder verdict in the I Dare You to Kill Him Murder. But if we look at what the California court 
in fact did with the three factors in Perez, which was to treat them as exclusive and necessary, 
 
178 See supra note 126 and accompanying text.  See also LEVENSON § 5:12 (discussing current views of 
Anderson). 
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the I Dare You to Kill Him Murder probably is not first degree.179 The California court has not 
provided guidance that would tell us whether it is, or not. 
 And . . . the picture is even worse than this analysis would suggest. A criminal conviction 
requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt.180 The jury will be told this, firmly, over and again, 
and judges reviewing the jury’s decision will countermand the verdict if the required level of 
proof is not present. And the unpleasant reality is that no one can reconstruct this crime—the I 
Dare You to Kill Him Murder—with very much accuracy. The prosecution cannot prove the 
crime in its case in chief by questioning the killer.181 Its best witness to the premeditation-
deliberation issue is that fine citizen, Big Jim, the very provocateur who uttered the phrase, “I 
dare you to kill that guy.” But Big Jim has every reason to decline to testify. If he does testify, he 
has every motive to falsify. And if instead he testifies truthfully, the jury has every reason to 
discount his story—to find reasonable doubt about every aspect of it.182 Therefore, the jury 
probably cannot obtain a precise picture of the events that control the premeditation-deliberation 
issue, and having reasonable doubts aplenty about that issue, it is required to acquit the killer of 
first degree murder even if that  is what would result from accurate reconstruction.  
 A crime definition that depends exclusively on factors that are inherently subject to such 
proof vagaries is not a good definition. And one need only reflect for a moment to realize that the 
evidence will often present this kind of factual confusion when the issues are as subjective as 
premeditation and deliberation. Unless there is definitive evidence from an entirely believable 
source, the facts that determine premeditation and deliberation are going to remain ambiguous in 
 
179 See supra note 127 and accompanying text. 
180 See, e.g., In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970) (recognizing burden as constitutionally required). 
181 U.S. CONST. amend. v. 
182 Cf. Williamson v. United States, 512 U.S. 594 (1994) (discussing potential lack of reliability in statements of 
coparticipants, on the ground that they may have motive to place blame on others falsely). 
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the courtroom, even if they would have been obvious to a neutral observer of the crime. 
Whenever the killer acts without witnesses (or with less than precise or credible witnesses, such 
as his own friends or coconspirators), the crime of first-degree murder may be unprovable even if 
everyone “knows” that it exists.183 And this is a bad state of affairs, one that crime definition 
should avoid if possible. 
 There is another twist, perhaps even more strange than those described above, that would 
result if the I-Dare-You murder were to occur in California.  As we have seen, the premeditation-
deliberation formula is not the only kind of first-degree murder, because the statute also includes 
non-premeditated murders committed by poison, lying in wait, and certain other specified means.  
One of these other provisions happens to define as first-degree “any murder which is perpetrated 
by means of discharging a firearm from a motor vehicle, intentionally at another person outside 
of the vehicle with the intent to inflict death.”184 It is here that the Pennsylvania pattern produces 
its most dubious outcomes.  If Big Jim and Shorty are sitting on the curb while waiting to be 
picked up for their drive-by-shooting when Shorty fires his shot, the murder probably is second-
degree, but if they are already in the car, it is first-degree.  This distinction does not correlate 
with blameworthiness at all, and it is emblematic of the gaps left in the premeditation-
deliberation formula. 
 Now, let us contrast these results under the Pennsylvania pattern to the Model Penal 
Code, as it appears in Texas law. The jury in Texas will be given a relatively clear question: did 
the defendant kill intentionally or knowingly? The precision of the bullet wound, to the 
 
183 “Often, there is no witness to the killing; and even if there is a witness, the killer does not always speak his mind.  
So . . . the facts . . . must be determined from the defendant’s conduct (so far as we can learn of it, usually from 
circumstantial evidence) . . . .”  LAFAVE 768. 
184 Cal. Penal Code § 190 (West 2005).  See also LEVENSON § 5:26 (discussing this kind of murder). 
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deceased’s aorta, supplies enough to support this inference.185 The alleged reflexiveness of the 
offense, even if inferable from the evidence, does not control the outcome, and neither do other 
vague unknowables, unrelated to blameworthiness, that the Pennsylvania pattern might use to 
determine premeditation and deliberation. If the jury remains unsure about the defendant’s intent 
to kill (or knowledge that he is killing), the inference that he must, in a reasonable world, have 
intended at least to cause a grievous injury, together with the “act clearly dangerous to human 
life” that the defendant committed by shooting at a human being, independently supports a 
conviction for the unitarily graded crime of murder in Texas. This conclusion results from the 
second type of murder, defined by “intent to cause serious bodily injury.”186 Mitigating factors, 
such as the impulsiveness of the I-Dare-You crime (if that is thought to be mitigating), are taken 
into account at sentencing, as are the mitigating factors that the impulse did not originate with 
the defendant (but instead came from Big Jim) and that the killer may have acted because he was 
afraid of Big Jim. As it decides its verdict, the jury uses clear definitions, phrased in words that 
non-lawyers can follow. And those terms correspond closely to the standards that reviewing 
judges will use in deciding whether to uphold the jury’s verdict, so that the courts can avoid 
second-guessing the jury on bases not contained in any statute and not known to the jury. 
 Results under this simpler Model-Penal-Code-based standard are likely to be more 
uniform. The verdict is less likely to be influenced by invidious considerations, such as whether 
the defendant is a type of person against whom the jury is prejudiced, and by the same token, the 
social class of a high-status individual is less likely to result in a verdict improperly lowered by 
jurors’ predilections. The values of the people of the State are more likely to be carried out in the 
 
185 Cf. Rojas v. State, 986 S.W.2d 241, 245-46 (Tex. 1998) (shooting of victim between the eyes sufficient to prove 
intent to kill).  In addition, the “deadly weapon doctrine” may allow inference of intent from the use of a firearm, in 
many States.  See, LAFAVE 734-35. 
55
grading of the State’s most serious crimes.  
 Above all, under the Model Penal Code formulation, the definition of the State’s most 
serious crime is not separated from considerations of blameworthiness, as they are under the 
Pennsylvania pattern.  The drafters of the Model Penal Code, which Texas closely followed, 
explained their reasons for rejecting premeditation and deliberation by pointing out the 
disconnect between these terms and rational crime grading.187 In fact, as this article has 
observed, this thought occurred to the English historian Stephen as early as 1883,188 and it has 
been repeated by modern writers.  For example, Sean J. Kealy calls premeditation “a poor 
indicator of severity,” and he asserts that there must be “better methods for determining which 
killings are worthy of society’s most severe penalties.”  Premeditated killings, he adds, “are not 
necessarily the worst crimes; in fact, many unpremeditated killings shock society’s conscience 
more than premeditated murders.”189 England has consistently declined to use premeditation in 
defining its modern crimes,190 and American jurisdictions have increasingly rejected the 
premeditation-deliberation formula.191 In fact, commentators from States using premeditation, 
including California, have argued that it should not be included in any new definition of 
 
186 Cf. Manuel v. State, 2002 WL 834537 (Tex. App.) (unpublished opinion) (holding evidence of fatal shooting 
sufficient to support inference of intent to cause serious bodily injury). 
187 Comment, Model Penal Code § 210.2 Part II (1962). 
188 See supra note 100 and accompanying text. 
189 Sean J. Kealy, supra note 101, at 248. 
190 ROYAL COMM’N ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, REPORT 182-89 (1953). 
191 In addition to Texas, see, e.g., Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 53a-54b (West 1985); Del. Code Ann. § 636 (1979 & 
Supp. 1986); Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 91 (West 1987); Maine Rev. Stat. Ann. § 201 (West 2005); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 
940, 01 (West 1982).  See generally Sean J. Kealy, supra note 101, at 249 & nn. 348-49. 
 It should be added that rejection of degrees of murder, in favor of using the sentencing process to reflect 
differences in blameworthiness, substitutes sentencing discretion of the kind usually handled by judges for findings 
of fact by juries.  The merits of judicial decisionmaking compared to that of juries is an old debate, of course, but 
this article does not intend to take sides on the general question. 
 Instead, the point is that sentencing discretion would provide a better mechanism for correlating results to 
blameworthiness than the dysfunctional jury discretion provided by the premeditation concept. 
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murder.192 Texas, by way of contrast, arguably has preserved the connection between crime 
definition and blameworthiness by adopting a single degree of murder and authorizing the taking 
into account of differences in culpability and severity at sentencing. 
 All of these advantages are negated, however, by the unstructured “discretion” provided 
juries by the California statutes and by the Anderson factors. That discretion should be labeled as 
what it really is: lawless arbitrariness. States using the Pennsylvania pattern would do well to 
adopt the reasoning of the Model Penal Code by defining a single degree of murder, in terms that 
mean what they say. 
II. THE MALICE AFORETHOUGHT CRITERION:  DEFINING 
MURDER BY MISNOMER AND METAPHOR 
 A separate problem with the Pennsylvania pattern is that all murder requires “malice 
aforethought.”193 This is the defining mental state for murder.  First-degree murder, as we have 
seen, also requires premeditation and deliberation, but malice aforethought is a necessary 
element of both degrees of murder, second-degree as well as first.  In fact, this term is a key 
ingredient of the Pennsylvania pattern and is to be found in the laws of many States.194 It traces 
to the common law and is deeply imbedded in Anglo-American jurisprudence.195 It also is a 
term, however, that is subject to severe criticism; in fact, it makes for bad crime definition. 
A. Is Malice Aforethought an Unnecessary Double Misnomer?  
 Malice aforethought does not require malice. Nor does it need to be preceded by any 
 
192 E.g., Charles L. Hobson, Reforming California’s Homicide Law, 23 PEPP. L. REV. 495, 520-21 (1996); Leo M. 
Romero, Unintentional Homicides Caused by Risk-Creating Conduct: Problems in Distinguishing Between 
Depraved Mind Murder, Second Degree Murder, Involuntary Manslaughter, and Noncriminal Homicide in New 
Mexico, 20 N.M. L. REV. 55, 72 (1990). 
193 E.g., Cal. Penal Code § 187 (West 2005).  See generally LEVENSON § 5:8 (discussing meanings of express and 
implied malice). 
194 See DAVID CRUMP et al., supra note 15, at 33-35 (explaining the term). 
195 Its development “required several centuries.”  LAFAVE 725. 
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aforethought. As a common law term, it may have originated in cases where literal malice 
aforethought existed, but it has become a term of art.196 It covers murders where no one is angry 
or acts with spite. It covers murders that are not premeditated or deliberate. In fact, it covers 
murders that are not even intentional; it is possible to act with malice aforethought by killing 
accidentally.197 The term expanded through common law evolution to include such unintentional 
homicides as those resulting from certain kinds of assaults, those committed during felonies, 
those perpetrated while resisting arrest (possibly), and those exhibiting depravity:  “depraved-
heart” murder.198 Malice aforethought became a flexible, useful term that simply stood for, and 
could be translated as, “the required mens rea for murder.” Most lawyers understand these 
principles from having taken Criminal Law courses. 
 But jurors do not come to court with an awareness of what the term “malice 
aforethought” means. It must be explained to them, and the explanation unfortunately must begin 
with the proposition that the jurors should not listen to the actual words of the judge’s charge, 
because they do not mean what they say. As Lafave puts it, the term is “misleading.”199 Usually, 
malice aforethought is explained in instructions at the end of the case as either “express malice,” 
which can be supplied by “intent,” or as “implied malice,” which can be supplied by several 
means, such as proof that the defendant acted with an “abandoned and malignant heart” (or, in 
 
196 Id. (observing that the phrase “does not even approximate its literal meaning”).  It appears that early concepts of 
malice may have included an ingredient similar to today’s premeditation, although it was not used as it is today to 
separate degrees of murder.  See id. 725.  See also LEVENSON § 5:8 (“[t]he difficulty of defining ‘malice 
aforethought’ has been recognized by many courts”); Charles L. Hobson, supra note 56, at 495-507 (similar); 
Suzanne E. Mounts, Malice Aforethought in California: A History of Legislative Abdication and Judicial 
Vacillation, 333 U.S.F. L. REV. 313 (1999) (similar). 
197 See infra Pt. II(B) of this Article; see also LAFAVE 725-26. 
198 See LAFAVE 725-26, 737-65 (discussing these variants of malice).  Resisting-arrest murder is a doubtful 
category.  See id. at 765.  See also Cal. Penal Code § 188 (West 2005) (distinguishing express malice, defined as 
intent, from implied malice, which in California uses the “abandoned and malignant heart” metaphor). 
199 LAFAVE 725. 
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some jurisdictions, with a “depraved heart”).200 The instructions usually do not expressly say that 
the terms “malice” and “aforethought” do not mean what they say, although this is the real 
significance of the instructions.201 The jury might as well be told that malice aforethought is a 
double misnomer: a label that means something quite different than what its words say, or rather, 
in this instance, a pair of labels used in misleading senses, as Lafave says.  The task of educating 
the jurors about the meaning of malice aforethought early in the case usually falls to the 
prosecutor, and sometimes to the defense lawyer as well.202 Usually, with the consumption of 
adequate time, the jurors can be reasonably educated about the fact that malice aforethought does 
not mean what it says. But that does not mean that jury instructions that contradict the jury’s 
task, or that require jurors to ignore the judge’s words, are a good idea. 
 I have had an unusual kind of experience with these issues, because early on, I tried 
murder cases under laws that required “malice aforethought” instructions, and later, I also tried 
murder cases in which the laws were phrased in terms of the Model Penal Code requirements of 
“intent” and “knowledge.”203 In malice-aforethought cases, the jury voir dire required a lengthy 
colloquy with the jury, centered upon the fact that the instructions would not mean what they 
said when the jurors received them at the end of the case. “Mr. / Ms. Jones, you understand, do 
you not, that malice is just a word, and it does not mean what it says? That when the judge uses 
 
200 E.g., Cal. Penal Code § 188 (West 2005) (defining express and implied malice); LAFAVE 725-26, 733-37, 739-
44 (same); LEVENSON § 5:8 (same). 
 See Committee on Standard Jury Instructions, California Jury Instructions—Criminal (CALJIC) § 8.11 (2005). 
201 The definition does indicate that a “pre-existing hatred” is not required, but it does not explicitly say that no 
“aforethought” at all is required, and it still could be taken to imply that a “contemporaneous hatred” is required, 
since a “pre-existing hatred” is not.  Furthermore, the definition is subject to greater confusion when embedded in a 
complete charge full of word usages.  Cf. e.g., People v. Conley, 411 P.2d 911 (Cal. 1966) (reproducing suggested 
charge which, though superseded in some ways, defines malice aforethought in context). 
202 Cf. DAVID CRUMP, supra note 15, at 15, 50-51 (explaining tactics). 
203 This experience was as an assistant district attorney for Harris County [Houston], Texas, from 1972 through 
1975.  During this time, Texas adopted a new Penal Code that was based on the MPC.  See supra notes 161-63 and 
accompanying text. 
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it, it really just means intent, or a ‘depraved heart’?” This questioning would be followed by the 
same treatment of the term, “aforethought,” and all of it would be preceded by an explanation of 
the double misnomer contained in the key phrase. It was difficult to accomplish this jury-
education function, however, consistently with meaningful jury examination, because many 
judges before whom I practiced preferred to have the voir dire for each side concluded within a 
half hour to an hour. The effort spent unraveling the meaning of malice aforethought consumed a 
major part of that time, making it impractical to address other important subjects.204 Even aside 
from the limitations imposed by time, jurors are like other human beings and can absorb only a 
certain number of foreign concepts at one sitting.  The principles involved in understanding the 
non-terminology of malice aforethought always seemed to elbow out understanding of other 
important concepts.  After the Model Penal Code version became the law in Texas, juries seemed 
to understand from the beginning the definitions of murder, lesser offenses, and defenses, about 
which they had seemed confused before.  And a jury that comprehends the law while hearing the 
evidence seems more likely to acquit or convict in accordance with the law. 
 Again, let me emphasize that it usually is possible to educate the jury about malice 
aforethought. I doubt that many jurors decide murder cases believing that murder can only result 
from ill will or spite, or that murders can only result from thinking about killing beforehand, 
because the voir dire or opening statement or final argument, if done competently, will inform 
them otherwise. This is by no means the most serious defect in the Pennsylvania pattern. The fact 
remains, however, that the double misnomer in malice aforethought is unnecessary. It could be 
remedied by a simple but elegant solution: the legislature could delete the phrase, “malice 
aforethought” entirely, and instead use the definitions that are to be given of that phrase. The 
 
204 The trial of a murder indictment often involves multiple lesser included offenses as well as multiple defensive 
theories.  Each of these also has multiple elements that the jury must understand. 
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phrase, malice aforethought, contributes nothing, and more specific instructions, to the effect that 
the guilty mental state can be supplied by an “intentional” killing or by a killing accompanied by 
the conditions corresponding to an “abandoned and malignant heart,”205 would convey all of the 
meaning that there is to convey.  
 This solution would eliminate the wasted time consumed by the need to explain the 
misnomer. It would prevent that explanation from crowding out an understanding of other 
important principles. And although I doubt that malice aforethought is frequently a misleading 
factor (because competent lawyers address it carefully), there probably are instances in which the 
double misnomer does result in miscarriages of justice, both by inappropriate conviction and by 
inappropriate acquittal.206 The malice-aforethought distractant, it should be remembered, is 
cumulative of the confusion created by the premeditation requirement. “Premeditation” does 
suggest a kind of “aforethought” element, and so jurors must understand that the malice-
aforethought issue is different.  They must separate out the aforethought aspect of first degree 
murder from the non-aforethought that is required for murders generally, even though the jury 
instructions literally call for “aforethought” for all murders.  Each of these concepts requires 
jurors to cross-reference different parts of the judge’s instructions, and the law recognizes that 
repeated cross-referencing creates confusion in lay readers.207 The malice label, too, may linger 
 
205 In fact, California has adopted this kind of omission and substitution for another phrase, “abandoned and 
malignant heart.”  Although this phrase is in the California murder statute, CALJIC § 8.11 omits it from jury 
instructions defining malice and instead informs the jury only of the underlying meaning.  See infra notes 223-25 
and accompanying text. 
206 For example, it seems possible that some occasional jurors may erroneously have inferred “malice,” and therefore 
murder, from the fact that a particular defendant acted in anger, when they would have acquitted the defendant of 
murder and opted instead for manslaughter, if the misleading literal meaning of “malice aforethought” had not 
lingered with them.  And the opposite also is possible: an irrational acquittal resulting from the absence of hatred or 
anger.  These events likely are infrequent, but they seem likely to occur sometimes, and any occurrence of them is 
unnecessary—except for the persistence of the double misnomer in the definition of murder. 
207 See, e.g., Wheatly v. Myung Sook Suh, 504 A.2d 792, aff’d, 525 A.2d 340 (N.J. App. 1987) (applying New 
Jersey’s Plain Language Act to impose damages upon proponents of a confusing contract, including “[c]ross 
references that are confusing” as one indicator of unacceptable text).  And, of course, there are many articles about 
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to cause confusion. It is not beyond the realm of possibility that the existence of ill will between 
killer and victim, even though not exhibited in the killing itself, could tip the jury into finding 
murder when it would find only manslaughter if instructed without the misnomer, and likewise, 
the absence of spite or anger could result in a manslaughter conviction when the jury would have 
properly found murder if instructed in a more straightforward manner.  
 Add to all of this the ingredient of skillful lawyering by an attorney on one side or the 
other, who is determined to use the malice aforethought instruction to make it mean something 
that, properly defined, it should not, and the possibility of miscarriage of justice is multiplied.208 
Finally, there is an inherent danger in jury instructions from the judge that require telling the jury 
that the instructions do not mean what they say. The recognition that the judge’s instructions 
contain meaningless gobbledygook might easily expand into a general suspicion by jurors that 
other parts of the charge can similarly be ignored or redefined. The jury usually attempts to 
follow the charge,209 and it does not seem wise to create disrespect for this effort. 
 The Model Penal Code avoids these disadvantages by eliminating the double misnomer 
of malice aforethought. The malice terminology at one time may have been useful as a matter of 
common law evolution, but then, horses and buggies once were useful means for Californians 
and Pennsylvanians to travel to work, and keeping the malice formula today has about as much 
to commend it. The Texas approach, based on the MPC, uses intent and knowledge, followed by 
 
the intelligibility of jury instructions.  See, e.g., Dean E. Murphy, New Language for Jurors in California: Plain 
English, N.Y. Times, Aug. 28, 2005 at 112; Final Approval of Amendments to Jury Instructions Under Rule 226a, 
Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, 68 Tex. B.J. 202, 204 (2005). 
208 See DAVID CRUMP et al, supra note 15, at 51. 
209 See generally HARRY A. KALVEN & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 219, 220-41 & n.31 (1966) 
(concluding that juries usually follow charges, although they may emerge with erroneous notions if charges are not 
clearly explained to them). 
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definitions that correspond to common uses of those terms.210 Extensive cross-referencing is not 
necessary, nor does the jury need to be told that words in the charge do not mean what they say. 
B. Adjudication by Metaphor:  “Depraved Heart” Murder” 
 And there is an even more serious defect contained within the malice formula.  So called 
“express” malice often is defined under the Pennsylvania pattern as intent.211 Aside from the 
unnecessary rigmarole that it takes to get this point across because of the malice misnomer, 
intentional murder seems reasonably likely to be understandable to lay jurors. But there are other 
categories of malice aforethought called “implied” malice. One kind, which arises frequently, is 
“depraved heart” murder, or as the California statutes put it, murder committed unintentionally, 
but with an “abandoned and malignant heart.”212 This statutory provision attempts to achieve a 
kind of crime definition by literary metaphor. 
 Defining legal duties by metaphor is a bad idea.  Poets use metaphors, and in special 
situations so do other kinds of writers. But poets usually employ them for very different reasons 
than to define crimes or to convict and punish people. Poetic metaphors are usually designed to 
show abstract truths in a way that sounds good, that surprises the ear, and that challenges the 
reader. In fact, confusion often is part of the literary character of a figure of speech: a felicitously 
sonorous phrase that means two or more distinct things at the same time.213 The figure of speech 
contained in the line, “O, my luve’s like a red, red rose,” could not be used very well to explain 
 
210 See supra notes 163-66 and accompanying text. 
211 Cal. Penal Code § 188 (West 2005). 
212 Id.  See generally LEVENSON § 5:8 (discussing this kind of murder).  There is yet another kind of implied 
malice in California based on a  complex concept called the “provocative act” doctrine, which can apply, for 
example, to a defendant who initiates a gun battle in which another perpetrator kills.  LEVENSON § 5:9.  The 
provocative act doctrine is beyond the scope of this article, except to the extent that it might be observed that this is 
another unruly set of complexities that would be unnecessary if California adopted a more straightforward homicide 
law. 
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in a literal way what the author’s love is really like.214 A metaphor is a species of analogy, and 
usually it is a far-fetched analogy at that. In any event, analogy is a type of inductive logic in 
which one thing is inferred to be similar to another in one aspect because of ostensibly unrelated 
similarities in another aspect, and it requires careful selection of the similarities upon which to 
build the metaphor and careful restriction of the inferences to be drawn from them.215 For 
precision, reasoning by analogy is inferior to the deductive logic that proceeds from 
definitions.216 A standard dictionary does not depend upon metaphors to define the meaning of 
words, and neither should jury instructions. 
 In particular, a metaphor such as “abandoned and malignant heart” is too indeterminate to 
serve well in crime definition.217 What does it mean? Most of us, from time to time, display what 
might be labeled an “abandoned and malignant heart” in our dealings with some moral 
dilemmas, but that does not mean that we display the state of mind  corresponding to 
blameworthiness for murder. The resulting jury instruction, if it uses these words, resembles 
telling a group of decisionmakers, “Decide whether you think the defendant is as evil as a 
pomegranate, and if so, convict him of murder.” “As evil as a pomegranate,” although less 
familiar, conveys about as much information as “abandoned and malignant heart” does in 
 
213 See RANDOM HOUSE WEBSTER’S COLLEGE DICTIONARY 851 (1995) (defining the term as “application 
of a word or phrase to an object or concept that it does not literally denote . . .”).  For criticism of this approach, see 
Charles L. Hobson, supra note 56, at 499-500).   
214 The line is from Robert Burns’s poem, A Red, Red Rose.  See www.worldburnsclub.com/poems/translations/ 
a_red_red_rose.htm (Nov. 13, 2005). 
215 See DAVID CRUMP, HOW TO REASON ABOUT THE LAW: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY APPROACH TO 
THE FOUNDATIONS OF PUBLIC POLICY 1-5 (2005) (explaining analogy as a type of induction). 
216 Id. 
217 For discussions of the disadvantages of this kind of crime definition, see Michael H. Hoffheimer, Murder and 
Manslaughter in Mississippi: Unintentional Killings, 71 MISS. L.J. 35, 109-23 (2001) (discussing Mississippi’s 
version, including the possibility that the metaphor “may have no meaning at all”); John Rockwell Snowden, Second 
Degree Murder, Malice, and Manslaughter in Nebraska: New Juice for an Old Cup, 76 NEB. L. REV. 399 (1999) 
(discussing Nebraska’s version); Abraham Abrahamovsky, Depraved Indifference Murder Prosecutions in New 
York: Time for Substantive and Procedural Clarification, 55 SYRACUSE L. REV. 455 (2005) (discussing New 
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defining murder.  One commentator suggests that the depraved-heart metaphor may have “no 
meaning at all.”218 As this article has observed in connection with the premeditation-deliberation 
formula, there is a long line of cases in which the United States Supreme Court has insisted upon 
relatively precise definition of crimes, and the Court has explained that the principal reason is to 
confine the decisions of governmentally empowered actors.219 This concern includes jurors who 
are given instructions about convicting a defendant of murder. 
 In fact, there have been defendants who have argued that the depraved-heart metaphor is 
so indeterminate that it is unconstitutional. In Thomas v. State,220 for example, a defendant in 
Nevada was sentenced to death for a murder. He argued on appeal that the jury charge, which 
contained an instruction allowing conviction for murder committed with an “abandoned and 
malignant heart,” denied him due process because “it uses terms that are archaic, without rational 
content, and merely pejorative.” The court observed, however, that it had “previously rejected 
these contentions” and dismissed the argument with a string citation.221 The court arguably was 
correct in holding that depraved heart murder is not unconstitutional, if only because that holding 
would judicially outlaw the use of a term that was current at the time of the founding of the 
United States222 and that has existed in the majority of States. But the defendant’s criticisms had 
a point to them: depraved heart murder is, indeed, “archaic, without rational content, and merely 
 
York’s analogous definition, which the courts have changed to an objective formula); LEVENSON § 5:8 
(“‘abandoned and malignant heart’ is not well defined”; preferring definition that does not use this phrase). 
218 Michael H. Hoffheimer, supra note 217, at 111. 
219 See supra notes 80-94 and accompanying text. 
220 83 P.3d 818 (Nev. 2004). 
221 Id. at 827. 
222 The depraved-heart terminology traces at least as far back as 1762.  SIR MICHAEL FOSTER, CROWN LAW 
265 (1762), as quoted in Darry v. People, 10 N.Y. 120, 139. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON 
THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 199 (1769), gives several examples of the kind of “wicked, depraved and malignant 
heart” that can supply malice.  For pre-constitutional use of the term in America, see, e.g., State v. Norris, 2 N.C. (1 
Hayw.) 429, 445 (1796) (reflecting a jury charge using Blackstone’s language). 
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pejorative.”  At the very least, a legislature or a reviewing court exercising supervisory authority 
over jury instructions should require a more precise definition of the crime of murder before a 
death sentence can be imposed. 
 This is one way, actually, in which some pattern jury instructions in California arguably 
have evolved for the better.  Jury instructions on implied malice found in CALJIC 8.11 omit the 
“abandoned and malignant heart” metaphor.  Instead, they substitute meaningful and intelligible 
language:223 
. . . Malice is implied when: 
 
1. The killing resulted from an intentional act; 
2. The natural consequences of the act are dangerous to human life; and 
3. The act was deliberately performed with knowledge of the danger to, and with 
conscious disregard for, human life. 
 
The problems raised by this instruction, however, are significant.  The first is that this 
formulation, by omitting the “abandoned and malignant heart” formula, does not use the 
statutory language passed by the legislature.  One can argue that it translates the legislation into 
different words and thereby changes the meaning enacted by the lawmaking body (although that 
conclusion depends upon discerning a coherent legislative meaning).  Courts in other 
jurisdictions may feel a proper reluctance to substitute a newly invented phrase for that contained 
in the statute.  This conjecture may lie behind Nevada’s repeated rejection, mentioned above, of 
complaints against the definition of depraved heart murder.  Second, the substituted definition is 
 
223 Committee on Standard Jury Instructions, California Jury Instruction—Criminal (CALJIC) § 8.11 (West 2005).  
The court in People v. Dellinger, 783 P.2d 200, 205 (Cal. 1989), found “no error” in giving an earlier version of this 
instruction, although it cautioned that it could be error if combined with arguments undermining its subjective 
requirements. 
 In fact, the California Supreme Court has disapproved instructions that depend upon the “abandoned and 
malignant heart” language.  People v. Phillips, 414 P.2d 353 (Cal. 1966) (reasoning that the language was 
misleading).  On the other hand, it can be argued that a court should not substitute its own standard for that of the 
legislature, and that the statutory words should be included, even if they are to be followed by interpretive 
instructions. 
66
not as readily intelligible as it seems.  For example, the word “deliberate” as used here does not 
mean what the same word means in the definition of first-degree murder.  The cases caution that 
it means only intent here,224 and the jury must keep the difference in mind to apply the definition 
correctly (although it may not be told about this fine distinction, because it is not mentioned in 
CALJIC 8.11).  Finally, the definition of depraved-heart murder in California seems to remain in 
flux, with two possible branches, one of which stresses objective criteria such as “wantonness” 
more than the other, which is a more clearly subjective branch.225 The better solution would be 
legislative revision that gets rid of the depraved-heart metaphor and substitutes clearer language. 
 Furthermore, in Pennsylvania-pattern jurisdictions that continue to use the depraved heart 
metaphor to instruct juries, the terminology is not merely indeterminate. It also is defective for 
the additional reason that it invites the jury to make its decision on an invidious basis. Most 
people who commit murders or manslaughters exhibit judgmental processes that are subject to 
criticism and that can be labeled “depraved” or “abandoned and malignant.” After all, 
involuntary manslaughter corresponds to (and often is defined in terms of) “recklessness,”226 and 
recklessness in some jurisdictions involves conscious indifference to a substantial and unjustified 
risk of killing another.227 It can be appropriate in some cases to describe that state of mind as 
“depraved,” at least in the ordinary discourse with which must jurors are familiar. Thus, the 
depraved-heart metaphor is not very useful as a distinction between murder and manslaughter, 
even though that is precisely the function assigned to it. Furthermore, the depraved heart 
 
224 See People v. Saille, 820 P.2d 588, 594-95 (Cal. 1991). 
225 See infra notes 235-38 and accompanying text (discussing the ongoing case of People v. Noel). 
226 Recklessness is the mens rea required by the Model Penal Code, although the MPC does not explicitly 
distinguish involuntary manslaughter from voluntary.  American Law Institute, Model Penal Code § 210.3 (1962).  
California uses recklessness to define involuntary manslaughter but uses the term confusingly together with other 
terms such as gross negligence.  See infra note 237; see also Pt. IIIB of this article (discussing this offense). 
227 Again, this is the Model Penal Code formulation. Id. § 2.02(2)(c). 
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metaphor does not prevent jurors from considering matters of “depravity” unrelated to the 
murder itself, or even from convicting the defendant, not because of his criminal behavior in this 
case, but because of who he is: because the jurors do not like him and consider him “depraved.” 
It should be added that the subjective depraved-heart instruction usually is accompanied by 
objective charges about its meaning, which may tell the jury that an “extreme indifference to the 
value of human life” is required.228 This kind of instruction probably helps to confine the 
vagueness and misleading nature of depraved heart murder, but “depravity” or an “abandoned 
and malignant heart” may remain the principal message.  It is too vivid and picturesque to be 
redefined by more precise but less interesting images. 
 Cases involving accusations of murder for killings by dogs are an example of these 
disadvantages. In Berry v. Superior Court,229 the defendant used a tethered pit bull dog, which he 
knew was capable of killing, to guard his marijuana plants. A two-year-old boy who resided 
nearby strayed into an area within reach of the dog, which mauled and killed the toddler.  The 
judge who presided over the defendant’s preliminary hearing bound him over for trial for 
murder. On the defendant’s application for writ of prohibition, the court of appeals upheld the 
murder charge as presenting a jury question. The court reasoned,230 
[The case law recognizes] two prerequisites for affixing second degree 
murder liability upon an unintentional killing.   One requirement is the defendant's 
extreme indifference to the value of human life, a condition which must be 
demonstrated by showing the probability that the conduct involved will cause 
death.   Another requirement is awareness either (1) of the risks of the conduct, or 
(2) that the conduct is contrary to law.   Here, evidence of the latter requirement is 
 
228 Cf. Id. § 210.2(1)(b) (MPC definition of murder). 
229 256 Cal. Rptr. 344 (1989) (ordered not published; previously published at 208 Cal. App.3d 783). 
 In addition to dog mauling cases, there are other situations that uncomfortably straddle the murder-manslaughter 
divide.  Other important examples include vehicular homicides where drivers are heavily under the influence, such 
as People v. Watson, 30 Cal.3d 290 (1981), and some kinds of homicides resulting from child maltreatment or 
neglect, People v. Burden, 72 Cal. App.3d 703 (1977). 
230 256 Cal. Rptr. at 348-50. 
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first, that the very possession of [the dog] may have constituted illegal keeping of 
a fighting dog.  Second, there is evidence that defendant kept [the dog] to guard 
marijuana plants, also conduct with elements of illegality and antisocial purpose.   
Thus the second element . . . required could be satisfied here in a number of ways. 
 Thus there is a basis from which the trier of fact could derive the two 
required elements of implied malice, namely existence of an objective risk and 
subjective awareness of that risk.   Additionally, there is arguably some base and 
antisocial purpose involved in keeping the dog (1) because harboring a fighting 
dog is illegal and (2) because there is some evidence the dog was kept to guard an 
illegal stand of marijuana.   Illegality of the underlying conduct is not an element 
of the charge, but may be relevant on the issue of subjective intent. 
In other words, the use of a non-fighting dog might have changed the result, even if the 
defendant had known of an identical risk that the dog would kill. So would have the use of the 
dog to guard something that was not independently illegal, such as money. It is unclear why 
those factors should determine something so fundamental as the difference between guilt and 
innocence of murder, as opposed to furnishing factors that might be taken into account at 
sentencing.  
 The California Supreme Court’s treatment of Berry after the court of appeals’s 
affirmance confused the issue.  Although the court of appeals opinion had already been 
published, the California Supreme Court retroactively ordered that this opinion not be officially 
published.231 This action deprived the opinion of precedential value.232 But the supreme court 
also denied review, meaning that the trial of Berry for murder could proceed.233 There is no way 
to know the reasoning that prompted the court to take these actions, but speculation, which is all 
we have left, probably would have to center on the inference that the court did not believe it 
could make sense out of the law of depraved heart murder and its distinction from manslaughter 
in a way that would justly resolve the case presented by these facts. The aftermath was that the 
 
231 256 Ca. Rptr. at 344. 
232 Cal. Rules of Court 976, 977, 979 (West 2005). 
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People prosecuted Berry for murder, but the jury returned a verdict acquitting him of murder and 
convicting him instead of the lesser offense of involuntary manslaughter.234 Again, it is difficult 
to know why.  
 Later decisions in which murder has been charged after deaths resulting from dog 
maulings have produced inconsistent results from juries and judges.  Most recently, for example, 
in People v. Noel,235 the jury convicted the defendant of second-degree murder after her dogs 
mauled a neighbor to death.  The trial court then granted the defendant a new trial because it had 
reconsidered the instructions on implied malice.  The court of appeals reversed the new trial, on 
the ground that “subjective awareness” of a “high probability of death,” which had been the 
standard used by the trial court, was not required.  Instead, the standard involved either (1) a 
“base, antisocial motive [with] wanton disregard of life” or (2) “conduct [that] endangers the life 
of another” coupled with “conscious disregard for life.”236 The first standard combines a vague 
subjective mens rea (motive) with an amorphously defined objective aspect (wantonness).  The 
second is confusingly similar to frequent definitions of recklessness, which is a typical basis for 
manslaughter in most jurisdictions, not murder.237 The California Supreme Court has granted 
review in Noel,238 and there is a chance that the court may clarify the standard to distinguish 
 
233 256 Cal. Rptr. at 344. 
234 See People v. Berry, 1 Cal. App.4th 778, 2 Cal. Rptr. 416 (1991). 
235 28 Cal. Rptr.3d 369 (2005) (review granted; previously published at 128 Cal. App.4th 1391).  See also 
LEVENSON § 5.8 (discussing Noel). 
236 28 Cal. Rptr. at 411. 
237 See supra notes 223-24 and accompanying text. 
 It should be added that California uses both “gross negligence” and “recklessness” to define its offense of 
involuntary manslaughter.  Id. at 410, quoting People v. Penny, 285 P.2d 926 (Cal. 1955) (defining involuntary 
manslaughter in terms of “aggravated, gross, reckless conduct” and also quoting cases requiring only “gross 
negligence”).  The statute requires a killing “without due care or circumspection,” which actually sounds like 
ordinary (civil) negligence.  Cal. Penal Code § 192(b) (West 2005).  See also infra Pt. IIIB of this article (analyzing 
California’s involuntary manslaughter). 
238 See supra note 232. 
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murder clearly from manslaughter and avoid vague words such as “wanton.”  Reduction of 
depraved-heart murder to a unitary definition featuring conscious indifference to human life as a 
subjective requirement, combined with a required objective element of an act dangerous to 
human life, would rationalize this standard in a manner consistent with the statute.239 It still 
would remain difficult to distinguish from manslaughter, but it would improve the Pennsylvania 
pattern. 
 Again, I believe that the Model Penal Code, as it is reflected for example in the law of 
Texas, is superior to this California confusion. Texas flatly would not authorize an indictment for 
murder in a case such as Berry or Noel. The defendants there did not act intentionally or 
knowingly to kill, did not intend serious bodily injury, and did not commit a causally related 
felony, and thus they would not have qualified for conviction under the Texas murder statute.240 
Instead, with evidence of recklessness, Texas would authorize indictment and conviction for 
manslaughter.241 One can argue persuasively that some reckless killings should be characterized 
as murders, as they would be in a depraved-heart jurisdiction such as California but would not be 
in Texas.  For example, if an enraged, jilted lover were to drive an automobile onto a busy 
sidewalk, killing a dozen people, although not aiming at anything in particular, shouldn’t his act 
be murder?  A partial answer is that it probably would be murder in Texas, if the defendant acted 
“knowingly” with respect to the probability of killing.  But even if the “knowingly” argument 
fails, the clarity and absence of ambiguity with which the crime can be set forth in Texas is a 
 
239 The statute defines “implied malice” in terms of an “abandoned and malignant heart,” so that the court must 
retain this kind of murder to remain faithful to the legislation.  Cal. Penal Code § 188 (West 2005). 
240 See supra note 163 and accompanying text. 
241 Tex. Penal Code § 19.04 (Vernon 2005).  This crime involves recklessness or conscious disregard of risk, which 
is distinct from the mental state of gross negligence.  See infra note 242 and accompanying text (explaining 
recklessness); note 291 (explaining criminal negligence).  Thus, although manslaughter in Texas superficially seems 
to correspond to involuntary manslaughter in California, the Texas crime requires subjective awareness of danger 
and carries a longer sentence than the California crime, which can be made out by inadvertence. 
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positive value in the criminal law. 
 A jury in this MPC-influenced jurisdiction would be instructed straightforwardly about 
this crime, in terms of a concept of recklessness that would be explained by a definition 
consistent with the common understanding of that term. A conviction for manslaughter in Texas, 
which is based closely on the Model Penal Code, carries a maximum penalty of twenty years 
imprisonment:242 more than enough to allow a sentence in Berry, for example, commensurate 
with the defendant’s relative blameworthiness. There would be no need for an application for 
writ of prohibition or for a court of appeals opinion interpreting “abandoned and malignant 
heart” in terms of marijuana plants. There would be no need for a Supreme Court order avoiding 
the question but retroactively assigning a published opinion to nonpublished status. There 
probably would be less inconsistency among juries and judges, if such a case had arisen in a 
Model Penal Code jurisdiction, because both the insufficiency of the evidence for murder, and its 
sufficiency for manslaughter, would be relatively unambiguous.  
III. MANSLAUGHTER: LESSER-DEGREE HOMICIDES 
A. Voluntary Manslaughter: A Passion Killing, Arising from an Adequate Cause 
 The California law of voluntary manslaughter, unlike the law of murder, does not exhibit 
so many arguable deficiencies. In fact, it avoids some of the mistakes that the drafters of the 
Model Penal Code fell into in defining this crime. The California law of voluntary 
manslaughter243 is functionally similar to the law in Texas governing passion killings, except that 
Texas does not create a differently labeled crime—in Texas, the crime remains murder, even if 
committed under passion circumstances, and the provocation element is reflected in a lessened 
 
242 Tex. Penal Code §§ 12.33, 19.04 (Vernon 2005) (defining manslaughter as second-degree felony; setting 
maximum for this degree). 
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sentencing range, analogous to the lesser sentence for the passion crime in California.  Also, 
Texas places upon the defendant the burden of proving the factual elements for this reduction.244 
It can be argued that the Texas version is preferable, and I would argue this; in truth, however, 
the structural245 differences are debatable. 
 The California statute defining voluntary manslaughter provides that this crime exists 
when the killing is “without malice” because it arises “upon a sudden quarrel or heat of 
passion.”246 If this were all that there was to it, the definition would be inadequate, because it 
would allow hotheads to invoke the lesser crime whenever they felt passion, without a 
requirement that the passion arise from a recognizably passion-producing source.247 Therefore, 
Pennsylvania248 and California249 are like many other jurisdictions250 in imposing additional 
requirements by judicial interpretation. These additional elements typically fall into four further 
categories: an adequate cause251 underlying the passion, an objective measure of the adequacy of 
 
243 Cal. Penal Code § 192 (West 2005) (defining this offense as occurring “upon a sudden quarrel or heat of 
passion”).  See also LEVENSON § 5:49-5:52 (discussing this degree of homicide); Charles L. Hobson, supra note 
56, at 503-07 (same). 
244 Tex. Penal Code § 19.02(d) (Vernon 2005). 
245 The statutes, that is to say, are functionally different, but only slightly so.  Adjudication is another, completely 
different issue. 
246 See supra authority cited in note 243. 
247 Cf. Commonwealth v. Flax, 200 A. 632, 637 (Pa. 1938) (declaring that although the law has “some tolerance” for 
an act impelled by “a justifiably passionate heart,” it has “no tolerance whatever” for an act produced by a 
“malicious heart”). 
248 See supra note 247. 
249 E.g., People v. Borchers, 50 Cal.2d 321, 325 P.2d 97 (1958). 
250 See DAVID CRUMP et al., supra note 15, at 52-53; see also LAFAVE 777, 788 (offering a different but closely 
similar formulation). 
251 Cf., e.g., State v. Avery, 120 S.W.3d 196 (Mo. 2003) (en banc) (holding that adequate cause “may include 
terror,” but it must be “so extreme that for the moment, the action is being directed by passion, not reason”).  With 
respect to California, see authority cited in supra note 249; as to Texas, see Tex. Penal Code § 19.02(a) (Vernon 
2005) (defining adequate cause statutorily).  See also LEVENSON § 5:50 (discussing California’s version). 
 In most jurisdictions, including California and Texas, the so-called “imperfect-self-defense” theory can supply 
the “passion.”  The coverage in both States is plain from the text of the statutes, since California includes a “sudden 
quarrel” and Texas includes “terror.” 
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the cause by reference to the common (or ordinary or average) person,252 an element of 
suddenness or immediacy that prevents “cooling” of the passion,253 and a requirement that the 
origin of the passion be traceable to the person killed or others acting with that person.254 Thus, a 
perception that the intended victim has been intimate with the killer’s spouse,255 or an attack by 
the deceased that provokes the killer but that does not rise to the level that justifies self 
defense,256 are traditional kinds of adequate causes. But circumstances that would not impair the 
reasoning of an ordinary person, such as the deceased’s resistance to the defendant’s request for 
money,257 or (in some jurisdictions) a nonthreatening sexual advance,258 would not invoke 
 
252 E.g., People v. Steele, 27 Cal.4th 1230, 47 P.3d 225 (2002) (rejecting argument based on defendant’s alleged 
“psychological dysfunction based on traumatic experiences in the Vietnam War” and that “he ‘snapped’ when he 
heard [a] helicopter” because it “does not satisfy the objective, reasonable person requirement” but is closer to 
“diminished capacity,” which “the legislature has abolished”); see also Tex. Penal Code § 19.02(a) (Vernon 2005) 
(requiring measurement by “person of ordinary temper” in statute).  See LAFAVE 784; LEVENSON § 5:50. 
253 Cf. State v. Mauricio, 117 N.J. 402, 568 A.2d 879 (1990) (declaring that the time adequate for “cooling off” is 
not measured by any definition “yardstick” but depends upon such factors as the extent of the passion and the nature 
of the provocation).  With respect to California, see authority cited in supra note 249; as to Texas, see Tex. Penal 
Code § 19.02 (d) (Vernon 2005) (requiring by statute that the act occur under the “immediate influence” of “sudden 
passion”).  See also LEVENSON § 5:51 (discussing California requirement of no “sufficient cooling-off period”).  
 LAFAVE 786 divides this factor into two subissues: (1) that an objectively “reasonable” time to cool off has not 
expired and (2) that the defendant subjectively has not in fact cooled off.  Thus, if the defendant is unusually cold 
blooded, has cooled off in less time than the average or reasonable person, and kills without passion, the offense is 
murder, not manslaughter.  Cf. People v. Pouncey, 437 Mich. 382, 471 N.W.2d 346 (1991) (holding that defendant’s 
own testimony that he was “not angry” barred manslaughter instructions in spite of passion-producing event). 
254 E.g., State v. Turgeon, 165 Vt. 28, 676 A.2d 339 (1996) (holding that “heated exchange” between husband and 
wife did not extend the possibility of manslaughter to killing of “a third party who was not involved in the initial 
altercation,” here a state trooper pursuing husband).  See also LEVENSON § 5:50 (explaining California 
requirement of causation by victim or at least of reasonable belief in causation by victim).  With respect to Texas, 
see § 19.02(a) (Vernon 2005) (declaring by statute that passion must arise out of “provocation by the individual 
killed or another acting with the person killed”). 
255 Cf. Maher v. People, 81 Am. Dec. 781 (Mich. 1862) (reversing conviction for assault with intent to murder where 
trial court excluded evidence allegedly showing assault committed shortly after defendant learned circumstances 
suggesting tryst between victim and defendant’s wife). 
256 Cf. State v. Avery, 120 S.W.3d 196 (Mo. 2003) (en banc) (requiring manslaughter instruction even if jury were to 
reject self-defense where defendant testified to conduct of deceased that assertedly frightened her). 
257 E.g., Caudill v. Commonwealth, 120 S.W.3d 635 (Ky. 2004) (deciding case under Kentucky’s “extreme 
emotional disturbance” standard derived form Model Penal Code; holding that “reasonable explanation or excuse” 
required by statute gain derived from MPC, was not supplied here by recent death of defendant’s former boyfriend, 
or argument with current boyfriend, or drug dependency, or victim’s refusal to provide money for drugs). 
258 E.g., People v. Page, 737 N.E.2d 264 (Ill. 2000) (holding alleged same-sex advance insufficient to raise issue of 
manslaughter; rejecting “homosexual panic” theory).  But the exact point at which to end this rejection of sexual 
advance, and to accept sexual overtures as a basis for manslaughter, is controversial.  Cf. Id. (suggesting that a 
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voluntary manslaughter. A killing taking place days later, after a time of brooding, also does not 
qualify, on the theory that suddenness is more indicative of lesser behavioral control and 
therefore lesser blameworthiness than action taken after mature reflection.  The theory is that the 
delay should have caused the passion to have cooled and the mental impairment resulting from it 
to have dissipated.259 And if the defendant kills a victim who is unrelated to the cause of the 
passion, such as a police officer who properly intervenes, the killing does not qualify for 
reduction to voluntary manslaughter even though the killing of a victim who caused the passion 
might have.260 These limits upon voluntary manslaughter, which are present in many States in 
one form or another, are generally present in California as in the analogous Texas doctrine,261 
although they are defined in California by varying court interpretations rather than by statute. 
 The corresponding Texas provision is analogous but more carefully defined by 
contemporary language in the statute itself.262 The Texas statute avoids the anomalous California 
requirement that the killing be committed “without malice,”263 which is illogical264 because 
 
“struggle” precipitated by the advance may suffice); see also Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975) (discussing 
Maine law construed to allow reduction to manslaughter upon same-sex advance; invalidating Maine’s statutes on 
other grounds).  See generally Joshua Dressler, Why Keep the Provocation Defense?:  Some Reflections on a 
Difficult Subject, 86 MINN. L. REV. 959 (2002) (discussing issues related to sexual advanced as bases for 
manslaughter, including whether the heat of passion doctrine itself ought to be retained). 
259 Cf. State v. Follin, 263 Kan. 28, 947 P.2d 8 (1997) (rejecting manslaughter upon passage of ten hours as “more 
time . . . than it would have taken an ordinary person to retain reason”).  But the time is said to be flexible, and its 
treatment varies.  See supra note 253.  Also, past provocation can be revived by a new episode, sometimes even by 
one that would not suffice by itself.  People v. Berry, 18 Cal.3d 509, 556 P.2d 777 (1976) (wife’s screaming held 
sufficient to rekindle passion based on earlier adultery).  The kind of “cumulative provocation” recognized in Berry 
complicates the cooling-off analysis. 
260 See supra note 254. 
261 Cf. supra notes 246, 249, 251-54, 59 (citing Texas and California authorities).  See generally LEVENSON  
§§ 5:50-5:51 (discussing California limits). 
262 See supra notes 251-54 and accompanying text. 
263 See supra notes 246 and accompanying text. 
264 Cf. Smith v. State, 83 Ala. 26, 3 So. 551 (1888) (explaining that voluntary manslaughter arises because “passion 
disturbed the sway of reason,” not because it “stripped the act of killing of the intent to commit it”).  If intent is 
malice, voluntary manslaughter is not “without malice,” because it is intentional.  But cf. LEVENSON § 5:49 
(explaining California doctrine that voluntary manslaughter is “without malice”). 
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intent supplies malice for murder, and voluntary manslaughter is usually an intentional crime.265 
But this difference probably is not significant in most cases, because the rest of the statute 
implies what the jury ought to infer: that the defendant’s passion negates malice, even though it 
otherwise would be supplied by intent. Nevertheless, the reference to malice is confusing, and it 
is better to omit it, as Texas does. Furthermore, Texas includes statutory treatments of sudden 
passion, adequate cause, the timing element, and the requirement of causation by the victim, in 
terms that are consistent with the ordinary understandings of these words.266 The inclusion of the 
language in the statute itself allows more faithful conformity of verdicts, and of their review, to 
the legislative intent.  The real point, however, is that the approaches of California and Texas are 
not greatly different. 
 But there are two more fundamental differences between Texas and California laws 
governing passion killings. The first is that Texas does not recognize a separate offense of 
voluntary manslaughter at all. An intentional or knowing killing remains murder, even if 
committed in the heat of passion arising from an adequate cause.267 The sentence range simply is 
reduced without redefinition of the crime.268 The second is that the defendant, not the 
prosecution, bears the burden of proving the factors that govern this sentence reduction.269 The 
 
265 It can arise without intent to kill when committed, for example, with intent to cause serious injury or with a 
depraved heart, because these circumstances also authorize conviction for murder.  Cf. United States v. Paul, 37 F.3d 
496 (9th cir. 1994) (authorizing manslaughter for unintentional but extremely reckless killing); see generally 
LAFAVE 776 (giving other example).  But these mental states are effective to support murder only because they 
also constitute malice, and therefore to refer to any of these kinds of killings as “without malice,” because 
committed under heat of passion, seems equally illogical.  In any event, intent to kill is so typically the underlying 
mens rea for voluntary manslaughter that the law of many States assume it as a condition.  Cf. People v. Brubaker, 
53 Cal.2d 37, 346 P.2d 8 (1959) (defining the offense as “characterized by . . . an intent to kill”). 
266 See supra notes 251-54 and accompanying text. 
267 Tex. Penal Code § 19.02(d) (Vernon 2005) (reducing grade of felony to second degree rather than first under 
heat-of-passion circumstances, even though offense remains murder). 
268 Id. §§ 12.32-.33 (defining maxima as life or 99 years for first-degree felonies such as murder without passion and 
as 20 years for second-degree such as murder with passion findings). 
269 The defendant must “prove[ ] the issue in the affirmative by a preponderance of the evidence.”  Id. 
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relevant language is in a subsection of the same section that contains the definition of murder:270 
(d) At the punishment stage of a trial, the defendant may raise the issue as to 
whether he caused the death under the immediate influence of sudden passion 
arising from an adequate cause. If the defendant proves the issue in the 
affirmative by a preponderance of the evidence, the offense is [reduced to] a 
felony of the second degree. 
Some other jurisdictions, such as New York271 and Maine,272 also place the burden of proof on 
the defendant even if they do not eliminate voluntary manslaughter. 
 Although the issue is debatable, one can argue that the Texas treatment of passion 
killings, which Texas adopted after rejecting its former separately defined offense of voluntary 
manslaughter that placed the burden of proof on the prosecution,273 is superior to that of 
California. The killing, by definition, is intentional or at least qualifies to support a murder 
conviction,274 and the passion-clouded mind that lowers its blameworthiness does not change 
either this mental state or the nature of the act. The survivors of the homicide, including those 
close to the victim, deserve a label fitting an unexcused intentional killing. Labeling this kind of 
killing as murder, even if it arguably is of lesser blameworthiness because of passion, may be a 
departure from the historical terminology of voluntary manslaughter, but it fits the label better to 
 
270 Tex. Penal Code § 19.02(d) (Vernon 2005). 
271 N.Y. Penal Law §§ 125.20, 125.25 (McKinney 1990) (providing that “extreme emotional disturbance” reduces 
murder to first-degree manslaughter but “need not be proved in any prosecution” for homicide).  The United States 
Supreme Court upheld the resulting placement of the burden upon the defendant in Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 
197 (1977), by treating the reduction as an “affirmative defense” distinct from the elements of murder. 
272 Maine Rev. Stat. Ann. § 2.01(3)-(4) (West 2003) (providing “affirmative defense” to murder upon proof of 
“extreme anger or extreme fear brought about by adequate provocation,” as defined).  An earlier Main statute had 
defined malice as an essential element of murder that could be rebutted by the defendant’s proof of heat of passion, 
but the United States Supreme Court held this earlier statute unconstitutional because it placed on the defendant the 
burden of disproving an offense element.  Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975).  Later, Maine revised its 
murder statute to eliminate malice as a required element and to substitute “intentionally or knowingly” causing 
death, and it simultaneously redefined the conditions for reduction to manslaughter as an affirmative defense.  
Maine thus conformed its law to Patterson v. New York, see supra note 271, and accomplished the same objective—
shifting the burden to the defendant—in a manner approved by the Court. 
273 Acts 1973, 63rd Tex. Leg., p. 883, ch. 339, § 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1974 (then codified as Tex. Penal Code § 19.03). 
274 In rare instances it may be unintentional but still exhibits the state of mind required for murder.  See supra note 
265. 
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the crime.  The measure of the sentence inflicted on the defendant is changed, however, so that 
the objective treatment of the killer reflects the passion, and thus the law arguably reflects 
relative blameworthiness by confining the consequences for the defendant to a lesser penalty.  
 Placing the burden of proof upon the defendant can be justified by the observation that 
this issue of sudden-passion-from-adequate-cause arises only after the prosecution has proved an 
intentional murder, and it concerns a matter that the prosecution inherently is less likely to be 
capable of proving beyond a reasonable doubt even if it is true: the precise motivation of the 
defendant.275 Often, the defendant is the only one who can offer firsthand evidence of the passion 
requirements. Given that the jury has found, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant has 
removed the most obvious other potential witness (by killing the witness), a requirement that the 
defendant’s invocation of sentence reduction should reach a level of probable truth arguably 
achieves the right balance.276 In fact, modern commentators have called for the abolition or strict 
confinement of voluntary manslaughter.  These arguments have come from writers of widely 
different philosophies: from law-enforcement advocates who see the lesser offense as providing 
a too-easy escape from liability,277 on the one hand, to feminists who argue, on the other hand, 
that it operates unfairly toward women.278 The Texas provision honors the intentions of these 
 
275 One ground for classifying a principle defining liability as an affirmative defense is knowledge and control of the 
relevant information by the defendant.  A particular instance concerns the subjective mental state of the defendant, 
which may be difficult for the opponent to prove.  Cf. Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635 (1980) (holding that good-
faith immunity from liability for civil rights violation is an affirmative defense) (civil case). 
276 Other principles of law analogously treat the proof differently if a party has removed witnesses.  Cf. Fed. R. Evid. 
804(b)(6) (providing that the hearsay rule is subject to “forfeiture by wrongdoing” if a party engages or acquiesces 
in procurement of the unavailability of a witness).  The analogy is imperfect, but perhaps the same consideration 
reinforces the argument for treating the passion issue as an affirmative defense, given that the defendant, by 
definition, has procured the unavailability of the most knowledgeable other witness, and has done so with a state of 
mind that otherwise would suffice for murder. 
277 “[P]rovocation law is under attack. . . . [O]ne might expect law and order advocates to criticize a doctrine that can 
permit an intentional killer to avoid conviction for murder.  Joshua Dressler, supra note 258, at 960. 
278 E.g., Robert B. Mison, Homophobia in Manslaughter: The Homosexual Advance as Insufficient Provocation, 80 
CAL. L. REV. 133 (1992); CYNTHIA LEE, MURDER AND THE REASONABLE MAN: PASSION AND FEAR 
IN THE COURTROOM (2003); JEREMY HORDER, PROVOCATION AND RESPONSIBILITY 186-97 (1992); 
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writers by reining in the passion doctrine, but it does so without eliminating a traditional doctrine 
needed to achieve proper crime grading in the views of other commentators.279 Again, these 
conclusions are debatable, and they are not nearly as important as other comparisons that can be 
made between the statutes of the two States. 
 In any event, what is more important in this area is that California, like Texas, has 
managed to avoid the disadvantages of the comparable crime that is defined in the Model Penal 
Code. Although I believe that the MPC has the superior approach to murder committed 
purposefully or knowingly, I also think that its definition of voluntary manslaughter is both 
vague and inconsistent with degrees of blameworthiness. The Model Penal Code provision 
defines manslaughter to include a criminal homicide that would otherwise be murder when it is 
committed under the influence of “extreme mental or emotional disturbance for which there is 
reasonable explanation or excuse.”280 Even if this provision reads sensibly, it becomes 
indeterminate and results in excusing serious homicides from being treated properly as murders, 
when applied to real cases.  The MPC formula provides “a new, far broader version of the 
[provocation] defense” when contrasted to the “narrow” original concept.281 Nevertheless, the 
MPC formulation unfortunately has been adopted in some States, such as Kentucky282 and New 
 
Emily L. Miller, Womanslaughter: Voluntary Manslaughter, Gender, and the Model Penal Code, 50 EMORY L.J. 
665, 667-78 (2001); Adrian Howe, More Folk Provoke Their Own Demise (Homophobic Violence and Sexed 
Excuses)—Rejoining the Provocation Law Debate, Courtesy of the Homosexual Advance Defense, 19 SYDNEY L. 
REV. 336 (1997); Victor Nourse, Passion’s Progress: Modern Law Reform and the Provocation Defense, 106 
YALE L.J. 1331 (1997). 
279 E.g., Dressler, supra note 258.  See also infra authorities cited in note 287. 
280 American Law Institute, Model Penal Code § 210.3(b) (1962).  The MPC version also expands the scope of the 
manslaughter reduction by providing, “The reasonableness of such explanation or excuse shall be determined from 
the viewpoint of a person in the actor’s situation as he perceives them to be.”  The objective requirement of a 
“reasonable” explanation or excuse thus is diluted by a purely subjective element. 
281 Dressler, supra note 258, at 961. 
282 Ky. Rev. Stat. 507.020(1)(a)(Baldwin 2003).  See Caudill v. Commonwealth, 120 S.W.3d 635 (Ky. 2004). 
 The Kentucky statutes seriously blur the distinction between manslaughter and murder.  Compare Turner v. 
Commonwealth, 153 S.W.3d 823 (Ky. 2005) (reversing “wanton murder” conviction by 4-3 vote) with Id. at 833-35 
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York.283 
As an example of the dysfunction inherent in the MPC criterion for passion-type 
manslaughter, consider the crime of Sirhan Sirhan, who was convicted in California of murder 
for killing Senator Robert Kennedy, the brother of President John F. Kennedy and a leading 
Presidential candidate in his own right.284 Sirhan claimed that he was provoked to commit the 
crime because Senator Kennedy, during his Presidential campaign, had refused to support the 
Palestinian cause in the Middle East. As a child, Sirhan had seen and experienced firsthand the 
deprivations suffered by Palestinians and the conditions they endured in refugee camps.285 If the 
Model Penal Code provision were applicable, the defense could argue persuasively that Sirhan’s 
mental state exhibited “extreme emotional disturbance” arising from a “reasonable” cause, and 
the prosecution presumably would have the burden of disproving this claim by proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt.286 The prosecution’s burden would be inherently difficult to carry because of 
the vagueness in the concepts of “extreme” disturbance and “reasonable” explanation. 
Furthermore, even if the prosecution could have succeeded in proving that Sirhan was not 
emotionally disturbed by a long past event in his life that was at some point a reasonable 
explanation for passion, it seems anomalous to consider lowering the grade of the offense for 
these reasons.  The victim was engaged in the political process in a way unrelated to the killer, 
 
(dissenting opinion of Justice Graves, pointing out that wanton murder in Kentucky “requires wanton conduct with 
respect to both the act and the circumstances, manifesting an extreme indifference to human life,” whereas “wanton 
conduct resulting in homicide” without extreme indifference to human life is only manslaughter). 
283 N.Y. Penal Law §§ 125.20, 125.25 (McKinney 1990).  New York avoids some excessive breadth by placing the 
burden of proof on the defendant.  See supra note 271 and accompanying text. 
284 See People v. Sirhan, 497 P.2d 1121, 1125 (Cal. 1972). 
285 Id. at 1127. 
286 See supra note 280 and accompanying text.  Actually, there could be some doubt that the traditional formulation, 
in California, completely avoids the effect of the MPC in cases such as Sirhan’s.  For example, so-called “cultural 
issues” may be applicable in California, although this conclusion is unclear.  See People v. Wu, 235 Cal.App.3d 614 
(1991) (retroactively ordered unpublished).  Even if so, however, the unlikelihood of extreme provocation in an 
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the triggering cause was of a kind experienced by many people who are not tempted to kill, the 
occurrence had influenced Sirhan only in the remote past, and it seems unlikely that ordinary or 
average people would similarly be rendered incapable of cool reflection. By instead retaining 
common law limits on the availability of voluntary manslaughter, California has prevented this 
kind of result. 
 It should be added that recent years have seen a wide variety of proposals for redefinition 
of the passion or provocation concept.  Some of these proposals are thoughtful and merit 
consideration.287 They are beyond the scope of this article, however, because my objective is to 
compare existing formulations and to do so on a broad front, and this goal cannot be achieved in 
that way. 
B. Involuntary Manslaughter:  “Without Due Cause or Circumspection” 
1. Is the Crime Really Equivalent to Negligent Homicide? 
 The general definition in California of the crime of involuntary manslaughter provides 
that this offense consists of an unlawful killing, “without malice,” by an “act which might 
produce death,” committed “without due caution and circumspection.”288 As in the case of 
 
“ordinary” person, even with cultural factors considered, would seem to preclude the defense, and the cooling-off 
factor would, also. 
287 Within the year 2005 alone, consider Vera Bergelson, Victims and Perpetrators: An Argument for Comparative 
Liability in Criminal Law, 8 BUFFALO CRIM. L. REV. 385 (2005) (proposing doctrine comparing fault of parties); 
Stephen P. Garvey, 90 IOWA L. REV. 1677 (2005) (proposing solution based on “akrasia” theory, which 
distinguishes those who act in defiance of the law from those who act in a moment of culpable ignorance or 
weakness of will); and Deborah W. Denno, Criminal Law in a Post-Freudian World, 205 U. ILL. L. REV. 601 
(proposing modern psychological approaches to conscious will as a replacement for Freudian psychology 
emphasizing the unconscious, which assertedly was dominant in the 1950’s and 1960’s and therefore framed key 
concepts of the Model Penal Code).  See also Joshua Dressler, supra note 258 (proposing a provocation defense 
“based on a partial excuse theory, separate from the diminished capacity doctrine,” not requiring a criminal act as 
provocation but enabling “any actions or words” potentially to qualify, “navigat[ing] a fine line between 
subjectivism and objectivism”). 
288 Cal. Penal Code § 192(b) (West 2005).  This statute also retains the so-called “misdemeanor manslaughter rule,” 
in a provision that covers killing “in the commission of an unlawful act, not amounting to felony.”  See LEVENSON 
§ 5:54 (discussing California’s misdemeanor-manslaughter rule).  There also are a third and possibly a fourth 
variation of this crime.  Id.  In addition, California defines five different types of vehicular manslaughter.  Id. § 5:55.  
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voluntary manslaughter, the requirement that the crime be committed “without malice” serves 
only to confuse the issue.289 The phrase, “without due care and circumspection,” seems to 
suggest that the mens rea is mere negligence—and simple negligence at that,290 of the kind that 
would suffice to support a money judgment in a civil case. The case law provides otherwise, 
requiring a mens rea roughly corresponding to that of gross negligence291 under the Model Penal 
Code.292 This definition closely parallels the provision for the analogous crime of criminally 
negligent homicide under the MPC, which consists of a killing with “criminal negligence,” 
defined as a “gross deviation” from ordinary standards of care.293 Involuntary manslaughter in 
California carries “2, 3, or 4 years” imprisonment, while the similar crime of negligent homicide 
in Texas carries “not more than two years or less than 180 days” in a state jail.294 
Given this comparison of the two States’ laws, and considering earlier parts of this 
article, we can construct a chart showing the general hierarchy of homicidal offenses in each.  
This chart will facilitate an analysis of overlaps and gaps in the two sets of laws.  Thus, murder 
 
These complex doctrines are beyond the scope of this article except for the observation that they would be 
unnecessary in a State with a better constructed homicide jurisprudence. 
289 See supra notes 263-64 and accompanying text. 
290 See LAFAVE 264-67 (distinguishing ordinary negligence from gross negligence and from recklessness); 
LEVENSON § 5:54 (defining California’s criminal negligence). 
291 The negligence must be “criminal” negligence, meaning that it involves “something more” than ordinary 
negligence.  It “must be aggravated, culpable, gross, or reckless [and] such a departure from what would be the 
conduct of an ordinarily prudent or careful [person] under the same circumstances . . . .”  People v. Penny, 44 Cal.2d 
861, 869, 876-80 (1955); accord, People v. Bennett, 54 Cal.3d 1032, 1036 (1991); People v. Ochoa, 6 Cal.4th 1199, 
1204 (1993). The test “is objective: whether a reasonable person in the defendant’s position would have been aware 
of the risk involved.”  People v. Valdez, 27 Cal.4th 778, 783 (2002).  For a case involving jury instructions, see 
People v. Gilbert, 2004 WL 2416833 at 4 (Cal. App.) (unpublished opinion).  See also LEVENSON § 5:54 (defining 
criminal negligence in California). 
292 American Law Institute, Model Penal Code § 2.02(2)(d) (1962). 
293 Tex. Penal Code § 19.05 (Vernon 2005).  See also Id. § 6.02 (defining criminal negligence in terms of gross 
deviation). 
294 Cal. Penal Code § 193 (West 2005); Tex. Penal Code § 12.35 (Vernon 2005).  The sentence in Texas is enhanced 
to that of a third degree felony (two to ten years) upon proof of exhibition of a deadly weapon or conviction for any 
of certain felonies.  Id. 
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in Texas corresponds to both first-degree and second-degree murder in California.295 
Manslaughter in Texas, however, also corresponds roughly to California-style murder of the 
“abandoned and malignant heart” variety, at least if the heart is sufficiently “abandoned” to 
imply malice.296 No crime in California clearly corresponds to the lesser mens rea of conscious 
indifference that is not sufficiently “abandoned” for murder, although the law on this point 
currently is confused.297 Texas would call this crime manslaughter.298 Negligent homicide in 
Texas corresponds roughly to involuntary manslaughter in California.299 Finally, voluntary 
manslaughter in California is analogous to murder-with-sentence-reduction in Texas.300 Put 
together, the comparison looks like the chart below.301 
Defining 
Characteristics 
California 
Crime 
Sentence 
Range (yr) 
Texas 
Crime 
Sentence 
Range (yr) 
Premeditation First-degree murder 25 minimum 
Intent-type malice Second-degree murder 15 minimum 
5 to 99 
Passion killing** Voluntary 
manslaughter 
3, 6, or 11  
Murder* 
2 to 20 
Conscious indifference 
amounting to abandoned-
heart malice 
Second-degree murder 15 minimum 
Conscious indifference 
amounting to 
recklessness*** 
Manslaughter 2 to 20 
Gross negligence 
Involuntary 
manslaughter 
2, 3, or 4 
Criminally 
negligent homicide 
½ to 2 
* Texas murder also includes knowledge, as well as intent to cause serious bodily injury coupled with an act 
clearly dangerous to life.  Both States define certain felony-murders. 
295 See supra Pt. I of this article. 
296 See supra Pt. IIB of this article. 
297 See supra Pt. IIB of this article.  See also supra notes 235-39 (discussing confusion and noting California 
Supreme Court’s recent grant of review). 
298 See supra notes 240-42 and accompanying text. 
299 See supra notes 290-93 and accompanying text. 
300 See supra notes 243-45. 
301 It should be remembered that a chart of this kind must contain ambiguities that cannot be clearly labeled.  For 
example, the line between second-degree murder and involuntary manslaughter in California is indeterminate.  The 
drawing of any line conceals this ambiguity, although the line must be drawn somewhere to make the chart 
meaningful.  For an overview of the California homicide law, see LEVENSON § 5:1 (briefly summarizing all grades 
of homicidal offenses). 
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 ** If the passion fits the statutory criteria in each State. 
*** For recklessness involving conscious indifference but not amounting to abandoned-heart malice, California 
defines no separate crime, although this mental state would suffice for involuntary manslaughter.  California 
also includes misdemeanor-manslaughter.  Both States define certain vehicular homicides as crimes. 
The chart reinforces several conclusions that this article already has reached.  For 
example, it shows graphically the splintering caused by California’s degrees of murder,302 the 
murder-manslaughter confusion created by the abandoned-heart metaphor,303 the correspondence 
of murder-with-sentence-reduction to voluntary manslaughter,304 and the contrasting simplicity 
resulting from the Model Penal Code’s unitary, comprehensive grade of murder.305 But the chart 
also shows something about lesser grades of homicide.  California does not define any grade of 
crime, lesser than murder, corresponding to conscious indifference of the reckless variety.306 
Model Penal Code States, such as Texas, define murder when the defendant’s mental state is 
intent or knowledge, manslaughter when it is recklessness (involving actual awareness of the 
danger of death), and criminally negligent homicide when it is gross negligence.307 This system 
produces a relatively smooth and continuous series of gradations roughly proportional to relative 
degrees of blameworthiness.  California, however, following the Pennsylvania pattern, defines 
no distinct crime of reckless homicide.308 Instead, California categorizes the crime as murder if 
the recklessness is extreme enough to qualify as abandoned-heart malice,309 but only as 
 
302 See supra Pt. I of this article. 
303 See supra Pt. IIB of this article. 
304 See supra Pt. IIIA of this article. 
305 See supra Pts. ID, IIIA of this article. 
306 At least, it does not do so in terms corresponding to the Model Penal Code definition, unless the recklessness is 
so extreme as to supply malice.  See infra notes 312-13 and accompanying text. 
307 See American Law Institute, Model Penal Code §§ 210.2-210.4 (1962); Tex. Penal Code §§ 19.02, 19.04-19.05 
(Vernon 2005). 
308 See supra note 306. 
309 See supra Pt. IIB of this article. 
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involuntary manslaughter if it is of a lesser degree amounting to gross negligence.310 This sharp 
falloff—all the way from murder to a relatively minor offense defined only by gross negligence, 
with no offense in between these two extremes—leaves a concealed gap in the Pennsylvania 
pattern of homicide. 
 This gap, in fact, may explain the anomalous results in California’s dog-mauling cases.  
In People v. Berry,311 for example, where the defendant caused the brutal death of a two-year old 
by setting up a dog bred for killing to guard his marijuana plants, he did not act with mere 
negligence.  Even “criminal” negligence, defined to require a “substantial and unjustified risk” 
and a “gross deviation” from ordinary conduct, seems inadequate to describe his culpability.  
Negligence and criminal negligence in Berry both depend on objective standards, and they can 
be made out by foolish inadvertence.312 The crime in Berry was not one of inadvertence.  
Instead, Berry acted with full subjective awareness of the risk he created, while knowing the 
substantial and unjustified quantum of that risk.  This kind of recklessness is distinct and more 
culpable than criminal negligence exhibited by inadvertence.313 But States such as California, 
under the Pennsylvania pattern, do not recognize recklessness in the form of subjective 
awareness, or actual knowledge of a substantial and unjustified risk, as a mental state separate 
from gross negligence, unless the mens rea is so extreme that it supplies the malice for murder.314 
It is natural in cases of this kind for a prosecutor to seek a charge more serious than 
negligence.  Since murder is the next rung on the ladder in California, and since depraved-heart 
 
310 See supra note 291 and accompanying text.  See also LEVENSON § 5:1 (providing an overview of California 
homicide). 
311 See supra notes 229-34 and accompanying text. 
312 See supra note 291. 
313 This is the Model Penal Code form of recklessness.  See supra notes 226-27 and accompanying text. 
314 See supra Pt. IIB of this article. 
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malice leaves room for it, a prosecutor’s natural instinct will lead to a stretch for that next rung, 
however ill-fitting the label of murder may appear in such a case.  It is understandable, then, for 
a trial judge to read the law as permitting this stretch, and it is equally understandable for a court 
of appeals, seeing no middle alternative to reduction to a mere negligence crime, to approve the 
stretch to murder as the appellate judges did in Berry.315 And then, it is at least forgivable, even 
if not commendable, for a higher court to do what the California Supreme Court did in Berry: to 
deny review, leaving the reinstatement of the murder indictment in place, but at  the same time to 
order the appellate court’s reasoning retroactively unpublished, so that the law is left completely 
opaque.316 Then, finally, it is predictable that a jury given binding legal instructions and a 
reasonable-doubt standard will produce only a negligence verdict, which then must be reviewed 
on appeal under ambiguous doctrine—again, as happened in Berry.317 
It should be added that this murder-skip-to-negligence gap is a practical, real-world 
effect, not a theoretical one.  It is not apparent from the face of the California statutes.  In theory, 
there is no gap; an unlawful homicide is either murder or manslaughter, and it is murder if the 
defendant is subjectively aware and manslaughter otherwise.  But the world is rarely so precise 
in fitting theory, and a factfinder subject to a reasonable doubt standard is likely to balk at 
convicting a defendant for murder when there is neither intent nor knowledge, as in Berry.
Hence, the practical effect is that very serious homicides (which describes Berry even in the 
absence of intent or knowledge) are shoved down to the level of mere negligence, an outcome 
that depreciates their blameworthiness.  Again, this effect is not an intended or theoretical result 
in California, but it is real nonetheless.  It results from the absence of a separate crime below 
 
315 Berry v. Superior Court, 256 Cal. Rptr. 344 (1989) (ordered not published; previously published at 208 
Cal.App.3d 783). 
316 See supra notes 231-33 and accompanying text. 
317 People v. Berry, 1 Cal. App.4th 778, 2 Cal. Rptr. 416 (1991). 
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murder but above mere negligence, that a crime might cover cases such as Berry, such as the 
subjective-awareness reckless manslaughter offense in Texas. 
 Earlier, this article critiqued the Pennsylvania pattern’s definition of depraved-heart 
murder in connection with Berry.318 The present discussion adds another criticism, centering on 
the discontinuity produced when the law creates no alternative below murder except criminal 
negligence.  A conscious-indifference crime as a lesser-included offense makes sense in light of 
the results illustrated by Berry. There may be an understandable historical reason for the failure 
of Pennsylvania-pattern States to define such a homicidal crime, since the conscious indifference 
or similar mental state required for abandoned-heart murder would remain confusingly similar to 
the conscious indifference required for recklessness.319 Lawmakers conceivably could 
distinguish malice-type conscious indifference by some sort of pejorative label such as 
“extreme,” but that adjective seems an illogical qualifier for a categorical mental state such as 
conscious indifference.320 This term, quite properly, is useful precisely to convey an either-it-is-
or-it isn’t condition: knowledge or awareness that  the defendant either does or does not possess, 
with degrees such as “extreme” consciousness seeming anomalous.  Thus, it is understandable 
that the Pennsylvania pattern leads to the absence of an intermediate crime.  At the same time, 
however, the failure to include that intermediate crime produces a gap that prevents proportional 
crime grading.  Under the Model Penal Code, the gap disappears: manslaughter covers the 
conscious-indifference case (recklessness), while criminally negligent homicide covers 
inadvertence (gross-deviation negligence). 
2. Vagueness in the Definition of Involuntary Manslaughter 
 
318 See supra notes 229-41 and accompanying text. 
319 See supra Pt. IIB of this article. 
320 Some jurisdictions do use this term in similar ways, however, including the Model Penal Code.  See supra notes 
380-83 and accompanying text. 
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 Aside from this coverage discontinuity, the definition of lesser included offenses under  
the Pennsylvania pattern sometimes produces unnecessary vagueness.  One disadvantage of the 
California jurisprudence, for example, is that the jury should be given the statutory definition, 
including the “without due care and circumspection” provision, which implies that ordinary 
negligence suffices and therefore conflicts with the higher requirement, tantamount to gross 
negligence, imposed by the case law. This problem parallels the issues raised by the malice 
aforethought criterion discussed in a previous section of this article.321 It probably is not a 
source of injustice if the jury is successfully educated about the contradiction and inculcated with 
the true meaning of the crime, but it still remains a source of unnecessary confusion that requires 
attention and may divert the jury from other issues—as well as a potential source of erroneous 
conviction, in those cases in which the jury might remain confused.  And this confusion, again, 
cumulates with other contradictions, such as those created by instant premeditation and the 
misnomer of malice aforethought. 
 Another problem arises from confusion in the judicial redefinition of the statutory 
formula.  As sometimes happens when the legislative language is so ill-fitting that it must be 
interpreted extensively,322 the California courts have produced inconsistent and varying 
translations of the “without due care and circumspection” requirement for involuntary 
manslaughter.  The prevailing definitions emphasize that the standard is objective, so that an 
inadvertent defendant, who is unaware of or has forgotten the risk, can still be guilty of the crime 
 
321 See supra notes 199-204 and accompanying text. 
322 “[O]ur law recognizes that ordinary negligence is a common occurrence in human affairs, and that even when 
such commonplace heedlessness proves lethal, its criminalization would be undesirable for a number of reasons 
including fairness, social utility, and the hazards of granting excessive discretion to prosecuting authorities to 
capriciously punish where there is little if any ground for moral blame or social opprobrium.”  People v. Gilbert, 
2004 WL 2416533 at 3 (Cal. App.) (unpublished opinion).  Thus, the statutory language, “without due care,” 
furnishes an inadequate standard. 
88
if this inadvertence results in conduct that is a gross deviation from that of an ordinary person.323 
In other words, “pure heart, empty head”324 does not avoid criminal liability.  But there are some 
decisions that seem to suggest otherwise, implying instead that actual awareness of the risk is 
required.325 Furthermore, the California cases use so many different terms to define the mens rea 
for involuntary manslaughter, each with different connotations, that confusion seems 
inevitable.326 
The following passage from a recent unpublished opinion in a case called People v. 
Gilbert shows a prototypical treatment of the issue:327 
The phrase " 'without due caution and circumspection' " means that the 
defendant's conduct must be criminally negligent. The Penal Code defines 
"negligence" using a variation of the familiar concept of lack of due care, i.e., "a 
want of such attention to the nature or probable consequences of the act or 
omission as a prudent man ordinarily bestows in acting in his own concerns." 
However, criminal negligence sufficient to establish manslaughter requires 
"something more" than the "mere negligence" or "ordinary negligence" that leads 
to civil liability.  " 'The negligence must be aggravated, culpable, gross, or 
reckless, that is, the conduct of the accused must be such a departure from what 
would be the conduct of an ordinarily prudent or careful man under the same 
circumstances as to be incompatible with a proper regard for human life, or, in 
other words, a disregard of human life or an indifference to consequences.' . . . 
'Aside from the facts that a more culpable degree of negligence is required in 
order to establish a criminal homicide than is required in a civil action for 
damages and that contributory negligence is not a defense, criminal responsibility 
for a negligent homicide is ordinarily to be determined pursuant to the general 
principles of negligence, the fundamental of which is knowledge, actual or 
imputed, that the act of the slayer tended to endanger life.' "
Thus, to support a conviction of involuntary manslaughter the defendant's 
conduct must rise at least to the level of gross negligence, which is defined as "the 
 
323 See infra note 327 and accompanying text. 
324 This phrase has been used to describe attorney negligence for purposes of sanctions under Fed. R. Civ. P. 11.  A 
signer of a pleading, it is said, cannot avoid sanctions “by operating under the guise of a pure heart and an empty 
head.”  Zuniga v. United Can Co., 812 F.2d 443, 452 (9th Cir. 1987). 
325 See infra note 327 and accompanying text. 
326 See infra note 327 and accompanying text. 
327 2004 WL 2416533 at 2-3 (unpublished opinion) (citations omitted).  Most of the recent opinions are unpublished.  
See infra notes 328-36 and accompanying text. 
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exercise of so slight a degree of care as to raise a presumption of conscious 
indifference to the consequences. 'The state of mind of a person who acts with 
conscious indifference to the consequences is simply, "I don't care what 
happens." ' "
. . . "[C]riminal negligence must be evaluated objectively. . . . The relevant 
inquiry . . . turns not on defendant's subjective intent . . . but on the objective 
reasonableness of her course of conduct." " 'The test is objective: whether a 
reasonable person in the defendant's position would have been aware of the risk 
involved'.”. . . 
The reference in this passage to “conscious indifference” indicate that actual awareness, or in 
other words, subjective knowledge, is required.  This position is supported by authority.328 But 
the reference to “objective reasonableness” indicates, on the contrary, that  “subjective intent” is 
not required.  This contrary position also is supported by authority.329 The references to both 
ordinary and gross negligence are inconsistent, even though a reader might conclude that the 
passage calls for gross negligence by reading it carefully as a whole.  Terms such as “aggravated, 
culpable, gross, or reckless,” although they all have been used to describe criminal negligence,330 
produce different meanings; in a sense, even ordinary negligence is “culpable,” even though it is 
not “aggravated.” 
 The same case, Gilbert, demonstrates the kinds of arguments that  result from this 
confusion.  The defendant had left his son, Kyle, in his automobile, where Kyle died of 
hypothermia.  Defendant contended “that he [could not] be guilty of criminal negligence because 
he forgot that Kyle was locked in the car.”  In other words, “without an actual present knowledge 
 
328 E.g., People v. Bennett, 54 Cal.3d 1032, 1036 (1991); People v. Ochoa, 6 Cal.4th 1199, 1204 (1993). 
329 E.g., Walker v. Superior Court, 47 Cal.3d 112 (1988); People v. Valdez, 27 Cal.4th 776, 783 (2002). 
 It should be added that the distinction between recklessness (which requires actual, subjective awareness of the 
risk) and criminal negligence (which does not, but rather can be supplied by mere inadvertence) is inherently 
confusing.  Undoubtedly, Texas juries must have difficulty with the distinction too.  But the confusion is reduced in 
Texas in that the two terms, recklessness and criminal negligence, are used separately and distinctly, and the 
difference is explained precisely.  In summary, the confusion cannot be dispelled perfectly in the real world, but it 
can be reduced. 
330 People v. Penny, 44 Cal.2d 861, 879-80 (1955). 
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that Kyle was in the car, he could not be charged with knowledge that Kyle was at risk.”331 The 
court rejected this argument as “incompatible with the principles we have just recited.”  The 
“governing question,” it held, is “the objective reasonableness of [defendant’s] course of 
conduct.”  This standard depended not only upon circumstances “of which the defendant is 
presently, actively aware,” but also upon “all of the circumstances of which a reasonable person 
would be aware.”332 Having thus founded its decision on an objective standard, however, the 
court went on to confuse the matter by injecting a subjective standard.  Gilbert’s conduct, it said, 
reflected a “conscious disregard of the lethal risk he had created,” and “[n]othing more was 
required to sustain a finding of guilt.”333 A “conscious disregard” requires an awareness 
(consciousness) of the risks that the defendant disregards, and this passage is flatly inconsistent 
with other parts of the opinion saying that awareness is not required. 
 This confusion carries over into jury instructions.  “Routine” charges in involuntary 
manslaughter cases include the statement that, for criminal negligence, “it must . . . appear that 
death was not the result if inattention, mistake in judgment[,] or misadventure[,] but the natural 
and probable cause of [an] aggravated[,] reckless[,] or grossly negligent act.”334 This instruction 
conflicts directly with the Gilbert holding, which enables “inattention” or “mistake” to be 
sufficient, and it also creates confusion when combined with instructions embodying an 
objective negligence standard.335 The Gilbert jury also was instructed that “[m]ere inattention, 
forgetfulness, mistake in judgment, or misadventure . . . is not criminal unless the quality of the 
act makes it so.” Understandably, the jury sent an inquiry during deliberations asking about the 
 
331 People v. Gilbert, 2004 WL 2416533 at 3 (Cal. App.). 
332 Id. 
333 Id. at 4, citing CALJIC 3.36. 
334 2004 WL 2416533 at 4. 
335 Id. 
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meaning of the cryptic phrase, “unless the quality of the act makes it so.”336 This key language 
provided the exception that allowed conviction. 
 Again, the presence of large proportions of unpublished cases suggests that this kind of 
confusion produces appeals that would otherwise be unnecessary.337 A Lexis search showed  
that nine of the ten most recent cases on point are unpublished and uncitable.338 Juries, lawyers, 
and courts probably would understand the standard better if the Model Penal Code formulation 
were used.  Ideally, this solution would be accomplished by legislation such as that in Texas, 
enacting both a more serious offense characterized by actual knowledge of the risk 
(manslaughter) and a lesser offense requiring only conduct that is grossly negligent by objective 
standards (negligent homicide).  Short of this kind of legislation, however, the California courts 
should follow the example of the Model Penal Code at least to an extent that avoids confusing 
the proper objective standard with subjective formulations such as “conscious indifference.” 
IV. FELONY MURDER: STATUTORY DEFINITION 
VERSUS COMMON LAW EVOLUTION 
 The felony murder rule, stated simplistically, defines as murder a killing caused by a 
defendant in the course of committing a felony, even if the mens rea for murder would otherwise 
be absent.339 At common law, a rough definition probably sufficed, because not only murder but 
 
336 Id. The judge replied, “ ‘[T]he quality of the act’ refers to the nature or character of the act or conduct including 
all of the facts and circumstances surrounding the act or conduct in light of the instructions.”  This highly abstract 
instruction seems less helpful than one that would have defined guilt in terms of gross negligence or referred to the 
existing instructions that did so. 
337 Cf. supra notes 148-49 (suggesting that large numbers of recent unpublished cases applying the premeditation-
deliberation formula to sufficiency and instruction issues means that appellate lawyers are being forced to raise 
issues with little actual merit but of such ambiguity that omission may result in accusations of ineffectiveness). 
338 The search inquiry was “INVOLUNTARY MANSLAUGHTER” & “PEOPLE V. PENNY.”  The latter is a 
seminal decision on the subject that virtually uniformly appears in cases depending upon sufficiency or instructions. 
339 Cf. LAFAVE 744 (defining the concept in terms of “an unintended death during commission or attempt”); 
LEVENSON § 5:33 (defining second-degree felony murder as “homicide that occurs during the perpetration of a 
felony that is not listed among the felonies that can support a conviction of first-degree murder”). 
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other felonies as well were punishable by death, and therefore the details did not matter as much 
as they do today.340 Contemporary jurisprudence seeks to limit the felony murder doctrine, 
however, because it might disconnect results from blameworthiness if applied to the outer edges 
of this rough definition.341 Jurisdictions differ primarily in the doctrines that they use for limiting 
the felony murder rule.342 
Some scholars who criticize the felony murder rule conclude that there is little in the way 
of policy that supports it.343 The most frequent attacks against the doctrine are that it allegedly 
creates a crime that does not correspond to the defendant’s individual blameworthiness, that it is 
artificial and formal, and that it cannot serve its supposed purposes.344 These criticisms are useful 
for evaluating different formulations of felony murder, even in jurisdictions that do not abolish it.  
In other writing elsewhere, I have argued that the felony murder rule does serve important 
purposes and that the limits that differing States have imposed upon it are consistent with those 
purposes, because they prevent the rule from applying to cases in which it does not serve its 
function.345 The policies underlying the felony murder rule, as I have explained them, are that it 
contributes to rational classification and proportional grading of homicides, because actus reus, 
 
Thus, California also recognizes a separate category of “first-degree felony murder.”  The reader will recall that 
California creates a number of situation-specific first-degree murder definitions, including murders committed 
during “arson, rape, carjacking, robbery, burglary, mayhem, kidnapping, train wrecking, or any other act punishable 
under [certain other statutes].”  This provision has the effect of dispensing with any requirement of premeditation or 
deliberation as well as all other mental-state requirements except those required for the underlying felonies, and also 
of elevating the crime to first-degree murder.  See LEVENSON § 5:17 (explaining this doctrine). 
340 See LAFAVE 744 at n.5. 
341 See David Crump & Susan Waite Crump, In Defense of the Felony Murder Doctrine, 8 HARV. J. L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 359, 377 (1985) (hereinafter cited as Crump, Felony Murder). 
342 Cf. Crump, Felony Murder 360, 377 (indicating that most States retain the doctrine, but there are many different 
limiting doctrines). 
343 E.g., Model Penal Code § 210.2 Comment (Official Draft & Revised Comments 1980) (concluding that 
“[p]rincipled argument in favor of the felony-murder doctrine is hard to find); Nelson E. Roth & Scott E. Sundby, 
The Felony-Murder Rule: A Doctrine at Constitutional Crossroads, 70 CORNELL L. REV. 446 (1985). 
344 See, e.g., authorities cited in supra note 343. 
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as well as mens rea, is relevant to blameworthiness;346 that it serves the function of 
condemnation, by reaffirming the sanctity of human life;347 that it serves a deterrent function;348 
that it enhances the clarity of crime definition and sentencing consequences that flow from 
crimes;349 that it contributes to the proper allocation of scarce criminal justice resources;350 and 
that it minimizes the utility of perjury.351 Here, I shall not repetitively develop the arguments 
supporting these purposes or the contrary arguments, although that is a matter for continuing 
debate and could be the subject of a complete article by itself.352 Instead, this article will use 
 
345 See Crump, Felony Murder 361-76 (describing policies that the rule arguably serves); 377-96 (analyzing the 
limiting doctrines). 
346 “Differences in result must be taken into account as part of actus reus . . . . For example, murder and attempted 
murder may require similar mental states . . . . The only difference justifying [more severe treatment of murder] is 
that death results in one but not in the other.”  Thus, “the felony murder doctrine reflects the conclusion that a 
robbery that causes death is more closely akin to robbery than to murder.”  Crump, Felony Murder 362-63. 
347 “[C]haracterizing a robbery-homicide solely as robbery would have the undesirable effect of communicating to 
the citizenry that the law does not consider a crime that  takes a human life to be different from one that does not .  . 
. [:] a devaluation of human life.”  Id. at 368. 
348 “[T]he argument that felons may be ignorant of [the felony murder doctrine] is unduly categorical . . . . [T]he 
general population, including felons, is provably more aware of the outlines of the felony murder doctrine than of 
many others, more common criminal concepts . . . .”  Also, “[t]he proposition that accidental killings cannot be 
deterred is inconsistent with the widespread belief that the penalizing of negligence, and even the imposition of strict 
liability, may have deterrent consequences.”  Id. at 370-71. 
349 “[W]hen the offense is spontaneous, occupies only a brief time span, and is dependent upon mental impulses 
evidenced only by the defendant’s actions, such terms as premeditation, deliberation, malice, or even ‘intent’ leave 
jurors with a difficult judgment.  [This ambiguity] produces disparity in verdicts [and] a perception of 
discrimination.”  These effects “are reduced by the felony murder doctrine.”  Id. at 372. 
350 “[No] less a tribunal than the California Supreme Court has stated this rationale [i.e., that a felon is less entitled to 
‘fine judicial calibration.’]”  Adjudication of the ambiguous mens rea issue in this situation “would use judicial 
resources that could be used elsewhere, in ways that might be more likely to improve the quality of justice.”  Id. at 
375. 
351 “The denial of harmful intent in such a situation is too facile. . . . The law itself is brought into disrepute when it 
is defined so that perjury is frequent.  Jurors might be inclined to lose respect for the criminal justice system even as 
they acquit the defendant on his ambiguous claim of accident, which they disbelieve but cannot reject beyond a 
reasonable doubt.”  Id. at 376. 
352 Thus, many of the articles that cite Crump, Felony Murder deviate from the pre-existing scholarship by asserting 
that valid purposes are served by the felony murder doctrine.  E.g., Dru Stevenson, Toward a New Theory of Notice 
and Deterrence, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 1535, 1595 & n.192 (2005) (describing Crump article as “excellent and 
fascinating”); Mitchell Keiter, With Malice Toward All: The Increased Lethality of Violence Reshapes Transferred 
Intent and Attempted Murder Law, 38 U.S.F. L. REV. 261, 273 & n.36 (2004) (supporting deterrence rationale); 
Sean J. Kealy, Hunting the Dragon: Reforming the Massachusetts Murder Statute, 10 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 203, 240 
& n.279 (2001) (describing as “[m]ost persuasive” the argument that “the rule offers a rational, purposeful grading 
of offenses).  Still, “huge disagreement” exists over mentes reae for homicide and over the theories set out in 
Crump, Felony Murder. Christopher Slobogin, The Civilization of the Criminal Law, 58 VAND. L. REV. 121, 168 
& n.115 (2005).  For continuing condemnation of the rule, see Sara Sun Beale, What’s Law Got to Do with It?: 
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these policies—those identified by both critics and supporters of the rule—as the basis for 
comparing the Texas and California versions of felony murder, on the assumption that, since 
most jurisdictions have retained the felony murder doctrine, the issue whether to retain the rule is 
separate from the question whether one formulation is superior to another. 
 The California felony murder doctrine is not expressed in the statutes. The relevant 
language simply defines murder as a killing with “malice aforethought,” and because that term 
derives from the common law, and because the common law included the felony murder rule as 
an aspect of implied malice,353 the California courts initially retained and applied a court-defined 
version of the rule.  The California Supreme Court later held, however, that “malice is not an 
element . . . under the felony-murder doctrine,” and that the rule in that State arose instead by 
more general implication from the legislative history of the murder statute.354 In fact, People v. 
Dillon,355 which announces this holding, is emblematic of the uncertainty in the California 
statutes that is created by a history of what can only be called sloppy legislation.  The 
 
Influencing the Development of (Federal) Criminal Law, The Political, Social, Psychological and Other Non-Legal 
Factors, 1 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 23, 45 (1995) (arguing that the rule “has received nearly universal scholarly 
criticism” and suggesting that it may be retained because of public attitudes at variance with those of “experts”(!)—
statements that no longer are accurate and that apparently assume that the rule’s detractors have “expertise” that its 
scholarly supporters do not); James J. Tomkovich, The Endurance of the Felony Murder Rule: A Study of the Forces 
That Shape Our Criminal Law, 51 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1429 (1994) (stating that “praise” for the felony murder 
rule would be “disingenuous,” even though to “bury” it would be “impossible”); Michael S. Moore, The 
Independent Moral Significance of Wrongdoing, 1994 J. COMPTEMP. LEGAL ISS. 237, 280 & n.107 (classifying 
felony murder among “unfair doctrines” because although results matter, “they don’t matter that much or in that 
way,” at least in Professor Moore’s view, although others may conclude that “they do”). 
353 Cal. Penal Code § 187 (West 2005).  The court initially applied various descriptors to the relationship between 
the concepts, including that felony murder “presumes” malice, or “ascribes,” “posit[s],” or results in an “imputation” 
or “implication” of malice.  See People v. Dillon, 668 P.2d 697, 715 & n.20 (Cal. 19  ).  In Dillon, however, the 
court traced the history of the statute and doctrine.  It concluded that the statute preserved the felony murder rule, 
but not because that rule implied malice; instead, felony murder was preserved by the general murder statute 
because the legislature had so intended, even though it had repealed the separate statute that actually expressed the 
doctrine.  668 P.2d at 464-72.  The court also held, however, that “malice aforethought is not an element of murder 
under the felony-murder doctrine.”  Id. at 475. 
354 See supra note 353.  See Charles L. Hobson, supra note 56, at 512 (discussing the origins of the doctrine, which 
“has no statutory sanction” but “lies embedded in our law”). 
355 See supra note 353. 
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commission that drew up the statutes repealed the predecessor provision that provided the felony 
murder rule, but elsewhere the commission assumed that it had preserved the rule, and therefore, 
according to the California court, “although the balance remains close,” the Commission indeed 
had preserved the rule, by its expression of intent to do so.  “It no longer matters whether the 
Commission may have [been mistaken]; what matters is (1) the Commission apparently believed 
that its version of section 189 codified the felony-murder rule . . . , and (2) the legislature 
adopted section 189 in the form proposed by the Commission.”356 Although Dillon is well 
written, the need for this kind of roundabout reasoning to discover something so controversial as 
the felony-murder doctrine, in the hidden crevices of a statute whose language has no relation to 
it, speaks volumes about the haphazardness of California’s homicide jurisprudence.  
Furthermore, in later decisions, the court has reverted to referring to felony murder as derived 
from imputed malice.357 This vacillation matters, because pattern jury instructions suggest 
omitting malice in felony murder cases, and it would be nice, to say the least, if such a basic 
issue were made clear so that trial judges could accurately instruct juries.358 
In accordance with the common law, the California court has limited the second-degree 
felony murder doctrine in two major ways: by a dangerousness requirement359 and by what is 
called the merger or lesser-included-offense rule.360 (The rule also is limited in other ways, 
 
356 Dillon, 668 P.2d at 408. 
357 See People v. Hansen, 885 P.2d 1022, 1026-27 (Cal. 1994) (relying on imputed malice without citing Dillon,
which rejected it). 
358 See Committee on Standard Jury Instructions, California Jury Instruction-Criminal (CALJIC) 8.11, Comment 
(flatly directing courts, “do not use” a malice instruction if the charge is felony murder; relying on Dillon, without 
citing the later Hansen decision, which equally flatly holds that imputed malice is an element of felony murder)(!) 
359 See infra Pt. IVA of this article.  See generally LEVENSON § 33-35 (discussing California’s requirement); 
Charles L. Hobson, supra note 56, at 512-13 (same). 
360 See infra Pt. IVB of this article. 
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notably by causation elements361 and by restrictions on vicarious liability,362 but these issues are 
beyond the scope of this article.363) Because these limits are developed in California on an 
ongoing basis by judges of differing philosophies, they are neither fully explained nor 
consistent.364 
Texas, by way of contrast, defines its felony murder doctrine in a statute adopted by the 
legislature, which provides that an actor commits murder if he or she365 
commits or attempts to commit a felony, other than manslaughter, and in the 
course of and in furtherance of the commission or attempt, or in immediate flight 
from the commission or attempt, he commits or attempts to commit an act clearly 
dangerous to human life that causes the death of an individual. 
As does California, Texas thus provides multiple ways to commit murder. This article has 
 
361 California has not required a “strict causal relationship” between the felony and the death, but only requires that 
the death occur “in the perpetration” of the felony or attempt and as part of a “continuous transaction.”  See People 
v. Tapia, 25 Cal. App.4th 984, 1024, 30 Cal. Rptr.2d 851, 873 (1994) (rejecting proximate causation instruction).  
Arguably, however, the “in the perpetration” component sets a time-relationship requirement, and the “continuous 
transaction” component requires a relationship between the felony and the death, and perhaps the two together 
amount to a substitute for causation.  Still, it is easy to hypothesize facts that might produce an unjust conviction, 
e.g., a robber spills a liquid upon which another person slips and is killed by a blow to the head from the floor.  Cf. 
JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 481 (2d ed. 1995) (posing similar hypothet in 
which pickpocket’s victim does of shock).  The California jurisprudence would be improved in such cases by the 
addition of a proximate cause limit.  Although Dressler’s hypothet could not support felony murder  in California 
because of the dangerous-felony limit, see infra Pt. IVB of this article, his point is sound because slight modification 
could produce a California felony murder. 
362 Different States reach different results when deaths are caused by cofelons, police officers, or others.  LAFAVE 
747-55.  The two main approaches are the proximate causation approach, which (simply put) holds the defendant 
liable if the death was causally and foreseeably related to the felony, and the agency approach, which holds the 
defendant liable for only those deaths caused by agents for whom the defendant is responsible, i.e., cofelons.  See 
State v. Sophophone, 19 P.3d 70 (Kan. 2001) (refusing to apply felony-murder rule to death of cofelon whom police 
officer lawfully shot in self-defense; adopting agency theory and rejecting proximate causation theory advanced by 
dissent). 
 The California law, here, is complex.  It basically adopts the agency theory, so that codefendants are generally not 
liable for lawful killings by third parties, but it adds a “provocation” doctrine.  If cofelon A provokes a gun battle 
that “provokes” a police officer to respond by shooting back, and the officer kills cofelon B, cofelon A is liable for 
B’s death.  See People v. Gilbert, 408 P.2d 365, 372 (Cal. 1966); People v. Briscoe, 92 Cal. App.4th 568, 589, 112 
Cal. Rptr.2d 401, 418 (2001).  See also LEVENSON § 5:23 (explaining California’s limitation of felony murder to 
accomplices’ actions). 
363 These issues are complex enough to consume entire articles by themselves, State-by-State variations in them are 
not especially dependent on the Pennsylvania pattern, and hence they are not included here. 
364 See infra Pts. IVA-B of this article. 
365 Tex. Penal Code § 19.02(b)(3) (Vernon 1993). 
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already discussed two of three Texas murder types: murder committed intentionally or 
knowingly, and murder committed with an intent to cause serious bodily injury, coupled with an 
act clearly dangerous to human life.366 The provision discussed here adds felony murder as the 
third method of committing the crime. And as does California, Texas limits felony murder by a 
dangerousness element and by a merger or lesser-included offense doctrine.367 The two States 
differ significantly, however, in their definitions of these limits. Therefore, this article now turns 
to an analysis of these two issues—dangerousness requirements and merger—to compare the 
California and Texas provisions with each other, as well as to consider how well they achieve the 
ostensible purposes of the felony murder doctrine. 
A. The Dangerousness Criterion: Should There Be a Requirement of an “Inherently 
Dangerous Felony,” or of an “Act Clearly Dangerous to Human Life”? 
1. California’s “Inherently Dangerous Felony” Approach 
 The California felony murder doctrine, by court evolution, includes the requirement of an 
“inherently dangerous felony.” It is the felony defined by the applicable law that matters, viewed 
in the abstract and without reference to the individual acts of the defendant in committing it.368 
Thus, a death produced accidentally in the course of grand theft is not felony murder, even if the 
defendant had acted in a manner outrageously risky to the life of the victim,369 and conversely, a 
robbery or arson that accidentally produces a homicide can be felony murder even if the 
 
366 See supra Pt. IIA of this article. 
367 See infra Pts. IVA-B of this article. 
368 People v. Howard, 104 P.2d 107, 111 (Cal. 2005) (holding that the felony of eluding a pursuing police officer” by 
“driving in a willful or wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property” is not an inherently dangerous 
felony).  See also LEVENSON § 5:33-35 (explaining criteria for identifying inherently dangerous felonies and 
listing certain categories adjudicated as fitting or not fitting the criteria). 
369 People v. Phillips, 414 P.2d 353 (Cal. 1966) (doctor of chiropractic who committed grand theft by unlawfully 
practicing medicine and who repeatedly assured parents that minor child did not require surgery, thereby causing 
child’s death, was not liable under felony murder rule). 
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defendant has done nothing particularly dangerous.370 The rule operates by considering the 
category of felony, not the case facts.  
 This inherently-dangerous-felony approach has produced some anomalous results. In 
People v. Satchell,371 for example, the California Supreme Court held that the felony of 
possession of a sawed-off shotgun by a previously convicted felon was not “inherently 
dangerous,” notwithstanding the fact that, in this case, the defendant pointed the illegal firearm at 
an individual and discharged it. This conclusion followed the court’s reasoning that the category 
of felony was to be viewed “in the abstract,” or in other words, without regard to the particular 
facts of the case.372 Furthermore, the court reasoned that the elements of possession of an illegal 
weapon by a felon could be committed in ways that were not dangerous to life.373 This reasoning 
seems dubious, because most non-homicidal felonies, including robbery and arson, also can be 
committed in ways that are not particularly dangerous to life: by a stronger robber, for example, 
who holds a weaker person down while taking her purse, or by an arsonist who burns a building 
known to be unoccupied. Thus, the Satchell reasoning would destroy all felony murder reasoning 
if applied consistently, although that is not what the California courts have done, of course.  
Furthermore, one might critique Satchell by hypothesizing that the California legislature had a 
purpose in mind in prohibiting felons from possessing sawed-off shotguns, and the probable 
purpose was to prevent behavior (namely felons’ possession of dangerous weapons without 
lawful uses) that the legislature must have considered . . . well, . . . “inherently dangerous”! 
 Actually, the court recognized this hypothesis in Satchell. “An ex-felon by his felony 
 
370 People v. Nichols, 474 P.2d 673 (Cal. 1970) (upholding liability for death from arson of a motor vehicle); but see 
People v. Henderson, 560 P.2d 1180 (Cal. 1977) (rejecting liability). 
371 489 P.2d 1361 (Cal. 1971). 
372 Id. at 1367. 
373 For example, a particular weapon can be possessed “as a keepsake or a curio.”  Id. at 1370. 
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conviction has demonstrated instability and a propensity for crime.  Thus, there is a core of logic 
in the assumption that if such a person arms himself with a concealable weapon he commits a 
crime per se dangerous to human life.”374 The court then proceeded, however, to reject this 
“core of logic.”  “[O]ne cannot logically achieve this conclusion that such person [a felon], when 
he arms himself, commits a crime inherently dangerous to human life, unless it also be shown 
that one who so demonstrates instability and propensity for crime is inherently disposed toward 
acts dangerous to human life.”375 A possible response to this logic is, “Huh!?  I thought that was 
exactly why the legislature made it a felony for ‘such person’ to ‘arm himself’ this way!” 
 Furthermore, in Satchell, the court reached its result only by overruling several of its 
prior decisions, in which it had held precisely the opposite: that a felon’s possession of an illegal 
weapon was, indeed, a crime inherently dangerous to human life.376 “At the outset, it is clear 
that this court has unequivocally held on more than one occasion that the offense of [felon in 
possession] is a felony capable of supporting a second-degree felony murder instruction.”377 The 
court then cited no fewer than four then-recent decisions in which it had so held.378 The court 
explained its overruling of those decisions only by reference to dictum that disfavored the felony 
murder rule as “highly artificial” and that concluded that it should not be “extended.”379 Unlike 
other courts, the California court made no attempt to point to any “special” factor that would 
 
374 Id. at 1368, quoting People v. Lovato, 258 Cal. App.2d 290, 295-96, 65 Cal. Rptr. 638, 642 (1968) (emphasis 
added). 
375 489 P.2d at 1368. 
376 Id. at 1366. 
377 Id. 
378 People v. Ford, 388 P.2d 892 (Cal. 1964); People v. Ford, 416 P.2d 132 (Cal. 1966); People v. Schader, 401 P.2d 
665 (Cal. 1965); People v. Robillard, 358 P.2d 295 (Cal. 1960). 
379 489 P.2d at 1364. 
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justify such a deviation from stare decisis.380 This chain of flip-flops stands in sharp contrast to 
decisions in States such as Minnesota, which has upheld the use of the felony murder rule in 
closely similar circumstances involving possession of an illegal firearm by a felon.381 The 
Satchell reasoning shows the kind of unpredictability that suggests that differences in result are 
nothing but political reflections of judge’s preferences.  Satchell thus makes a strong case for 
clear statutory definition of such a longstanding and broadly applicable doctrine as the felony 
murder rule, rather than the kind of casual, tack-and-weave jurisprudence produced by a fickle 
judiciary.  A policy question of this kind should be resolved by the political process, in the 
legislature, not by changing judicial judgments about whether a rule followed by virtually all 
American jurisdictions is “artificial” and therefore disfavored.382 
More recently, the California court held in People v. Hansen383 that the felony of “willful 
discharge of a firearm at an inhabited dwelling” was inherently dangerous. The underlying 
felony of discharging a firearm into an “inhabited” dwelling was defined so that it could be 
committed even if no occupants were present, and for that matter, even if the perpetrator had 
assured himself that no one was at home.384 Thus, the predicate felony was capable of being 
completed without danger to anyone, just as the crime of possession by a felon of an illegal 
 
380 This reasoning stands in sharp contrast to decisions of other courts that have attempted to preserve stare decisis 
by placing constraints on the overruling of established precedents.  E.g., Payne v. Tennessee, 581 U.S. 808 (1991) 
(setting out specific factors that may provide the kind of “special justification” required); Planned Parenthood v. 
Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (plurality opinion conditioning overruling on factors of unworkability, reliance interests, 
abandonment, and changed facts, and refusing, therefore, to overrule Roe v. Wade).  These factors would not have 
come close to justifying Satchell.
381 State v. Anderson, 654 N.W.2d 367 (Minn. 2002) (applying a totality-of-the-circumstances test to consider both 
the felony and the act; rejecting Satchell). 
382 This is not to say that the pre-Satchell decisions reaching the opposite result were correct either.  See supra note 
375.  Those decisions depend upon “abstract” classification of the felony, which separates felony murder more from 
individual responsibility than does the opposing approach of focusing upon the defendant’s own dangerous act.  See 
infra notes 403-05 and accompanying text. 
383 885 P.2d 1022 (Cal. 1994) (en banc). 
384 Id. at 1027. 
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weapon was in Satchell. Nevertheless, without overruling Satchell, and without disapproving its 
reasoning, the court upheld the conviction of a defendant who shot at a residence and 
unintentionally killed a thirteen-year-old girl who lived there:385 
. . . In firing a gun at such a structure, there always will exist a significant 
likelihood that an occupant may be present. Although it is true that a defendant 
may be guilty of this felony even if, at the time of the shooting, the residents of 
the inhabited dwelling happen to be absent, the offense nonetheless is one that, 
viewed in the abstract—as shooting at a structure that currently is used for 
dwelling purposes—poses a great risk or "high probability" of death within the 
meaning of [prior decisional law]. The nature of the other acts proscribed by [the 
statute] reinforces the conclusion that the Legislature viewed the offense of 
discharging a firearm at an inhabited dwelling as posing a risk of death 
comparable to that involved in shooting at an occupied building or motor vehicle. 
Furthermore, application of the second degree felony-murder rule to a 
homicide resulting from a violation of [this statute]  directly would serve the 
fundamental rationale of the felony-murder rule—the deterrence of negligent or 
accidental killings in the course of the commission of dangerous felonies. . . . 
In reaching this conclusion, the court did not consider its earlier dictum disfavoring the felony 
murder rule as “artificial” or refusing to “extend” it.  The approach of avoiding that dictum 
seems appropriate.  Considering the rationale of a doctrine and attempting to follow the 
legislative intent will normally provide superior reasoning, as opposed to relying on vague 
indications of disfavor unrelated to the statutory policy, which provide little structure for either 
applying or not applying the doctrine in a given case. 
 Justice Mosk dissented in Hansen, on the arguable ground that the result was inconsistent 
with the court’s precedents,386 as well as with the more dubious suggestion that a proper 
predicate felony must be one from which death, in any given instance, is “highly probable.”387 
Indeed, this was what the majority had said: the felony must be one from which death must be 
 
385 Id. 
386 Id. at 1036 (analyzing Satchell and other decisions). 
387 Id. at 1035. 
102
“highly probable.”388 Even robbery, rape, or arson would fail this test as predicates for felony 
murder,389 because most robberies, rapes, and arsons do not result in homicides, and thus they 
are not crimes from which it can be said that death is a “high probability.” The court also 
referred to “a great risk” of death, for which drive-by shootings into inhabited residences may 
arguably qualify,390 and it treated this phrase as the equivalent of “a high probability.” To say the 
least, the reasoning in Hansen is muddled.  
 In fact, there simply is no consistency whatsoever in the California court’s distinctions of 
crimes that are inherently dangerous from those that are not. Here is the court’s own list of its 
holdings, from its 2005 decision in People v. Howard:391 
Felonies that have been held inherently dangerous to life include shooting at 
an inhabited dwelling; poisoning with intent to injure; arson of a motor vehicle; 
grossly negligent discharge of a firearm; manufacturing methamphetamine; 
kidnapping; and reckless or malicious possession of a destructive device. 
Felonies that have been held not inherently dangerous to life include 
practicing medicine without a license under conditions creating a risk of great 
bodily harm, serious physical or mental illness, or death; false imprisonment by 
violence, menace, fraud, or deceit; possession of a concealable firearm by a 
convicted felon; possession of a sawed-off shotgun; escape; grand theft; 
conspiracy to possess methedrine; furnishing phencyclidine; and child 
endangerment or abuse. 
It is difficult to see why recklessly possessing a destructive device is “inherently dangerous” 
while intentional possession of a concealed weapon by a felon (or possession of a sawed-off 
shotgun) is not.  Likewise, it is unclear why manufacturing methamphetamine is inherently 
 
388 See supra notes 384-85 and accompanying text. 
389 These felonies still would qualify because they are set out in the first-degree statute itself, see supra Pt. ID of this 
article, but their nonconformity to the “high probability” test arguably exposes that approach as unworkable. 
390 “Great risk” of death remains problematic, however, because it does not answer the question, “Just how great?”  
In the same passage, the court made clear its holding that “great risk” was a relative term, referring to risks of 
similar magnitude to those created by other felonies that are held to support second-degree murder.  See supra notes 
384-85 and accompanying text. 
391 104 P.3d 107, 111-12 (Cal. 2005) (citations omitted).  For a similar pair of lists, see LEVENSON § 5:34-5:35. 
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dangerous while furnishing phencyclidine is not.  And what policy determines that “grossly 
negligent discharge of a firearm” is inherently dangerous, while (intentionally) practicing 
medicine without a license “under conditions creating a risk of great bodily harm, serious 
physical or mental illness, or death” is not?  These are decisions reached without any basic 
rationale, and worse yet, with no respect for legislative classifications.392 
In fact, in Howard, the predicate felony was that of “eluding a pursuing police officer 
[by] driving in willful or wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property.”393 The 
requirement of “willful or wanton disregard for . . . safety” might well alert a court that  the 
legislature considers the defined felony to be “dangerous.”  The Howard majority, however, 
declined to follow this indication of legislative intent and instead found an absence of inherent 
dangerousness in the essentially arbitrary way in which it had done so in the past: by referring to 
felony murder as “artificial” and as “deserving no extension beyond its required application,” 
without doing any meaningful analysis of the proper “required application” of the rule.394 
Two justices dissented in Howard. It can be argued that both were closer to the mark 
than the majority.  Justice Baxter looked to the definition of the offense, which, as he put it, is 
“inherently dangerous [because] it creates a substantial risk that someone will be killed.”395 
Furthermore, Justice Baxter would have considered the defendant’s actual conduct: “[T]here is 
no doubt that the defendant [in this case] committed exactly the reckless endangerment of human 
 
392 Even when the legislation has expressly included a danger of death or near death as an element, as in the last 
example, the California court has denied the existence of that danger.  See also infra note 393 and accompanying 
text. 
393 104 P.3d at 109.  The majority’s reasoning was that a person could commit the predicate felony by conduct 
dangerous only to “property,” and in such a case there might be no inherent danger to “persons.”  But this kind of 
reasoning, depending upon a contrived possibility of violation with no danger to persons, would preclude the use of 
any felony as a predicate.  The residential target in Hansen could have been unoccupied, for example.  This 
approach would destroy the felony-murder rule.  Furthermore, it is difficult to imagine a police chase that endangers 
property without creating risk for persons. 
394 Id. at 110-12. 
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life forbidden by the statute.”396 This approach imports a “dangerous act” or “totality of the 
circumstances” test, which would look to more than the “abstract” felony: arguably, a more 
promising approach.397 Justice Brown’s analysis was more radical, although she “agree[d] with 
Justice Baxter that if any offense should easily qualify as inherently dangerous, [this offense] 
certainly would.”398 She noted that all three courts of appeals that had considered the question 
had agreed with the “inherently dangerous” label, and she concluded that the California court’s 
approach “suggest[ed] a level of arbitrariness we should make every effort to eliminate from the 
criminal law.”399 Justice Brown’s solution:  “I would abrogate the second-degree felony murder 
rule and leave it to the Legislature to define precisely what conduct subjects a defendant to strict 
criminal liability.”400 Although it is doubtful that the court itself should have abolished a 
doctrine that, although judicial in origin, has received such longstanding legislative 
acquiescence, Justice Brown’s suggestion for more precise legislative definition should sound a 
clarion call to the California legislature. 
 The problem, it is submitted, lies in California’s “inherently dangerous felony” test.  The 
term is vague enough so that most felonies will require ad hoc adjudication to determine whether 
they qualify. And the results do not seem likely to reflect the policies supporting the felony 
murder rule as they are hypothesized above.401 In Satchell, for example, where a previously 
convicted felon possessed an illegal weapon and pointed and discharged it at a human being, the 
 
395 Id. at 116. 
396 Id. 
397 See supra note 381 and accompanying text (describing Minnesota’s totality of the circumstances test); cf. infra 
notes 403-05 (describing Texas’s “dangerous act” approach). 
398 Id. at 114. 
399 Id. at 115. 
400 Id. 
401 Compare text accompanying supra note 391 (describing California decisions) with supra notes 346-51 and 
accompanying text (describing arguable rationales of the felony murder rule). 
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policies of reflecting grades of blameworthiness, condemning the taking of human life, deterring 
outrageously dangerous conduct by felons, as well as other arguable policies, seem to support 
invocation of the felony murder rule, assuming, of course, that those policies are validly 
hypothesized.402 And the analysis of the drive-by shooting in Hansen, preoccupied as it was with 
the possibility that the crime of shooting into a residence could theoretically be committed in a 
safe and sound manner, seems to have very little to do with the reasons for having a felony 
murder doctrine, even if Hansen is considered correct in upholding its application to the 
particular felony at issue. 
2. The “Dangerous Act” Approach:  Is It a Better Way? 
 Perhaps a sounder way to use the dangerousness element to limit the felony murder 
doctrine is to require the jury to focus instead on the defendant’s actions in the particular case. 
Perhaps, in other words, the dangerousness limit would perform its function of keeping the 
felony murder rule consistent with its policies if the crime were defined in terms of the 
dangerousness of the individual defendant’s conduct, rather than by reference to the felony 
viewed “in the abstract.” The Texas statute accomplishes this purpose by requiring not only a 
predicate felony, but also “an act” by the individual defendant in the particular case that is 
“clearly dangerous to human life.”403 Through this language, the Texas statute offers an answer 
to critics who argue that the felony murder doctrine separates guilt from blameworthiness.404 
Individual blameworthiness is a statutory element of the crime, at least to the extent that the law 
requires objective dangerousness “clearly” manifested by this individual’s actions during a 
felony.  Inconsistent rhetoric and dubious results in defining inherently dangerous felonies are 
 
402 See supra notes 346-51 and accompanying text. 
403 Tex. Penal Code § 19.02(b)(3) (Vernon 1993). 
404 See supra note 344 and accompanying text. 
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not necessary under this dangerousness limit. The Texas statute thus seems to succeed better than 
the California approach in carrying out the policies of crime grading corresponding to 
blameworthiness, condemnation of actions that take human life, deterrence of conduct that 
creates a risk of death during commission of a felony, and other purposes that can be 
hypothesized in support of the felony murder doctrine.405 The California legislature should hear 
Justice Brown’s message, and it can make sense of the dangerousness limit by defining felony 
murder to require a “clearly dangerous” act by the individual defendant. 
B. “Merger”: A Sound Doctrine, but One Capable of Unsound Application 
1. California’s “Bootstrapping” and “Independent Felonious Purpose” 
Doctrines 
 Another limit commonly found in the felony murder doctrines of the various States is 
called “merger.”406 The simplest example involves lesser included homicides, of which the most 
illustrative is manslaughter. Without a limit on the use of manslaughter as a predicate felony, a 
murder conviction could be obtained by proof otherwise sufficing only for manslaughter, by the 
straightforward (if dubious) reasoning that manslaughter is itself a felony.  It is dangerous, and it 
causes death. The unvarnished felony murder rule therefore converts all manslaughters, 
automatically, into murders.407 This reasoning, of course, conflicts with the crime-grading 
system created by the legislature in defining the crime of manslaughter in the first place. It also 
violates the usual rule of statutory construction, that all language and all provisions passed by the 
legislature are supposed to have some sort of meaning. Therefore, most jurisdictions have 
inferred a limit: the murder that otherwise would result from the felony murder doctrine is 
“merged” into the lesser included crime, if the lesser offense is all that is supported by the 
 
405 See supra notes 346-51 and accompanying text. 
406 See Crump, Felony Murder 377-78.  See also LEVENSON § 5:23 (discussing merger doctrine and its limitation 
by independent felonious purpose doctrine). 
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evidence.408 
This example, however, is only the beginning. Many jurisdictions apply the merger 
limitation to crimes other than manslaughter. California, for example, applies the doctrine to 
assaultive offenses, holding that they cannot support felony murder. In People v. Ireland,409 the 
California court explained its application of the merger doctrine  to assaults by concluding that 
murder convictions based upon assault would amount to “bootstrapping.” The court reasoned 
that “the felony murder rule would effectively preclude the jury from considering the issue of 
malice aforethought in all cases wherein homicide has been committed as a result of a felonious 
assault—a category which includes the great majority of all homicides.”410 This reasoning, in 
turn, has required the courts in California to sort out which crimes are sufficiently assault-like to 
require merger. What about assault that is not merely assault, but that qualifies for the more 
serious label of assault with a deadly weapon?411 Or, for a more challenging example, what about 
discharging a firearm into an inhabited building, as in the Hansen drive-by shooting case 
discussed in the previous section?412 Applying felony murder to Hansen would “effectively 
preclude the jury from considering malice aforethought” in an assault-like case, exactly as in 
Ireland. The California court, however, distinguished Ireland by reasoning that a drive-by 
shooting involves an independent felonious purpose, separate from the assaultive conduct it may 
involve:413 
407 See Id.; see also LAFAVE 760-61 (containing similar analysis, but without using “merger” terminology). 
408 See JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 485-86 (2d ed. 1995). 
409 450 P.2d 580 (Cal. 1969).  See also LEVENSON § 5:23 (discussing application of merger to assaultive crimes 
under “bootstrapping” rationale). 
410 Id. at 590. 
411 Cf. Id. at 589-90 (holding that the same rationale applies). 
412 See supra notes 383-90 and accompanying text. 
413 885 P.2d at 1029-30. 
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. . . [T]he merger rule [is] inapplicable [when] the defendant [has] exhibited a
collateral and independent felonious design that [is] separate from the resulting 
homicide.  [W]e [have] held that where the underlying felony is committed with a 
design collateral to, or independent of, an intent to cause injury that would result 
in death, “[g]iving a felony-murder instruction in such a situation serves rather 
than subverts the purpose of the rule.”. . . 
For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the offense of discharging a 
firearm at an inhabited dwelling house does not “merge” with a resulting 
homicide . . . , and therefore that this offense will support a conviction of second 
degree felony. 
In the same passage, however, the California court also declined to accept the independent 
felonious design theory.  Even if Hansen is correctly decided, this reasoning is unsatisfying. It is 
difficult to perceive any “independent felonious purpose,” apart from the purpose of shooting 
into a building, that is to be found in the unitary act of shooting into a building. But without it, 
Ireland is difficult to distinguish.  Perhaps the answer is that Ireland, which applies the merger 
doctrine to assaults, is wrongly decided. The courts of other States as diverse as Georgia414 and 
Minnesota415 have refused to follow California’s example and have instead predicated the felony 
murder doctrine on assaults. 
 Another issue is presented by burglaries that include assaultive elements. In People v. 
Wilson,416 the California Supreme Court applied the merger doctrine to bar the use of burglary 
with intent to commit assault as a predicate for felony murder. The court used “bootstrapping” 
reasoning similar to that in Ireland to conclude that the merger doctrine applied.417 The court did 
not view the crime of burglary as containing an independent felonious purpose or ingredient, 
even though the entry into the victim’s residence that made out the burglary was arguably an 
 
414 See Wyman v. State, 602 S.E.2d 619 (Ga. 2004). 
415 See Cole v. State, 542 N.W.2d 43 (Minn. 1996) (basing the rule on a felony theft and second-degree assault). 
416 462 P.2d 22 (Cal. 1970).  See also LEVENSON § 5:23 (discussing this situation). 
417 Id. at 26. 
109
independent ingredient.418 Hansen, which was resolved on grounds of independent felonious 
purpose,419 was decided after Wilson, but seems inconsistent with it; if one can see an 
“independent felonious purpose” in a drive-by shooting that results in death, it seems even more 
persuasive to argue that the defendant’s own armed entry into the victim’s residence can supply 
such an independent purpose or ingredient. Furthermore, the purposes of the felony murder rule 
seem to be carried out by applying the rule to a case like Wilson, especially to the extent that the 
underlying policies include the grading of crimes to correspond to their blameworthiness and 
severity. New York has pointedly disagreed with the merger argument in Wilson by observing 
that burglaries of residences involve a high risk of violence.420 The majority of States, in fact, 
follow the New York approach.421 
2. Texas’s Statutory Approach 
 The Texas statute, in sharp contrast to the reasoning of the California court, identifies 
only one felony that is subject to merger:  manslaughter.422 Texas thus avoids the anomaly in 
Wilson of applying merger to a killing during a burglary.423 But there are other anomalies. First, 
what about assaultive killings? The statute does not clearly resolve the issue. At first, the Texas 
Court of Criminal Appeals inferred a merger bar as a matter of statutory construction, as 
California did in Ireland, to prevent the use of assault as a predicate felony for murder.424 Later, 
recognizing that the text of the statute conflicted with this application of merger, the Texas court 
 
418 Id. at 29. 
419 See supra notes 412-13 and accompanying text. 
420 People v. Miller, 297 N.E.2d 85, 87 (N.Y. 1973). 
421 See LAFAVE 762. 
422 Tex. Penal Code § 19.02(b)(3) (Vernon 1993). 
423 See Homan v. State, 19 S.W.3d 847 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). 
424 Garrett v. State, 573 S.W.2d 543, 546 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978). 
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overruled itself and allowed felony murder to be based on aggravated assault.425 Today in Texas, 
in other words, if one feloniously assaults another person but inadvertently goes too far and kills 
the victim, the felony murder doctrine can apply. 
 This result is subject to the criticism that prompted the California court to bar assault as a 
predicate felony by invoking the merger doctrine in Ireland. The assault that the perpetrator 
commits is one course of conduct with the murder, and the “bootstrapping” argument that the 
court there invoked seems to apply.426 As a matter of policy, however, basing felony murder on 
aggravated assault does not necessarily derogate from the goal of matching offense grades to 
blameworthiness. Felony assault, in Texas, is not made out by just any assault; there is a lesser 
offense of simple assault.427 The felony of aggravated assault requires an additional element:428 
the infliction of “serious bodily injury,” defined to mean protracted loss of use of a bodily 
member or organ,429 or the use of a deadly weapon. Thus, the defendant who pleads 
bootstrapping is advancing an unappealing claim. The argument sounds like this: “Yes, I shot the 
victim (or yes, I ran over him, or bashed his head in with a pool cue), but I only meant to maim 
(or to severely injure, or make a paraplegic out of) him. Gosh, I guess I overdid it and killed him, 
but I shouldn’t be guilty of murder!” As is indicated above, a number of other States base felony 
murder on assaults.430 Furthermore, so did the common law, which held that intent to cause 
 
425 Lawson v. State, 64 S.W.3d 396 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001), following Johnson v. State, 4 S.W.3d 254 (Tex. Crim. 
App. 1999). 
426 See supra notes 409-10 and accompanying text. 
427 Tex. Penal Code § 22.01 (Vernon 1999). 
428 Tex. Penal Code § 22.02 (Vernon 1999). 
429 Tex. Penal Code § 1.06(46) (Vernon 1994).  One can argue that felony murder is unnecessary in this situation, 
because Texas expressly defines murder in the basic statute as including intent to cause serious bodily injury.  But 
see infra note 438. 
430 See supra notes 414-15 and accompanying text.  In fact, so does Califoria, apparently—but in a roundabout way.  
See infra note 438. 
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serious injury supplied malice aforethought, if it resulted in death in fact.431 This principle was 
not a part of the felony murder doctrine but furnished a separate kind of common law malice. In 
reading its murder statute to bar felonious assaults that result in death from supporting felony 
murder, the California Supreme Court arguably violated one of its own frequent rules of 
statutory construction, which calls for the court to interpret statutory terms that derive from the 
common law in accordance with the common law.432 
But there are other inferable results that could possibly follow from the Texas statute that 
would not be so easily defended. For example, the crime of negligent homicide433 is a “felony 
other than manslaughter,” and it therefore might be considered as a predicate felony under the 
literal statutory language.  Although negligent homicide is a felony in Texas today, it was a 
misdemeanor434 at the time that the “felony other than manslaughter” language was adopted, and 
this history may explain the evident legislative oversight that created this possibility.  But using 
negligent homicide in this manner would violate the legislative intent for the same reasons that 
using manslaughter would. Therefore the Texas court has barred its use as a matter of 
construction, by a holding that extends to “lesser included offenses” of manslaughter.435 The 
 
431 See LAFAVE 737-39. 
432 See, e.g., Keeler v. Superior Court, 470 P.2d 617 (Cal. 1970) (concluding that statutory term, “human being,” did 
not include a fetus or unborn child, largely on the asserted ground that this interpretation prevailed at common law). 
 Some California courts have, however, found malice in intent-to-cause-serious-injury homicides, even if not 
directly, by stretching the abandoned-heart murder doctrine to fit.  See LEVENSON § 5:8 (discussing case of People 
v. Noel, so holding).  An intent to cause serious injury that produces a homicide does seem likely to reflect 
“conscious indifference” to life in many instances.  But the doctrine remains seriously inadequate.  First, it is 
possible for a homicide unambiguously to show intent to cause serious injury, but to leave reasonable doubt about 
conscious indifference to life.  “I intended only to chop his hand off, not to kill him; but he moved.”  Second, 
evidence may clearly show an intent to injure but not explicitly speak to conscious indifference; e.g., a defendant 
confesses to intent to cause serious bodily injury but not to subjective awareness of risk of death.  Further, the Noel 
holding is that of a court of appeals only; it does not have the imprimatur of the California Supreme Court.  It would 
have been better if that court had followed its own jurisprudence and faithfully incorporated the common law in 
interpreting common law terms. 
433 Tex. Penal Code § 19.05 (Vernon 1994). 
434 Id. (Comment). 
435 Lawson v. State, 64 S.W.2d 396 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001). 
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anomaly thus disappears as a result of judicial interpretation. 
 Another controversial issue—one that persists—concerns felony murder based on the 
predicate crime of endangerment or injury to a child.  As is indicated above, California disallows 
the use of child abuse felonies as a basis.436 Texas, however, allows it.437 Arguments about 
merger that distinguish “independent felonious purpose” from “bootstrapping,”438 as in 
California, would lead to the result that California in fact reaches: a conclusion that, since the act 
constituting the felony of child abuse is an integral part of the course of conduct causing death by 
child abuse, felony murder is barred by merger.439 The different Texas result, however, can be 
based both on different statutory language and on policy arguments.  Texas’s crime of injury to a 
child440 is defined differently from manslaughter, with entirely different ingredients, and it is not 
a lesser included offense.441 Since the text of the felony-murder statute excludes only 
manslaughter as a predicate, fidelity to the legislation is arguably advanced by allowing injury to 
a child to serve as a predicate.  Furthermore, the purpose of child-endangerment or -injury 
statutes, as separate enactments from assaultive provisions applicable to adult victims reflects the 
policy justifications for felony murder.  The vulnerability of children of the covered ages and 
their dependence on adults are a part of this purpose.  Another part is the tendency of injuries to 
children to be based on long-duration cycles of repeated abuse in residential settings that are 
inaccessible to others.  Finally, yet another part of the policy is the difficulty of proving which 
 
436 See supra note 391 and accompanying text.  The California court’s reasoning, however, if based on the 
conclusion that “child endangerment or battery” is not inherently dangerous is dubious on the grounds stated in 
supra Pt. IVA of this article.  The decision may better be described as based on merger. 
437 See Johnson v. State, 4 S.W.3d 254, 256 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999); Ex Parte Easter, 615 S.W.2d 719 (Tex. Crim. 
App. 1981). 
438 See supra notes 409-10 and accompanying text. 
439 See supra note 391. 
440 Tex. Penal Code § 22.04 (Vernon 2003). 
441 See authorities cited supra in note 437. 
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actor among two or more has injured a child, even when the child is unmistakably known to have 
been abused.442 This difficulty is aggravated by the clandestine nature of the crime and by 
privileges443 that prevent testimony from those most likely to know about it.  These 
considerations arguably support the approach of allowing felony murder to be predicated on 
child-abuse felonies. 
 The consequences of the Texas statute do not end there, however. The statute provides 
that the felony of injury to a child can be committed not only intentionally, knowingly, or 
recklessly, but also with “criminal negligence,” which is negligence involving a “gross 
deviation” from ordinary conduct.444 Therefore, if it is used as the basis of felony murder, this 
crime creates a species of murder for which the mens rea may be no more serious than gross 
inadvertence.  The Texas court, in fact, has upheld murder convictions based on injury to 
children supported by instructions permitting criminal negligence to suffice.445 Should this rule 
of law be maintained?  Actually, California allows negligence-based offenses to serve as 
predicates for murder,446 and thus this Texas result is not unusual.  The Texas cases thus far 
generally seem to have involved caregivers of children who have killed them under egregious 
 
442 See Audrey E. Stone & Rebecca J. Fialk, Criminalizing the Exposure of Children to Family Violence: Breaking 
the Cycle of Abuse, 20 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 205 (1997) (discussing state statutes barring conduct dangerous to a 
child); Milton Roberts, Validity and Construction of Penal Statute Prohibiting Child Abuse, 1 A.L.R.4th 38 (2005) 
(same). 
443 Usually, multiple actors, including those who have merely witnessed the events, have reason to fear prosecution 
based not only on affirmative acts but also on omissions, and therefore witnesses frequently can rely on the privilege 
against self-incrimination.  The husband-wife privilege also applies in many jurisdictions.  See Trammel v. United 
States, 445 U.S. 40 (1980) (permitting spouse to refuse to testify). 
444 Tex. Penal Code §§ 6.03(d), 22.04(a) (Vernon 2003). 
445 Ex parte Easter, 615 S.W.2d 719, 720 (Tex. Crimp. App. 1991); Flores v. State, 102 S.W.2d 328, 330 (Tex. App. 
2003). 
 Actually, the California legislature has acted to address the gap left by child abuse homicides.  See Cal. Penal 
Code § 273ab (2006).  This statute criminalizes certain child assaults by caregivers resulting in death, and it carries 
the same imprisonment range as first-degree murder. 
446 See text accompanying supra note 391 (holding that offense of “negligent discharge of a firearm” is a proper 
predicate).  By itself, however, this example obviously does not establish the wisdom of using negligent felonies as 
murder predicates, which remains debatable. 
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facts.447 The cases appear, in other words, to carry out the policies discussed above. 
 But what of a case not involving a caregiver:  for example, a case involving a child killed 
in an outrageously careless traffic accident by an “act clearly dangerous to human life” that is a 
sufficiently “gross deviation” to be labeled criminal negligence?448 That sort of case does not 
appear in the appellate reports, and it is tempting to conclude that felony murder would not 
apply.  But the Texas jurisprudence, read literally, seems to permit it.  And as these words were 
being written, a murder complaint was pending in Houston against a bus driver who arguably 
drove his vehicle with criminal negligence so that it killed a child whom he apparently did not 
see.  The theory of the charge was felony murder, with criminally negligent injury to a child as 
the predicate.  It seems doubtful that this charge was consistent with the legislative intent, and 
arguably this is one area in which the California law is clearer and more consistent with felony 
murder policies than the Texas law. The smart money, however, is on a holding by the Texas 
courts that applies merger to this situation, and one might guess that this anomaly in Texas may 
disappear.  In fact, the grand jury indicted the bus driver only for manslaughter, after the 
prosecutor presented the case as one of recklessness—subjective awareness of a high risk of 
death reflected in outrageously dangerous conduct—instead of a felony murder case.449 Texas’s 
 
447 Consider the cases cited in supra note 445, for example.  In both, criminal negligence was charged along with 
higher mental states such as intent.  In Easter, the proof showed that  the defendant “beat and choked the child for 
about two hours before she died.”  615 S.W.2d at 721.  In Flores, the witness left the sleeping child in defendant’s 
sole care for five to ten minutes and returned to find the child “battered so badly that  death followed shortly 
thereafter.”  102 S.W.2d at 332-33. 
448 The “act clearly dangerous to human life” requirement comes from the felony murder statute, see supra notes 
403-05 and accompanying text, and the requirement of a sufficiently “gross deviation” to constitute criminal 
negligence comes from the injury to a child statute and the definition of criminal negligence.  See supra note 444 
and accompanying text. 
449 The responsible assistant district attorney had “direct-filed” the complaint in district court but continued to 
investigate it without having yet presented it to a grand jury, and therefore it remained possible that a grand jury 
might ultimately no-bill  the defendant or that the prosecutor might decline to present it.  See Rick Casey, D.A. Plays 
Cop in School Bus “Murder” Case, Hous. Chronicle, Nov. 13, 2005, at B1; Rick Casey, D.A. Wasn’t in Loop on 
Bus “Murder” Case, Hous. Chronicle, Oct. 14, 2005, at B1; interview with Harris County (Houston) District 
Attorney Chuck Rosenthal, in Houston, December 12, 2005. 
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authorization of felony murder based on injury to a child may nevertheless remain arguably 
justified in terms of statutory interpretation and policy if the courts prevent it in cases such as the 
bus driver’s, and the question that then would persist would be whether the Texas jurisprudence, 
with its stronger condemnation of killings of children, is superior to California’s approach. 
CONCLUSION 
 The Pennsylvania pattern creates a messy jurisprudence. When one finds judicial 
decisions holding that malice is not an element of a particular kind of murder, and coexisting 
with those decisions one also finds decisions in the same jurisdiction holding, on the contrary, 
that malice is an essential element, something is wrong.450 And the contradiction matters, 
because trial judges cannot possibly know, in the most basic way, what to say to juries in their 
instructions. When this sort of flip-flop persists over decades, in multiple opinions, one wonders 
how jury verdicts or court opinions can possibly maintain any fidelity to the State’s 
jurisprudence. Then, when one also sees that the legislature has repealed a certain definition of 
murder, but that it remains in place because the state supreme court assumes that the legislature 
did not intend to do what it did but instead intended to preserve the particular version of murder 
even as it repealed it, one’s confidence in both the legislature and the courts can only be 
shaken.451 The Pennsylvania pattern precipitates this kind of jurisprudence by its dependence on 
oxymoron, metaphor, misnomer, and ambiguity. 
A. The Legislative Response 
 The Premeditation Criterion: Arguments for Legislative Repeal. In some jurisdictions 
(particularly California), the jurisprudence of homicide seems like a contraption held together by 
duct tape and bailing wire. The separation of two degrees of murder by the concept of 
 
450 See supra notes 353-57 and accompanying text. 
116
premeditation, for example, puts the courts to a difficult challenge.452 To make sense of this 
standard in practice, the courts inevitably find themselves forced to explain to juries that no time 
interval should be required for premeditation. Otherwise, some of the worst kinds of murders, 
those that are bizarre, senseless, and brutal, will merit acquittal of first-degree murder precisely 
because they are bizarre, senseless, and brutal. Hence, the Pennsylvania pattern pushes courts 
toward a concept of “instant premeditation,” or premeditation not requiring any mental focus 
prior to the crime itself. This concept seems to conflict with the requirement of premeditation, 
which implies, at the very least, a need for some kind of prior mental focus.  
 Furthermore, a concept of instant premeditation undercuts the legislative distinction 
between the two degrees of murder. Premeditation becomes synonymous with intent, which 
arguably should be insufficient for first-degree murder, since intent theoretically supplies only 
malice, which in turn is a requirement for both first and second degree murder. In response to 
this anomaly, some courts have attempted to create a jurisprudence of premeditation that 
distinguishes it sharply from intent. Thus, the California court’s decision in Anderson, which set 
out judicially invented “factors” by which to judge premeditation, was an understandable, if 
badly misguided, effort to honor the legislative intent. Unfortunately, the court thus forced 
premeditation into a Procrustean bed, such that the definition meant that some of the most 
aggravated murders required acquittal of first degree. It also distorted the legislative intent. 
 The ostensible solution to this dilemma is to paper over the problem. The courts can keep 
ill-fitting decisions in place but announce that they have the status only of guidelines, and they 
can instruct juries on premeditation in ways that undercut it by equating it, in effect, to intent. 
 
451 See supra note 356 and accompanying text. 
452 See supra notes 135-41 and accompanying text. 
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This is the result that California unfortunately has reached with decisions such as Perez,453 and in 
fact it is a result shared at least to some degree, with variations, in other jurisdictions. The trouble 
is, this approach muddles the standard. It requires litigation of the first-degree issue up and down 
the appellate ladder in virtually every case. It wastes millions of dollars’ worth of scarce criminal 
justice resources that could be dedicated instead to better policing, victim-witness services, or 
improvement of prison conditions. It detracts from the coherent presentation of other appellate 
issues that might be more meritorious. At the trial level, it results in instructions that create a 
confusing non-standard. California has pretended that this confusion is not a problem by labeling 
it, euphemistically, as jury “discretion.” Instead, the result is lawlessness. Juries can reach results 
only by applying their own philosophies of crime seriousness, producing disparity and 
arbitrariness. In doing so, they are free to hinge their decisions on invidious criteria. 
 Degrees of Murder: The Case for Abolition. If this condition were the result of a 
necessary concept, one that furthered sound policies of criminal justice, it might be tolerable. But 
the premeditation standard is not necessary; it is not even helpful. Both ancient and modern 
critics have explained persuasively why premeditation is a dysfunctional method of separating 
the most serious homicides from lesser ones. The drafters of the Model Penal Code concluded 
that beyond a requirement of knowledge or intent, “no further grading distinctions . . . can 
usefully be made . . . .”454 A focus upon premeditation simply produces bad crime grading.  This 
critique is not new. The great historian James Fitzjames Stephen expressed it in similar terms 
almost 150 years ago, and commentators in the 2000’s have done the same.455 The message is a 
simple one: the Pennsylvania pattern has outlived its usefulness, and it should be scrapped.  
 
453 See supra notes 142-43 and accompanying text. 
454 Comment, Model Penal Code § 210.2 (Official Draft and Revised Comments 1980). 
455 See supra notes 101-02 and accompanying text. 
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 Attempts to divide the crime of murder into pigeonholes outstrip our ability to use words 
of sufficient precision to achieve the goal. Justice Cardozo doubted the ability of juries to apply 
the fine standard implicit in the idea of premeditation.456 One might modify that message to say, 
with less lawyer-oriented egocentrism, that lawgivers cannot compress all of the relevant factors 
into a premeditation standard that will enable juries to separate murder rationally into degrees. 
The ancient function of the Pennsylvania pattern, to confine the death penalty, is now 
accomplished by separate definitions and factors adapted more directly to that goal.457 A single 
degree of murder is preferable, and the legislatures should enact this change. 
 Malice Aforethought: An Unnecessary Distractant. At the same time, the Pennsylvania 
pattern depends upon the multivariate concept of “malice aforethought.”458 The double misnomer 
that these words convey produces confusion at best and arbitrariness at worst. Jurors in homicide 
cases often must navigate through instructions containing multiple concepts of murder, multiple 
lesser included offenses, and multiple defenses, each depending on multiple elements.  The result 
is that they must apply literally dozens of technical but similar-sounding legalisms. The 
cumulative confusion unnecessarily added by the superfluous term, “malice aforethought,” can 
only furnish a distraction. The misnomer inherent in this language can be addressed by firm 
direction to the jury to ignore these words because they do not mean what they say, but the jury-
education effort that goes into this non-issue is lost to other important concepts that the jury 
should master.  People can absorb only so many twists and turns in a finite time. Besides, a 
charge that requires the jury to ignore words given by the judge, because they are meaningless, 
seems unwise in the extreme; one might well fear that this approach would create disrespect for 
 
456 BENJAMIN CARDOZO, LAW AND LITERATURE AND OTHER ESSAYS 99-100 (1931). 
457 See supra note 15 and accompanying text. 
458 See supra Pt. II of this article. 
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other parts of the charge. Jurors may wonder, “Is the definition of intent similarly meaningless, 
or is the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt something to be ignored too?,” if they are 
told that solemn terms such as malice aforethought are devoid of significance.  
 Again, this effect would be tolerable if the malice terminology were useful. But it is only 
a historical appendage, an atavistic relic. The jury necessarily must be instructed separately about 
the meaning of express malice, or intent, and implied malice, or depraved-heart murder. Malice 
adds nothing to those instructions. It can be removed from the judge’s charge without any loss of 
meaning. The charge would be improved if the legislature were to mandate this result and to tell 
the courts to instruct solely on intent and depraved-heart murder. 
 Depraved-Heart Murder:  A Dysfunctional Concept and a Gap in Crime Definition. 
But another difficulty with the malice standard is that it includes the depraved-heart variety of 
the crime. Adjudication by metaphor is a bad idea. A metaphor is a species of analogy, and thus 
it is inferior to definition when precision is important.459 In fact, metaphor is a literary device, 
one that achieves fuzzy truths precisely by confusing disparate concepts. The depraved-heart 
formula enables the jury to set its own standard by guessing just how depraved is “depraved,” 
and thus it inevitably must create disparity and arbitrariness. It invites jurors to consider what 
they do not like about the defendant in ways extrinsic to any crime definition and then to use that 
pure dislike to return a verdict of murder. It even invites the use of invidious criteria. The best 
solution to this problem is legislative: to repeal the depraved-heart formula and to substitute for it 
a standard with greater precision, such as subjective awareness of a high degree of risk or 
conscious indifference, coupled with causally dangerous behavior. Better yet, the legislature 
could follow the Model Penal Code by reserving the label of murder for intentional and knowing 
 
459 See supra Pt. IIB of this article. 
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killings, with certain supplementary provisions, and by placing the lesser label of manslaughter, 
instead of murder, upon reckless but unintended killings with subjective awareness of risk.460 
The inclusion of depraved-heart killings in the category of murder means that the 
Pennsylvania pattern creates another kind of anomaly. The result of placing reckless killings 
(those that are unintentional but committed with subjective awareness of risk) into the category 
of murder, and creating a lesser included offense that drops the standard all the way down to 
criminal negligence, is that a gap appears in the hierarchy of offenses, and the levels of homicide 
cease to correspond to levels of blameworthiness. Crimes that are not comparable to murders, but 
that are more serious than negligent homicides, are assigned to no category reflecting their 
seriousness.  
 The dog-mauling cases in California are examples. Some of these cases unmistakably 
exhibit mentes reae more serious than mere negligence. When actors consciously expose 
innocent bystanders to animals bred to kill, with awareness of the risk they create and with 
indifference to it, their subjective mental states are more culpable than negligence. Their crime is 
not the minor version of homicide corresponding to that lesser mens rea. Therefore, one can 
expect competent prosecutors, who seek to obtain justice in such cases, to attempt to categorize 
these crimes as murders, especially since they fit the depraved-heart metaphor and  supply the 
subjective awareness component that usually is given as a companion instruction in second-
degree murder cases. But the crime of murder seems ill-fitting to address conduct of this kind. 
These kinds of offenses fit neither the negligence standard nor the label of murder, no matter 
which of these categories is ultimately chosen, the judgment will represent a stretch. There 
should be a separate crime of manslaughter that covers a mental state between that of intent and 
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knowledge at the high end and that of negligence at the low end. This result, however, can be 
achieved only by legislation. The Model Penal Code shows one way to do it.461 
Voluntary Manslaughter: Legislation That Retains the Common Law. There is one 
place, however, where the ancient standards that usually accompany the Pennsylvania pattern are 
superior to modern conceptions such as the Model Penal Code. Voluntary manslaughter in the 
MPC depends upon a mental state of “extreme mental or emotional disturbance” for which there 
is a “reasonable explanation or excuse.”462 This standard might exonerate, say, a political 
terrorist from a conviction for mass murder, if the terrorist were to act from deviant versions of 
religious beliefs that are a “reasonable explanation” of the actor’s emotional disturbance.  The 
MPC’s definition is too diffuse: it is both vague in application and excessively broad in 
coverage. Many Pennsylvania-pattern States, including California, have avoided this result by 
retaining the historical formulation of voluntary manslaughter, which in this instance is a better 
fit.  
 The common law tradition reduces the grade of a passion offense in a way that is 
confined to the policy of recognizing human frailty. It is a doctrine of forgiveness that is 
deontological463 in nature, rather than utilitarian; it interferes, in fact, with the utilitarian 
foundations of sentencing and should be confined to instances in which it is needed for fair crime 
grading. The common law achieves this result by confining the lesser offense to sudden passion 
that arises from an adequate cause, measured objectively, close in time to the homicide, and 
precipitated by the victim. A few States, unfortunately,  have instead adopted the MPC approach. 
The common law approach, which can be either codified or preserved by decision, is preferable. 
 
461 See supra note 307 and accompanying text. 
462 Model Penal Code § 210.3(1)(b) (1962). 
463 See Joshua Dressler, supra note 258, at 959-63. 
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It is arguable that improvements could be achieved by retaining the murder label and adjusting 
only the sentence and by defining the conditions for the reduction as an affirmative defense so 
that the burden of proof is placed upon the defendant. These issues are less important, however, 
and more debatable than the fundamental definition of the concept. 
 Felony Murder: Legislative Revision. Most States have preserved the felony murder 
doctrine, possibly because of the policies that it arguably serves. At the same time, the doctrine 
can result in crime definition that deviates unacceptably from blameworthiness if it is 
insufficiently limited, and the arguments of the critics thus are also important in defining its 
contours. This article takes no position on the question whether the doctrine should be preserved, 
but assumes from current conditions that most jurisdictions will choose to retain it. The 
remaining question, then, concerns the definition of felony murder. How can it best be described 
so that it carries out its arguable functions, while minimizing the degree to which some of its 
applications might detract from the connection between crime and blameworthiness? 
 First, freeing felony murder from the common law of malice is desirable for the same 
reasons that it is desirable in other cases.464 The jury should not be told that “implied malice” 
arises from felony murder conditions; instead, it should be instructed more straightforwardly: to 
convict the defendant of murder if the conditions are proved beyond a reasonable doubt, and to 
acquit if not.  Second, the “inherently dangerous felony” doctrine is unworkable and should be 
replaced, in those States that use it, by legislation requiring “an act clearly dangerous to human 
life” or the equivalent. The dangerous felony approach results in classifications devoid of 
rationality and conflicting with each other.465 It invites nonsensical translations, such as 
California’s “high probability of death” standard, which few felonies would meet even among 
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those that concededly are “dangerous.”  The dangerous act approach, on the other hand, serves 
such arguable policies as consistent crime grading, upholding the sanctity of life, deterring 
dangerous acts, and simplifying crime definition. At the same time, since it depends upon the 
conduct of the individual defendant, the dangerous act formula avoids disconnecting individual 
culpability from assignment of guilt, and thus it addresses the most consistent issue raised by 
felony-murder critics.  
 A third issue raised by the common law of felony murder is the merger doctrine. States 
that define felony murder by statute and that confine merger to manslaughter raise difficult issues 
of crime grading by allowing negligently committed felonies to serve as predicates for murder 
convictions. To some extent, this difficulty is mitigated by the requirement of an act clearly 
dangerous to human life, which imposes a requirement that confines felony murder in a 
relatively consistent way.466 Also, by construction, courts can extend merger to lesser included 
offenses within manslaughter, such as negligent homicide. A more difficult question is created 
by felony murder that is predicated on criminally negligent child injury or on aggravated assault. 
Texas allows both of these predicates, while California allows neither. Textual and policy 
arguments support Texas’s approach, but the arguments of critics against felony murder support 
California’s approach since they seem most applicable to murder convictions predicated on 
crimes of criminal negligence. At the same time, California’s application of merger to assault, 
without the provision of a serious-bodily-injury means of committing murder, is inconsistent 
with the common law that California purports to apply, and its extension of the prohibition to 
assaultive burglaries is inconsistent with the goal of maximizing the achievement of underlying 
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policies as well as contrary to the majority rule.467 
The Case for Comprehensive Legislative Redefinition. Legislation to correct these 
anomalies under the Pennsylvania pattern is highly desirable. They result in both vagueness and 
poor definition of homicidal crimes. Sound legislation would abolish degrees of murder and the 
premeditation-deliberation formula. It would abolish the antiquated and dysfunctional symbol of 
malice aforethought, together with the depraved-heart variety of murder that it implies. In place 
of these concepts, it would define murder by intent or knowledge. Sound legislation would also 
include a type of murder based on serious assaults, those intended to produce serious bodily 
injury, defined as lasting loss of a body feature. A good statute also would recognize passion 
circumstances in a provision confined by legislatively codified common law restrictions, either 
in the form of a separate crime of voluntary manslaughter or as a sentence-range reduction. 
 For homicides not involving intent or passion, sound legislation would create an 
intermediate lesser-included crime of involuntary manslaughter, characterized by conscious 
indifference to life: a crime committed with actual awareness of a major risk of death. It might 
also create a lesser crime of negligent homicide, requiring criminal negligence and depending 
upon a gross deviation from ordinary conduct, but capable of being supplied by highly 
inexcusable inadvertence. Finally, if the jurisdiction retains the felony-murder rule, its legislature 
should replace the “inherently dangerous felony” doctrine with a requirement of “an act clearly 
dangerous to human life.” It should carefully consider and describe which felonies are to be 
excluded by merger from serving as predicates. Lesser-included offenses are the first candidates 
for this merger list. The merged offenses also can sensibly include assault as a prohibited 
predicate if murder is separately defined to include killings with intent to cause serious bodily 
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injury. And arguably, crimes committed only by negligence should be excluded, although child 
injury resulting in death poses a set of policy considerations that might merit its exception from 
the exclusion. 
B. Adjudication:  Without Legislation, How Can the Courts Improve Their Jurisprudence? 
 Premeditation: Making Sense of Its Incoherence. In the meantime, some issues can be 
dealt with by judicial evolution. For example, until the legislature is persuaded to act, courts 
adjudicating the Pennsylvania pattern should forthrightly recognize that complete rationality 
cannot be achieved together with fidelity to the legislation. As California has demonstrated, 
efforts to protect the distinction between intent and premeditation by judicially invented factors 
lead to irrational results. A better solution is to rely on the terms “premeditation” and 
“deliberation” themselves; to tell juries that no time requirement is implied; to avoid complex 
attempts to translate these terms into other terminology that is not contained in the statutes; and 
to tolerate the apparent oxymoron created by the possibility of instantaneous premeditation, as 
well as the difficulty of distinguishing intent.468 This approach may well be the one that 
California finally has chosen to follow. If so, however, California should make a clean break 
from the mistake it made in People v. Anderson by overruling that decision.  
 Malice Aforethought: Conceptual Definition, without Misnomer. Simultaneously, 
courts subject to the Pennsylvania pattern could dispense with the inclusion in jury instructions 
of the misleading symbol created by the phrase, “malice aforethought.” Legislation here should 
not be necessary because the function of jury instructions is to enable jurors to apply the law 
consistently to the facts they find.  Nothing of value is added by the words “malice 
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aforethought,” and they interfere with jurors’ understanding of the mens rea for murder.469 
Worse yet, they endanger acceptance of the rest of the charge by implicitly suggesting that the 
judge’s instructions contain terms that are to be ignored. Full conveyance of the meaning of 
malice aforethought can be achieved by a charge that tells the jury about intent as one possible 
mens rea for murder, together with other modalities for supplying the mens rea if they are 
applicable. Nothing is lost by this approach, and the double misnomer contained in the ancient 
phrase “malice aforethought” then no longer would create confusion. 
 Depraved-Heart Malice: Abandoning the Metaphor. The branch of malice 
encompassing the depraved heart formula is more difficult to deal with in the absence of 
legislation, but it merits the same basic judicial treatment. Courts subject to the Pennsylvania 
pattern, with its archaic element of malice, are required as a matter of fidelity to legislative 
language to honor the kind of murder that the depraved-heart metaphor creates. But as with 
malice, there is no good reason to continue to use the precise language, “depraved heart,” or 
“abandoned and malignant heart.”470 Usually, when jury instructions are given, the depraved-
heart terminology is accompanied by more precise language requiring an element such as 
extreme recklessness, which in turn is made out by a subjective, actual awareness of a high risk 
of death, or a conscious indifference to that risk, combined with conduct that causally produces a 
homicide. Jury instructions based on these concepts would preserve the meaning of depraved-
heart murder without inviting the potential abuses that could follow from jury concentration on 
the depraved-heart terminology.  
 There is little that the courts can do, however, to remedy the legislatively created 
anomaly that results when depraved heart murder either overlaps with a kind of manslaughter 
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that also is defined by recklessness, or when there is no intermediate crime between murder and 
homicides committed by mere negligence. Legislation is probably required in these 
circumstances to create a hierarchy of crimes that corresponds better to grades of seriousness.471 
The courts can, however, make sure that the rules are clear. In California, where both of these 
disadvantages are inherent in the jurisprudence—that is, where there is a gap between murder 
and a lesser crime defined by criminal negligence, and there also is overlap, because the term 
“recklessness” is confusingly applied to both—the California court could improve both the 
proportionality and the clarity of these crimes by clearly holding that subjective awareness of 
risk is required for the greater offense while gross negligence in the form of highly inexcusable 
inadvertence suffices for the lesser. 
 Felony Murder: Preserving Both Its Purposes and Its Connection to Blameworthiness. 
Courts that still use the dangerous felony approach to felony murder should overrule it. This is a 
court-created doctrine, one that furnishes an adjunct to a court-created type of murder.472 Its 
abolition would meet even stringent standards for departure from stare decisis, since it has 
proved transparently unworkable.473 In its place, these courts could adopt the dangerous act 
approach instead. This replacement test would focus upon the conduct of the individual 
defendant in the particular case, requiring that this conduct include “an act clearly dangerous to 
human life,” instead of isolating the formal elements of the felony “in the abstract.” Other courts 
have adopted this kind of test as a matter of common law evolution. It is capable of more 
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consistent results than the dangerous felony approach, and it carries out the policies that arguably 
support the felony murder rule with less violation of the concern for disconnection between 
culpability and conviction that critics of the rule raise. 
 The Incompleteness of Judicial Solutions. But legislation reforming homicide laws 
from top to bottom is a better path for States subject to the Pennsylvania pattern. The tug of stare 
decisis, as well as the terms of the existing legislation, will prevent courts from rationalizing 
many of the most serious disadvantages. To return to an observation that appeared near the 
beginning of this article, Texas revised its homicide laws in 1973 as part of a comprehensive 
reform based on the Model Penal Code.474 The result was neither easy nor cost-free. But today, 
the people of my State have homicide laws that mean what they say, reflect the people’s values, 
and correspond to degrees of blameworthiness. States that struggle to do justice under the 
strictures of the Pennsylvania pattern should do the same.  
474 See supra notes 12-14 and accompanying text. 
